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Subslug:

[Italicized passages are recorded]

### FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:

- [Italicized passages are recorded]
- (Text) The Cardoen-Bell helicopter has been designed exclusively to serve as a civilian multipurpose aircraft. This was stated by Raul Montecino, public relations chief of Cardoen Industries. He was referring to reports from European newspapers that connected the death of British journalist (Jonathan Miles) in Santiago to the development of helicopter gunships in Chile.
- 3. Montecino said that the 206L helicopter is undergoing technical inspection in (?Fort Ord), United States, by a Federal organization. The aircraft could not undergo this inspection if it were a combat aircraft, since the Kennedy Amendment, thus forbids so.
- (Reporter) Could this multipurpose aircraft have military uses?
- [Montecino] Any means of transportation could have military applications, depending on what you want it for. However, the Cardoen-Bell helicopter has been designed exclusively as a multipurpose civilian aircraft.
- The Cardoen Industry spokesman denied that his company is holding-\* talks with other countries to sell the 206L helicopter for combat purposes. He added that the company is waiting to finish building a

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prototype to carry out marketing studies. It is thought that once in the market, the Cardoen-Bell helicopter will cost \$2.5 million, one third of what a similar aircraft would cost if it were built in other countries, for example the FRG. The clients for this helicopter will mainly be third-world countries. He reiterated that Cardoen has not tried to offer the helicopter to Iraq.

- 7. When asked about the relation between Cardoen Industries and British journalist (Jonathan Miles) who was found hanged in his room at the Carrera Hotel on 31 March, Montecinos answered that relations with him were the same as with other journalists.
- 8. [Reporter] What relation did British journalist (Jonathan Miles) have with Cardoen Industries, since it is known that his last activity in Santiago was to prepare an article about the construction of this helicopter?
- 9. [Montecino] The relation we had with this unfortunate journalist was no different from the one we had with other journalists during the FIDA [International Air Fair]. More than 130 journalists came to us, not only to ask for details but to [words indistinct] of the helicopter which was the center of attraction of our stand. He was not different from the other journalists who came from all parts of the world.
- The Cardoen spokesman said he does not believe that the British journalist was after industrial secrets.
- 11. [Montecinos] I do not think so, because our design is so modest in the international field of helicopter technology that it would seem childish to seek a secret where there is none.
- 12. The death of British journalist (Jonathan Miles), editor of the specialized weapons magazine (name indistinct) is currently being investigated by Criminal Judge Alejandro Solis. The judge ordered the Investigative Police to carry out some investigations after an autopsy on the British journalist revealed that he had taken tranquilizers.

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT
FOR

ASSESSMENT OF PERSIAN GULF ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE

20 June 1991

ICS 3641-91

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### Executive Highlights

- This report to the Congress conveys the findings of an Intelligence Community task force established expressly to evaluate the capabilities of National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) assets to contribute to US Government assessments of the nature, impact, and extent of environmental damage resulting from oil fires and spills in Kuwait.
- O Director of Central Intelligence priorities that guide the Community's collection and analytic efforts are consistent with the high-level of interest US policymakers have expressed in environmental damage from Iraqi sabotage of Kuwait oil facilities.
- o The task force concludes that the fires are presently of foremost concern, and that the most immediate requirement of environmental scientists and analysts is for systematic collection of data pertaining to rates of emission and combustion, and the chemical composition of the pollutants which result.
- Computer models used to simulate and project dispersion patterns for atmospheric pollutants are available to, and have been applied to, the Kuwaiti problem by both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories.
- o The task force ascertained that the NFIP possesses no unique collection resources able to <u>quickly</u> resolve the existing uncertainties over both the quantities and the qualities of burning oil from the Kuwaiti fields.
- Community analysts do believe, however, that meticulous study of data collected by civil satellites and national technical means will eventually produce accurate estimates of the rates at which oil has burned, and the amount. Technically innovative collection concepts have been proposed, and are being evaluated within the Community, which would enable intelligence sensors designed for other purposes to be applied in ways which might abet this process.
- O It is uniformly agreed that resolving uncertainties over the chemical composition of the products of combustion from Kuwaiti wells requires systematic, near-source sampling within the oil fire plumes. Existing NFIP aeric\_ sampling assets were found unsuitable for that purpose.

National Foreign Intelligence Community Support for Assessment of Persian Gulf Environmental Damage

### Background

Congress, in a passage contained within the Persian Gulf "Dire Emergency" supplemental appropriations bill, strongly urged the Director of Central Intelligence to review capabilities embodied within the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) in order to identify and employ those systems and resources which might be applicable to supporting US Government assessment of the environmental and ecological damage resulting from Iraqi sabotage of Kuwaiti oil facilities.

An interagency Intelligence Community working group was formed and convened to determine the status and objectives of US Government activities already under way and the needs and priorities of the engaged scientific community. National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) resources and capabilities were reviewed to determine what has been done and what else might be done to assist in US Government assessment of the nature, impact, and extent of the damage resulting from the Kuwaiti fires and oil discharges. New lines of communication with other US Government agencies studying the Kuwaiti problem were opened, adding to regular contacts already taking place. This paper, prepared in both classified and unclassified versions, constitutes the report that Congress has requested.

### Other Expressions of Interest and Concern

Congressional interest in utilizing intelligence capabilities for damage assessment of the extreme pollution event in Kuwait was subsequently broadened to embrace support to environmental research in general. Senator Boren, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, endorsed and forwarded to the DCI a letter from Senator Gore, of the Senate Armed Services Committee, recommending that actions be taken to begin discussion between intelligence officers and environmental scientists to investigate ways and means by which intelligence data collected for other purposes, but nonetheless potentially useful to environmental scientists, might be shared.

Concurrently, within the Executive Branch, the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology was emphasizing to the Department of Defense the research importance of the Kuwaiti oil fires in better understanding atmospheric processes and improving prediction of human health risks, and requesting that DoD continue its assistance toward meeting those goals. Similarly, the Senate Armed Services Committee was encouraging routine DoD involvement in environmental issues by way of a Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program. Thus, with the initiation of the DCI's Congressionally directed review, those components of the NFIP which are organizationally vested within the Department of Defense have been responsive to dual avenues of inquiry concerning capabilities—primarily, collection capabilities—which could be applicable to the class of environmental problems for which the Kuwaiti experience serves so dramatically as case in point.

### Early Community Response

Sensing a mounting interest among US policymakers in environmental matters, the CIA Directorate for Intelligence established an Environmental Issues Branch (GRD/EIB) two years ago--well in advance of the acute pollution episode which was to occur in the Persian Gulf. Initial emphasis was placed on the political and economic aspects of environmental issues. Within the Office of the President, reports and briefings on these issues have been provided to council chairmen, special counsels and assistants, and the Office of the US Trade Representative. During its brief tenure, CIA's Environmental Issues Branch has responded to policymakers at all levels in the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency.

At the broader community level, the Foreign Intelligence Priorities Committee of the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS/FIPC) was also responding to a sense of shifting interests among policymaking consumers of national foreign intelligence. In 1990, a major review was undertaken of "US Foreign Intelligence Requirements Categories and Priorities," the document which sets forth the DCI's basic substantive guidance to the Community for the operation, planning, and programming of the overall US foreign intelligence effort. Among the many revisions that this review produced was creation of a new subject category on health and the environment. Kuwaiti oil fires and slicks were subsequently assigned a high priority within this new category.

### Direct Intelligence Contributions

In the building momentum of planning for Operation DESERT STORM, the possibility that the about-to-be evicted Iraqi intruders, turned vindictive, might use oil as a defensive weapon was not overlooked. In response to the threat this prospect might hold for both the well-being and tactical effectiveness of coalition military forces, a couple of important activities were initiated.

Sandia National Laboratory, under the auspices of the Office of Foreign Intelligence, Department of Energy, formed a multidisciplinary team to provide preliminary potential optical effects, ecological stresses, and reservoir damages that would result from the demolition of wellheads in Kuwait oil fields and from the discharge or ignition of oil from nonreservoir sources such as oil storage tank farms, man-made oil-filled trenches, pipelines, and oil tankers. Best-case and worst-case scenarios for the oil fields were considered. The approach in this study was to perform a series of time-phased analyses, each stage of which generated not only immediate results, but also the requisite inputs, or source terms, for the succeeding stage. example, reservoir analyses provided source terms for combustion analyses in addition to estimates of reservoir damage; combustion analyses defined combustion products, posed oil-filled trench issues, and provided source terms for atmospheric processes; atmospheric analyses generated potential optical effects and provided source terms for ecological analyses that, in turn, provided estimates of ecological stresses.

Also, within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a fast-track initiative was undertaken to adapt an existing contractor-developed, multidisciplinary, atmospheric dispersion computer model to the Persian Gulf threat. The resultant plume model produces tactical forecasts of soot and other pollutants in the air at ground level from which short-term impact on human health can be projected more than two days in advance. has been further applied to estimating the cumulative effect throughout the Middle East and adjoining regions of extended exposure to combustion products generated by the Kuwaiti fires. Projections so derived comprise the central thrust of the analyses currently under way at CIA. Again, human health is of major concern, and CIA's Office of Medical Services (OMS) is a regular participant in analyses of the toxicological implications of pollution from the Kuwait fires. Other ramifications such as agricultural production are also receiving analytic attention.

As Iraqi destruction of Kuwaiti oil facilities moved from prospect to fact, attention initially focused on the oil slick and assessing the oil slick threat to Saudi desalinization facilities became a foremost concern. The Remote Sensing Applications Staff (RSAS) at CIA was called upon to develop and apply unorthodox new imagery sensing techniques to this problem on a priority basis. Using civilian satellite (AVHRR) multiband

imagery, RSAS was able to determine and describe the location, movement, and dispersion of the Gulf oil slick weeks earlier than it could be tracked by teams operating within the region. This early tracking facilitated planning and activation of preventive measures, such as positioning of booms to protect sea water intakes, as well as the subsequent cleanup efforts which were led by the US Coast Guard. The information also allowed a running start for the oil slick monitoring activities of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration.

While the environmental damage from oil discharges into the Persian Gulf was by no means trivial, the extent of the damage never reached the proportions to which the Iraqis aspired. Clearly, where pollution is concerned, the proverbial "ounce of prevention" is indeed worth a pound of cure. In truncating, quickly and precisely, Iraq's capability to pump Kuwaiti oil into the Gulf, US military forces provided the prevention that was needed. And the Intelligence Community, in contributing to the detailed targeting information that was needed to execute US preventive air strikes successfully, played a significant role in containing Iraq's attempts to pollute Gulf waters.

Later, as the threat from oil slicks waned, focus shifted to the smoke plumes from the oil well fires. On both points, slicks and plumes, imagery and maps using the new techniques evoked a strongly favorable response from senior US Government officials, as well as from concerned analysts both within and beyond the Intelligence Community. Application to the oil fire smoke plumes of the same techniques used against the slicks was able to provide US policymakers, scientific analysts, and the American public with unprecedentedly graphic evidence as to massive oil field damage and the scope of the spreading smoke.

The bulk of CIA's effort has been invested in developing and applying their plume model. Both CIA and DOE continue to seek data in an effort to improve upon the validity of their modeling projections. CIA notes that, in its present form, the computer model it has employed has substantial growth potential in being amenable to steady refinement to improve predictive capabilities as additional field measurements become available. If additional resources were made available, CIA would apply the funds to further validate the computer model on which its analysis is based and acquire additional LANDSAT imagery—which has also figured importantly in CIA's work to date.

The DOE analysis, which follows up on the Department's earlier work in estimating the regional toxicological threats, has three closely related thrusts: dispersion (plume) modeling, health effects projection, and a monitoring program. dispersion model used in the DOE study was developed under contract to the Environmental Protection Agency, and is widely used for estimating pollutant concentrations. The health effects projections were synthesized from EPA's National Ambient Air Quality Standards and from a National Academy of Sciences study on particulate polycyclic organic matter. DOE's monitoring program has been designed to address the significant levels of uncertainty associated with the dispersion model calculations. This uncertainty is due principally to uncertainty in emission factors. Implementation of a properly designed monitoring program will reduce these uncertainties. Health effect projections are also replete with uncertainties at least as significant as those associated with the dispersion model. Consequently, in DOE's view, acquisition of acute health effects data (e.g., hospital census data) should be an integral part of a monitoring program.

# The Immediate Need: More and Better Data

Scientists have viewed the Kuwaiti oil fires as providing an opportunity for an unplanned, large-scale experiment, and stressed the importance of seizing the opportunity to advance scientific understanding of both atmospheric processes and health effects. The purpose of an experiment is, of course, to make observations: to generate and record data which can then be used to (1) identify the things that matter, (2) describe how these variables relate one to another, and (3) test the relationships to be sure they are correct. However tightly reasoned and insightful an analysis may be, absent data it must retain a flavor of supposition.

Within the scientific community studying the Kuwaiti fires, general agreement is manifest on two very basic points. The first regards analytic approach. There is a broad endorsement of the essential importance of computer models in projecting patterns of dispersion, exposure, and transfer; considerations which are in turn prerequisites to further analyses. This consensus on methodology applies to a wide range of atmospheric pollution events; from a Bhopal to a Chernobyl; a Mount St. Helens to forest fires, whether in Yellowstone Park or the rain forests of Brazil. Numerous such models have been constructed, and each has won its set of analytic proponents. The analytic problem is that the results often diverge, and there is no way to know why until more information about the Kuwaiti fires is recorded. Hence the second point of consensus: data is surely

needed, first to better define "parameters" (i.e., the "inputs" upon which all computer models feed) and then to establish the accuracy or lack thereof of the projections a model is producing (i.e., to test the "outputs").

This is the generic opportunity environmental scientists have seen in the Kuwaiti fires: the chance to acquire data which could lead to advances in understanding for a whole class of pollution events. Until that is accomplished, it becomes difficult to envision how a productive dialog over the myriad of substantive issues might unfold. In the argot of intelligence, first and foremost, environmental scientists face a "collection problem."

Collection and sampling requirements against the Kuwaiti fires, as set down by the DOE's Sandia National Laboratory, are presented in the Attachment. These requirements have been reviewed by CIA and others and—modified only to include determination of thermal properties, such as flame temperatures and heat release rates——may be interpreted as reflective of common needs across the environmental analysis community. Logically, the kinds of data that are needed to improve present abilities to project dispersion patterns—which is in turn prerequisite to sound assessments of the ultimate toxicological, climatological, or ecological implications of the event—fall into three categories:

- (1) Meteorological Conditions
- (2) Source Emission Factors
  - Quantitative (rates and amounts)
  - Qualitative (composition)
- (3) Down Plume Conditions

Measurement of meteorological conditions and emission factors (i.e., how much oil is burning, where, and what precisely is the chemical composition of the products of this combustion) provide inputs to the computer models. Down-plume measurements are necessary to verify the accuracy of the projections the models are producing and provide a basis for methodological refinements aimed at improving forecasting accuracy.

One fundamental need for emissions data pertains to the rate at which oil is burning. CIA has estimated the initial overall capacity of the Kuwaiti wells to have been on the order of four to six million barrels per day. This set an initial, worst-case upper limit on the amount of oil that might be afire. As yet, however, there is no solid, empirically derived estimate as to how much oil is actually burning, or how that rate is varying over time. As the wells continue to vent, the natural pressures

which drive emissions lessen. And, of course, wells are gradually but steadily being extinguished and capped. Millions of barrels of oil are still burning each day, but it has yet to be determined just how much.

# Potential for Further Intelligence Contributions

Review of existing NFIP capabilities has revealed no unique intelligence means by which to quickly resolve the analytic impasse over emissions data. Intelligence sensors are for the most part highly-sophisticated devices specialized for purposes distinctly different from that of measuring the parameters of the Kuwaiti fires. Although US intelligence has no "breakout" data collection capabilities against the Kuwaiti oil fires, work is under way and new ideas have emerged—some quite unorthodox and innovative—that may provide information of considerable value to US environmental scientists.

As noted above, substantial uncertainty exists over the amount of oil that is burning in the Kuwaiti fires, and a second critical set of unknowns is the composition of the contaminants that the fires are producing. DOE considers this uncertainty over qualitative "emission factors" to be the most significant source of estimation error in its analytic work to date. CIA, which has sponsored some test burns to generate the emission factors that its model employs, also places a high-value on acquiring better data about the composition of the products of combustion at the several Kuwaiti fields. Specific emphases of analysts vary somewhat according to which particular computer model they are working with, but generally interest centers on soot (both amount and granularity), oxides of nitrogen and carbon, sulfur dioxide, and benzene.

Gathering these data, which are so sorely needed to advance scientific understanding, presents a formidable—and indeed dangerous—collection challenge. Scientists agree that samples must be taken as near as possible to the sources of combustion, which means entering the very heart of the smoke plumes—not once or twice, but repeatedly in accordance with a carefully worked out, statistical valid sampling plan. Moreover, since the merging of plumes may alter the chemistry of the pollutants, measurements from individual well fires will need to be complemented with samples taken in areas where plumes are joining together. So far, acquiring the qualitative "source—term" data analysts seek has proven an elusive and frustrating task. Only a few samples of near—source emissions have been acquired.

Inasmuch as low altitude flights directly into the oil fire smoke plumes, whether with fixed wing aircraft or helicopters, inherently pose substantial risk to crews and aircraft, Air Force

intelligence has proposed the use of unmanned systems to penetrate the plumes and collect the samples which analysts need. Several options are being weighed, all of which would employ one or more remotely activated sampling bottles aboard an unmanned carrier. One alternative would be to use a modified military RPV--Remotely Piloted Vehicle. But at a cost of \$10,000 to \$50,000 apiece, use of RPVs for any extensive sampling program could become prohibitively expensive unless it is assumed the vehicle would be routinely recovered and reused. Under the scientifically ideal case wherein collections would be made right at the flame-smoke boundary, this assumption could prove unfounded.

A second complication, common to any sampling approach that involves complex, close-in launch or retrieval operations from the ground, lies in the danger of conducting such wide-ranging activities in the immediate vicinity of the damaged oil fields. A clear threat to the safety of sampling teams remains present in the combination of unexploded munitions, oil-soaked terrain, and the heat, fumes, and curtailed visibility resulting from the fires themselves. Although it is to be emphasized that these unmanned air sampling options represent ideas, not fully evaluated concepts--much less existing capabilities--the Air Force is prepared to pursue further investigation, tests, and demonstrations, if so directed and funded.

Data Requirements and Sampling Overview: Kuwait Oil Fires

### Meteorological Measurements

Collect data hourly (as is done routinely by airport weather services) or as needed (i.e., more frequently if hourly data show large changes) at altitudes, latitudes, and longitudes appropriate for correlating with source-term, downwind airborne, satellite, and ground-based measurements. Data include:

- o Wind direction and windspeed
- o Ambient temperature
- o Humidity
- o Pressure
- o Visibility
- o Sky condition (cloud cover)
- o Solar insulation
- o Weather

### Source-Term Measurements

Collect data for individual (single wellhead) plumes using airborne collection platform, satellite imaging, and well site measurements. Data collection modes should be coordinated in time. At least twice daily sampling using:

- o Airborne Measurements
  - Plume injection height; plume cross-sectional area (using lidar)
  - Speed and direction of motion of plume
  - Primary pollutant<sup>1</sup> concentrations and emission factors (develop data base for using soot as a tracer, i.e., to infer concentrations of other pollutants from that for soot)
  - Optical properties, such as scattering and absorption coefficients (to tie together satellite image and soot concentration).
- o Satellite Measurements
  - Locations of sources and a real extent
  - Images from which to infer soot concentrations
- o Well Site Measurements (check for consistency with airborne data)
  - Oil/gas flow rate
  - Oil/gas composition (in particular, carbon content)

l Primary pollutants are generated at the burning wells and include soot, H2S, NO2, SO2, CO, CO2, and volatile hydrocarbons. Other, secondary pollutants are then generated by the reactions of primary pollutants in air.

### Downwind Plume Data

- Downwind Ground-based Measurements (monitor ground-based exposure levels)
  - Pollutant concentrations (including secondary pollutants)
  - Particle geometry and size distribution (soot)
- Downwind Airborne Measurements (validate model predictions; correlate with satellite data)
  - Pollutant concentrations (including secondary pollutants)
  - Plume orientation and dimensions
- o Satellite Measurements (tie in with airborne data, establish feasibility of routine use of satellite imaging in infer tracer, i.e., soot, concentrations; note that, potentially, archived images may be examined to infer concentrations at early well burning times for which no other data are available)
  - Soot concentrations
  - Plume orientation and dimensions

### Sampling Design

## Statistical Experiment Design

- o Ground-based, receptor site Measurements
  - Using existing receptor sites (viz, the existing USIAAT sites) and data to obtain a preliminary estimate of the spatial variability of the pollutant dispersion process.
  - Using this information, determine the number and location of additional receptor sites that would provide a significant improvement in the measurements; perform cost/benefit analysis.
  - In general, receptor network design should provide for continual monitoring along transects that run perpendicular to the expected path of the plume and at sites located (whenever possible) within population centers.

### o Airborne Measurements

- For source-term measurements, select the wells to be sampled by random sampling of burning wells within each major oil field (stratified random sampling approach); sample size for each field will be determined using statistical method for sample size determination (e.g., representative sample method: if 38 well plumes are sampled in a field then one can be 90 percent confident that 90 percent of the true values of a measured quantity will fall within the range of the smallest and the largest measured values).

 Expect selected statistical experiment design to be modified somewhat by operational considerations such as aircraft availability, allowable flying time, safety considerations, visibility, accessibility of single plumes, etc.

 In general, sample by flying transects above and within plume at near-field (for source-term data) and far-field (for downwind plume data) locations.

# Parameter Estimation and Model Validation

- o Examine a number of dispersion models that possess certain commonalities with respect to the modeling parameters (e.g., pollutant emission factors, oil/gas flow rate, plume injection height, windspeed and direction, etc.) that are used and focus on those input parameters that most sensitively affect predicted pollutant concentrations.
  - Provide estimates of these input parameters (estimated using appropriate measurements; e.g., meteorological data and source-term data that serve to define physically realistic ranges of values for these parameters) to each model and compare predicted concentrations to measured concentrations; use criterion such as minimization of mean square error to assess quality of each simulation.
  - Change values of input parameters (but keep within physically realistic range) and run dispersion simulations. Repeat this process noting which model provides best results over the parameter space (i.e., over the range of physically realistic values for the parameters).

september 29,1989

### IRAQ: Reducing Foreign Labor Force

Baghdad, which claimed Wednesday to be preparing to demobilize five divisions by mid-October, is trying to reduce the number of foreign workers in Iraq in order to prepare for large-scale demobilization and to conserve hard currency. The US Embassy reports that next month Iraq will sharply reduce the amounts most foreign workers can convert to hard currency and remit. Earlier this year, Baghdad banned Egyptians from operating produce stands and prohibited workers from converting their earnings locally. The Embassy reports 1,000 more Egyptians are leaving than entering Iraq daily. The five divisions to be demobilized include 50,000 troops, 4 to 5 percent of Iraq's current forces.

Comment: Although previously announced demobilizations have resulted only in the shifting of units to Border Guard or internal security duties, Iraq probably wants to free some of the jobs of its 2 million foreign workers for soldiers. Baghdad also wants to save hard currency for development projects and imports; annual remittances will be halved to about \$1 billion even if most workers remain. Many Egyptians probably will stay in Iraq because of poor opportunities at home. Baghdad's actions are likely to increase friction with members of the Arab Cooperation Council, which seeks opportunities in Iraq for its workers.

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Trends

(NUMBER)

- East German political turmoil
   Steps toward Yugoslav multiparty system

- USSR anniversary slogans

  Progress on USSR press law
  Beijing on Soviet nes
  Jordan election results
  Egyptian workers leaving Iraq

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# Foreign Broadcast Information Service P.O. Box 2604 Washington, DC 20013

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# Egypt-Iraq

# Iraqi Treatment of Egyptian Workers Sours Ties

Egyptian media have stepped up their criticism of Iraq for its reported financial and physical harassment of Egyptian workers and their consequent mass departures in recent months. At the same time, however, Cairo's restrained official statements, combined with the government—owned media's limited coverage of the most sensational allegation—about the shooting deaths of more than a hundred Egyptians in Iraq—suggest an effort to prevent the issue from seriously damaging bilateral ties. Official restraint notwithstanding, the crisis seems to strip the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) of much of the substance that Egypt had hoped it would have and imposes on Egypt's already overburdened economy the additional strains of newly returned unemployed workers.

A spate of recent press accounts indicates that the Egyptian workers in Iraq are returning home in increasing numbers. 1 reportedly because Iraqi obstacles make it difficult for them to obtain their legitimate earnings and transfer them back to Egypt. The international edition of the government—owned Al-Ahram on 7 November claimed that 10,000 workers are returning to Egypt every week. While the figures are less than reliable (the same report claimed that a million workers had already returned since June—representing a far higher rate than 10,000 a week), the reports indicate that a massive influx has been taking place.

This migration, which has apparently been continuing for some months, appears to have reached massive proportions more recently with the implementation of new Iraqi regulations that severely limit the amount of money that can be transferred out of the country (Al-Ahram international edition, 7 November; Al-Jumhuriyah, 11 November). The new regulations come on top of longstanding but apparently growing delays by the Iraqis in implementing permitted transfers of funds to Egypt. Taken together, the delays

Published figures on the number of Egyptians employed in Iraq vary: a report in Al-Ahram on 20 August put the figure at about a million, while another in the paper's international edition on 7 November claimed there were twice that many.



and the new restrictions seem designed to encourage Egyptian workers to return home without issuing a formal expulsion order that would fly in the face of recent efforts to facilitate economic movement and other aspects of relations between ACC member countries.<sup>2</sup>

A report in the government-owned daily Al-Jumhuriyah on 5 September cited the head of the Arab-African Development Bank in Egypt, one of several banks engaged in processing remittances from Iraq, as saying that Iraqi authorities had attributed the nearly year-long delays to depletion of hard currency needed for postwar reconstruction projects. In any event, the return of hundreds of thousands of demobilized Iraqi troops to a now glutted labor market gives Iraq a strong reason for inducing Egyptian workers to leave.

Reports on the bleak situation for Egyptian workers in Iraq have recently expanded to allege other forms of abuse, ranging from mass dismissals without notice or proper compensation to a sensational accusation in the 8 November issue of the government-owned daily Al-Akhbar that 102 bodies of Egyptian workers—most of them bearing bullet wounds—had arrived in Egypt in October. While no government-owned media other than Al-Akhbar have been observed to report the allegations of shooting deaths, neither have they been denied by the media or through official statements.

# Public Airing of Tensions

While some of the problems being cited—such as delays in the transfer of workers' remittances—have existed for some time and have been reported

in the press. Cairo recently stepped up pressure on Baghdad with an unusual airing of grievances in the government-controlled media. The move is a departure from Egypt's usual practice of glossing over such tensions with Iraq in public and portraying instead only the positive aspects of their relationship. The official Middle East News Agency (MENA) on 3 November reported at length on comments by the chairman of Egypt's official trade union federation, who said he had appealed to the Foreign Ministry "to quickly intervene with the Iraqi authorities" over the plight of Egyptian workers. Still more unusual was an editorial in the 6 November Al-Ahram—generally considered the most representative of official policy among the government dailies—that called on Iraq for an "urgent" solution to the problems facing Egyptian workers there. The editorial appeared to pave the way for the subsequent blitz in media

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>The ACC, comprising Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and North Yemen, was founded in February 1988 primarily to bolster economic relations.

coverage of the issue in the government-owned media, as well as in the opposition press.

This public airing of the problem probably reflects Egyptian officials' heightened fears of the potential social, economic, and political impact not only of delaying remittances but also of the increasing numbers of newly unemployed workers arriving back in the country. The timing may also reflect Cairo's frustration over the failure of past efforts to prod Baghdad through private channels.

Moreover, the deteriorating situation depicted in media accounts has already subjected the government to criticism—albeit primarily in the opposition press—for inaction on the issue. A columnist in the government—owned Al-Ahram on the 11th claimed that "a veil of silence" surrounding the issue "is not appropriate" and called on "the responsible authorities in Egypt" to take up the matter with Iraq. Media coverage has undoubtedly helped to heighten both popular resentment against the Iraqis and pressure on the Mubarak government to solve the problem. The opposition newspaper Al-Wafd, for example, has stepped into the issue with scathing accounts of Iraqi mistreatment of workers and combined criticism of both the Cairo and Baghdad governments. An editorial by Al-Wafd's chief editor Jamal Badawi on the 6th concluded: "If political and diplomatic restrictions prevent the 'Atif Sidqi government from raising the issue, the democratic institutions in Egypt... should raise their voice against the wave of racist persecution of Egyptian workers in Iraq."

Official Restraint

Even while publicizing the issue, however, Cairo has taken a measured approach in an apparent effort to prod the Iraqis without allowing the matter to undermine bilateral relations. Accordingly, the initial allegations of mass shooting deaths—the kind of development that might be expected to draw extensive media coverage and certainly far more than the remittance issue—have since been virtually ignored in the government—owned media, with the exception of a followup Al-Akhbar report that the embassy in Baghdad has received instructions to investigate the matter (MENA, 10 November).

Moreover. an Al-Jumhuriyah report on the 9th cited Minister of Manpower and Training 'Abd-al-Haqq as calling the problem of Egyptian workers a "transient one" that "will not affect the close brotherly relations between the two countries." Numerous press reports have cited contacts currently under

Decontrolled six months after date of publication 34 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY way to resolve the problem, and Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Majid has stated that the issue will be discussed in a previously scheduled meeting in Cairo on the 18th of the Higher Joint Egyptian-Iraqi Committee, cochaired by Egyptian Prime Minister Sidqi and Iraq's First Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan (MENA, 14 November).

Although the labor issue has soured the atmosphere of the Egyptian-Iraqi relationship. Cairo's handling of the problem and its continued stress on good relations clearly represent an effort to contain the crisis and prevent it from seriously damaging bilateral ties. The Egyptian Government has prided itself on having restored and maintained close relations with almost all Arab states and on the central role these relations have afforded it in the inter-Arab and international arenas, and it probably continues to value the benefit of military and economic cooperation with Baghdad. Nonetheless, the crisis undermines one of Cairo's primary objectives in forging close ties with Iraq both bilaterally and through the ACC—namely, preservation of its role in the Iraqi labor market.

Perhaps more significant are the social and economic burdens facing Egypt as a result of the diminishing labor market in Iraq and the accompanying constriction of the flow of foreign currency. Cairo appears intent on pressing the Iraqis to resolve the labor problem in some fashion, but it is probably resigned to a less than ideal solution—such as arrangements to expedite remittance transfers and compensation plans for the dismissed workers—that will not stem significantly the continued flow of returnees. Accordingly, the Al-Ahram editorial on the 6th, as well as other press reports and commentaries, focused less on the displacement of workers than on the long delays in making permitted transfers of funds and qualified their grievances with recognition of Iraq's circumstances in the aftermath of the Gulf war.

# Beating Plowshares Into a Swords: Iraq's Defense as Industrialization Program.

Beating Plowshares Into Swords: Iraq's Defense Industrialization Program

Key Judgments
Information evailable
as of 1 June 1990
was used in this report.

Iraq is making significant gains in expanding its defense industries—one of President Saddam Husayn's main postwar goals. Iraq is developing, assembling, or producing nearly 100 types of major ground, air, and naval weapon systems, small arms, and munitions. The arms industry encompasses dozens of military and nominally civilian industrial organizations. Baghdad spends several billion dollars annually on military industries, and military and military-related industries probably employ as many as 500,000 of Iraq's labor force of 4.4 million. The defense industries program will help Iraq become one of the most industrialized countries in the Middle East by the end of the century.

The development of missiles and nonconventional weapons is the defense industry's highest priority and is the program most at odds with US interests in limiting proliferation and in promoting regional stability. Moreover, Iraq's activities present significant problems for controlling US technology. Dual-use technologies can be easily diverted from civilian programs because Iraq integrates its civilian and military production facilities.

Saddam Husayn probably perceives US criticism of Iraqi strategic weapons programs as an effort to undermine his regime, and he is likely to rebuff US pressure to end Iraqi efforts to acquire Western technology for
strategic industries. Baghdad almost certainly views the unhindered acquisition of US and other Western technology as an important issue for
relations between Iraq and the United States. Iraq would prefer to
minimize damage to commercial relations, but it would probably discontinue servicing some of its \$2 billion debt to the United States if Washington
applied sanctions in response to continued Iraqi export violations or
weapons development

The Ministry of Industry and Military Industries directs and supervises the procurement and production responsibilities that are spread among numerous military and civilian production facilities. Under the leadership of Maj. Gen. Husayn Kamil al-Majid—perhaps the second-most influential man in Iraq—Baghdad is developing key managerial and technical skills. Its achievements in munitions production, chemical warfare, and missile development suggest Baghdad has capable top-level managers, scientists, and technicians. Iraq is increasing this cadre by expanding college and vocational study in management, engineering, and applied science.

Sector NESA 90-10009

# Chronology of Soviet Policy Toward Iran and Iraq, 1980-83 (continued)


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Date	Major Evens	lean	fraq
June	4	Gromyko, addressing actains of Supreme Soviet, criticizes Iran's capulsion of Soviet diplomats and warm that the USSR's policy to- ward Iran will be based upon Tok-	Saddam Hutayn conforms Iraqi Com- munist Party in interview with Italian journalists.  Gromyka, addressing session of So-
July	from Jaumohes attack in the Kurdistan area in the northern sector of the border.	ran's actions.	preme Soviet, says USSR and Iraq are "linked by relations of friendship." Saddam lauds the Soviet-Iraqi "rap- prochement" in interview with French journalist.
August	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Iran protests to Mescow and Kabul over alleged bombing by Soviet or Afghan jots of Iranian village near the Afghan border.	Ariz makes another teip to Moscow (lifth since war began). Soviets and Iraqis snipe at each other in their modia.

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Scope Note

This paper assesses Iraq's plans and capabilities for developing modern defense industries during the next three to five years. Significant reporting from all sources is available on the organization of Iraq's military industries, procurement operations, and development plans. Information on Iraqi manufacturing processes, technical training, and the number of foreign advisers in Iraq's factories is limited, however, and we cannot compare fully Iraq's capabilities with other developing or developed countries.



Score

# Beating Plowshares Into Swords: Iraq's Defense Industrialization Program

One of Iraq's main postwar goals is the ambitious expansion of its defense industries. In May 1989, Minister of Industry and Military Industries Hussyn Kamil al-Majid claimed publicly that Iraq was implementing a defense industrialization program to cover all its armed forces' needs for weapons and equipment by 1991. He also said the program was intended to provide all of Iraq's basic industrial supplies—such as metal, pipes, and water pumps—from indigenous sources. The Ministry of Industry and Military Industries says it intends to develop other civilian fields in Iraq, including civil engineering; the production of electronic, textile, and other consumer goods; and the oil sector

### Ambitious Goals

lraq's desire for a large arms industry has grown during the past decade. Initial plans for defense industrialization date from the oil boom of the mid-1970s, but the war with Iran delayed implementation. President Saddam Husayn apparently believes an expanded arms industry will enhance Iraqi prestige as well as help solve security problems identified during the war, such as the lack of reliable arms supplies. We believe the rapid growth of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industries and its bureaucratic and industrial components in the past three years indicates the importance placed by the regime on developing indigenous arms manufacturing capabilities.

Although Iraq's stated goals almost certainly are overly ambitious, we believe the regime recognizes its limitations and holds more pragmatic aspirations in private. Baghdad has significant advantages that make less grandiose, but still substantial expansion of its defense industries a realistic goal:

 It has ample supplies of cheap hydrocarbons to meet its energy needs and has placed a high priority on expanding its electrical generation capacity.

- Oil income—about \$14 billion in 1989—is likely to increase gradually during the next few years, making extra money available for defense programs.
- Its large military can absorb relatively high levels of production. We estimate that, even after postwar demobilization is completed in the next few years, lraq will have between 400,000 and 500,000 men in its Army, an Air Force of at least 750 combat aircraft, and a Navy with at least 10 warships.
- A potential supply of customers for arms exports
  already exists. Some Arab countries have expressed
  interest in buying Iraqi arms, and Iraq's modest
  military aid programs may develop into sales programs.

# Pursuing Expanded Arms Production

Iraq apparently has decided that a broad-based arms industry is the key to military self-sufficiency. Its current efforts and future plans involve nearly every type of modern ground, air, or naval weapon system. We estimate the Ministry of Industry and Military Industries is developing, modifying, assembling, or producing nearly 100 types of major weapon systems, small arms, and munitions. Many of these systems were displayed publicly at military exhibitions in Baghdad in October 1988 and April 1989. The majority of Iraq's larger and more sophisticated weapon systems are still in the development stage, and only prototypes or mockups were displayed at the exhibitions.

Most Iraqi products rely on older technologies, although more sophisticated technology increasingly is being incorporated into these weapon systems and their components. Baghdad has not successfully demonstrated an indigenous design and development capability for a total major weapon system, in our judgment. Licensed assembly and coproduction and



# Hard Lassons, High Hopes

"Naturally, the major powers are upset when a country like Iraq produces arms and when it reduces, and I do not say ends, its dependence on them. They get upset ... because their ability to influence the independence and decisionmaking of countries politically will be less than when these countries were importing their war needs from them."

Saddam Husayn December 1997 (V)

The security, political, and economic motivations behind Baghdad's ambitious programs are similar to those traditionally associated with developing countries. The Iraqis, however, appear especially driven because of their experiences during the eight-year war with Iran, which cost Iraq more than 125,000 dead.

Greater security and self-sufficiency in supplying its military with weapons almost certainly are Iraq's main goals. The Iraqis were stung during the war by arms embargoes by many countries—including briefly by its main supplier, the Soviet Union. Baghdad also resented paying the higher prices charged by those willing to sell armaments. Recent public statements by Saddam Husayn have made clear his desire to lessen Iraq's vulnerability to foreign decisions.

Baghdad probably hopes that increased self-sufficiency will result in greater financial savings, preventing it from falling deeper into debt. Iraq was unprepared for its lengthy war with Iran, and we estimate that during the conflict Baghdad spent an additional \$27 billion dollars on armaments. This spending helped drain Iraq's foreign exchange reserves and caused it to borrow heavily. Baghdad still views Iran as a threat, and the size and scope of its industrialization

• Iraq's foreign exchange reserves fell from \$25 billion in 1980 to \$2 billion at the end of the war. Iraq's non-Arab foreign debt rose from \$55-6 billion to about \$45 billion at the end of 1983. Iraq has an additional \$37 billion in "soft" loans from the Oulf Arab stans, which are wallerly to be repaid.

program suggest it is preparing for supporting another large-scale and lengthy war.

In the wake of its victory in the war, Baghdad views its progress in defense industrialisation—particularly with more advanced weapons—as a source of national pride, in our judgment. Saddam may hope that arousing nationalist pride with occasional displays of Iraq's improving capabilities will reduce popular resentment over the slow pace of economic recovery, the lack of a formal or definitive settlement with Iran, and the continued concentration of political power within his family.

Iraq also intends its defense industries programs to provide significant foreign policy benefits, in our Judgment. The emphasis on the advanced technology programs reflects their usefulness in reminding Iran and Israel of Iraq's growing capabilistes and in providing leverage over militarily weaker Iraqi opponents and competitors such as Syria. Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Bazhdad probably believes that lis weapon programs—by carrying the Arab banner in the technological arms race with Israel—strengthen its political position in the Arab world. Moreover, Iraq has given surplus weapons and municions to countries such as Jordan, North Yemen, Sudan, and Mauritania, and it may believe that its future production will allow continued military aid with its attendant political benefits

Economic motivations may grow as Iraq widens its strategic advantage over Iran. Iraqi afficials have stated publicly that the main economic goals of defense industrialization are import substitution and the technological stimulation of civilian industries, and they ciaim successes in both areas. The Iraqis have emphasized the export potential of the arms industries, referring to Iraq as a source of weapons for other Arab and friendly states. In our judgment, Baghdad believes its expanding defense industries will provide more economic options for developing and using its industrial and manpower assets most effectively.



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# Irael Conventional Weapon Systems and Programs

Strategic Systems. Iraq is working on at least five types of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. It also is developing a space launch vehicle and various types of short-range missiles and rockets.

Aircraft. Iraq has modified Soviet-supplied IL-16 transport aircraft to serve as airborne early warning and control system aircraft and as fuel tankers. It also has modified Soviet-built MiG-23 and Sw-22 aircraft for aerial refueling and to carry Westernstyle ordnance, while Mirage F-1 aircraft have been modified to carry Soviet-style ordnance. The Ministry of Industry and Military Industries is pursuing coproduction deals for trainer and fighter aircraft and helicopters

Ground Equipment. Iraq probably is self-sufficient in small arms and munitions production. It has modified numerous armored vehicles by adding more modern fire control systems, larger main guns, or additional armor. The Iraqis produce or assemble under license several types of artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers, and Baghdad is developing its own howitzers from foreign-supplied components assembled in Iraq. The Ministry of Industry and Military Industries produces a few types of antiaircraft guns, control systems, and radars

Naval Systems. Iraq has modified small patrol boats with various types of weapon systems. It also manufactures several types of naval mines and is developing an antiship missile that appears to be based on

the Chinese-built HY-2 Silkworm antishly missile. The Ministry of Industry and Military Industries is considering a program to build minisubmarines.


Miscellaneous Production. Iraq produces or assembles remotely piloted vehicles. In addition, the Ministry of Industry and Military Industries has modified several air-launched missiles for different missions, and it manufactures a wide variety of bombs. Iraq's military electronic production facilities manufacture radars, radios, antennas, mine detectors, and relatively sophisticated electronic circuit boards, semiconductors and transistors, and integrated circuits.

Nonconventional Weapons. Baghdad produces the blister agent mustard and several types of nerve agents and has put these agents into aerial bombs, rockets, artillery shells, and probably missile warheads. Iraq also produces large quantitles of the biological warfare agents botulin toxin and anthrax bacteria and will probably achieve a limited operational capability by the end of 1990. Although we have not confirmed any nuclear-weapons-related facilities in Iraq. Baghdad's procurement activities strongly suggest the existence of a nuclear weapons program. In our judgment, Iraq has the technical competence, when combined with clandestinely obtained foreign technology or assistance, to develop a nuclear weapon by the middle-to-late 1990s.

adaptations of foreign weapon systems and technologies dominate Iraqi production of major weapon systems. Iraq also is manufacturing increasing amounts of spare parts and electronic components for weapon systems in its inventory. The weapons produced completely by Iraq are limited to small arms, mortars, small bosts, and munitions.


Iraq does not release production figures for its defense industries, but we believe high-volume production exists in only a few areas. Major weapon systems that appear ready for full-scale production, such as Iraq's





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Figure 1. The Al Russyn and Al Abbas russection-tursect mistiles.

Tiger G radars, the Sijiil multiple rocket launcher, and some of the Saddam-series artillery pieces, have not been seen in significant numbers in storage depots near the production facilities. We believe pressure to increase production of most systems is slight because Iraq's military has surplus weapons in its inventory. Slower production may also reflect an Iraqi decision to pursue—within the constraints of its capabilities—quality over quantity.

Iraq apparently plans to develop its arms industries to support likely wartime demands. Capacity has been reached at some munitions and electronics factories, for example, and Iraq is trying to increase production rates by adding shifts and new assembly lines at

various munitions plants. We believe Baghdad will soon have a surge capacity for most types of small arms and tank and artiflery ammunition.

# Organizing for Success

Iraq has established a complex defense industries organization that encompasses not only military-related production facilities, but also state enterprises primarily devoted to civilian production. The Ministry of Industry and Military Industries directs and oversees the procurement and production responsibilities of subordinate offices, departments, and commissions. It also coordinates projects that often involve many other Iraqi and foreign organizations. Under the leadership of Saddam's son-in-law, Maj. Gen. Husayn Kamil al-Majid, the ministry has become an increasingly powerful organization. Husayn Kamil's influence allows him to order other ministries, organizations, and independent committees to support the industrialization effort.

devotes a considerable share of its financial and labor resources to its military industrialization effort. We estimate Baghdad spends several billion dollars annually on military industries. Iraq's 1990 budget allocates 53 percent of investment funds—equivalent to 59.5 billion at the overvalued exchange rate—to industry, according to Iraqi press reports. On the basis of Iraqi Government information on the size of Iraq's labor force and our estimate of the size of its defense industries, we speculate that military and military-related industries employ as many as 500,000 of Iraq's 4.4 million labor force.

The Ministry of Industry and Military Industries
The creation of the Ministry of Industry and Military
Industries is mid-1988 acknowledged and strengthened existing ties between defense and civilian industries. The ministry wedded the Military Industries

'Iraq's overvalued official exchange rate makes it difficult to quantify the amount Baghdad allocates to industry in US dollars. Examination of the share of spending allocated, however, underscores the importance Iraq attaches to industry.



Commission and the cominally civilian-oriented Minletry of Industry and Minerals. The new ministry almost certainly reflected Bagbias's emphasis on improving the overall management of industry.

The ministry is nominally broken down into a civilian side, headed by Deputy Minister Adnan al-Ani, and a military side, headed by Deputy Minister Lt. Geo. Amir al-Sa'di, according to a reliable source of the US defense attache in Baghdad. The ministry's subordinate defense and civilian organizations apparently are closely integrated.

The ministry has several offices that are beautiphicologies in procuring fereign technology and assistance for the defense industrialization program.

- The Technical Corps for Special Projects series as frag's focal point for defense related industrial construction and civil engineering and commercial contacts between fragilenterprises and foreign suppliers.
- The State Organization of Technical Industries serves a similar role in coordinating and facilitating the involvement of fragiorganizations in industrial development. It also serves as a common address and clearinghouse for fragionterprises and some foreign suppliers.
- The Military Production Authority apparently secures foreign participation in the industrial ration program.


So-called state establishments are the central administrative organizations and production facilities. Some state establishments—sometimes called enterprises, organizations, or general establishments—are responsible for the production of several types of weapon systems or components and control facilities at several locations.

[Some of the production of several types of weapon systems or components and control facilities at several locations.

[Some of the production of several types of weapon systems or components and control facilities at several locations.

[Some of the production of several types of weapon systems are large and have well-planned layouts for production lines, support buildings, milities, and bounds. Foreign access to Iraqi plants is limited, but newer factories apparently are fairly model and well equipped. We believe Iraq had to emphastic autismation in its new plants because of wartime demands on

labor and the shortage of skilled personnel. State establishments usually have research facilities as well.



The close integration of the defense and civilian industrial sectors almost certainly is intended to allow use of facilities by both and ultimately to diversify the defense industry's base for civilian goods production. The Ministry of Industry and Military Industries has tried to fulfill Saddam's public instructions that line, maximize its limited technical resources by "maxima; use of civilian industry for military purposes . . . and military industry for civilian purposes by using [their]




Species

Flgure 4 Organization of Iraq's Military Industrialization Effort

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The Special Projects office lectudes the Technical Corps for Special Projects, the Military Production Authority, and probably the entity known as SAFAN. The State Organization for Technical

Industries also is closely tied to the Special Projects office but may be on par with other state organizations and public-sector enterprises.

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We believe Bagbdad exploits the ministry's civilian functions to facilitate the covert procurement of foreign technology and equipment for Iraq's military programs. Many nominally civilian firms legally acquire equipment that probably is used to support arms production. The ministry's military-civilian structure technically allows it to meet some stringent foreign licensing requirements while diverting equipment and technology to its arms factories.

Iraq has established extensive procurement networks for foreign technology assistance, advanced industrial machinery, and weapon system components. These networks use front companies and intermediaries to avoid controls on dual-use technologies and other sensitive material

March 1990, Iraq: Airways employees were arrested in London as part of a US-UK sting operation for their role in buying and transporting to Iraq electronic capacitors used for nuclear triggers.

# The Vital Component: Foreign Assistance

Iraq has required large-scale foreign assistance for the progress in its defense industrialization program during the past decade. Foreign private and state-owned companies have provided Iraq with the technology, equipment, and management techniques to move quickly from basic to more sophisticated weapons assembly and production. Bagbdad also continues to rely on some foreign personnel—particularly engineers and consultants—in its established facilities.

We have identified companies from at least 20 countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas—including the United States—involved in various phases of Iraq's defense industrialization program:

 State-owned companies from Yugoslavia and France have provided the most assistance in building facilities and in manufacturing weapons during the past eight years.

- Private West German firms probably have played a critical role in Iraq's high-priority missile and chemical warfare programs.
- Other companies heavily involved in Iraqi arms
  projects come from Austria, Argentina, Belgium,
  Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, Switzerland, and the
  United Kingdom, according to press reports. Since
  late 1989 the Iraqis have been trying to increase
  technical and scientific cooperation with India and
  probably Japan.
- The Ministry of Industry and Military Industries
  has received computers and general electronic testing equipment from US companies through its
  clandestine procurement network.
- The Iraqis are increasing their use of international consortiums to procure equipment and technology, to diversify sources, and, as necessary, to avoid export controls or unwanted attention.

We believe the Iraqis will deal with any source that can provide the technology they need, but they prefer Western technology


Diversification of suppliers has been a key goal of Iraq's industrialization effort, in our judgment, and this accounts, in part, for the large number of countries involved. Iraq probably believes that numerous sources improve its bargaining position and avoid overreliance that might jeopardize progress in specific areas. For example, Bagbdad has been concerned that political developments in Eastern Europe might harm military supply agreements.

We believe the Iraqis are always looking for new sources of military supplies or production equipment that can provide financing when debt disputes cause existing suppliers to refuse to advance new credita.

# Managerial and Technical Skills Improving

Iraq's achievements in fields ranging from munitions production to chemical warfare and missile development suggest it has a cadre of capable top-level


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## Irag's Extensive, but Troubled Covert Procurement Networks

We believe Iraq's efforts indicate it is willing to go to great lengths to avoid international restrictions on the acquisition of high technology. As a result of Western restrictions on technology transfers, Iraq has established international procurement and financial networks to acquire covertly equipment and technology.



lished with banks, firms, or subsidiaries in France, lished with banks, firms, or subsidiaries in France, Italy, Switzerland, the United States, and West Germany. The companies bought have been those that manufacture or can quietly acquire components or equipment Baghdad needs. The Iraqi holding companies, in turn, have set up front companies to acquire equipment.

Large parts of Iraq's network have been uncovered by press investigations in 1989 and actions by export control officials in Western Europe this year. A joint

US-British sting operation prevented the illegal export of nuclear weapon triggering components by the front company EUROMAC and Iraqi Airways to Iraq in March 1990. Components for Iraq's longrange artillery or "supergun" program were seized in several countries, including the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Turkey, and West Germany.

The reported ties between Iraqi-based organizations, Iraqi Airways, and a wide assortment of companies have made it difficult for them to operate covertly. It may make some elements of the networks targets for hostile governments. For example, Gerald Bull was murdered in March 1990 after press reports linked his company, Space Research Corporation, to Iraq's procurement network and its strategic weapons programs. Officials of Space Research Corporation and its subsidiaries claimed they were closing their businesses in April.


Iraq is unlikely to abandon these efforts despite the increased scrutiny. Baghdad began to develop new holding companies and front organizations in early 1990, and greater efforts in this area are likely.

managers, scientists, and technicians involved in the defense industrialization program. This cadre is expanding rapidly, in our judgment, and by the mid-1990s Iraq should be able to correct many of the managerial and skilled manpower problems that currently plague its defense industries.



Many of the ministry's top managers are military officers who, like Husaya Kamil, are willing to give strong directions to their offices. Because of their past successes, Husaya Kamil and his lieutenants apparently have been given unprecedented authority within the government to accomplish their goals.





We believe earlier Iraqi efforts to improve the talents of its middle managers and production workers were at least partly successful as demonstrated by increases in production in some areas and in the research and development of advanced technological systems. For example, officials of a Swedish-US consortium working with Iraq on beavy truck manufacturing told the US Embassy that the firm had to rework its proposals because higher than expected Iraqi competence reduced the amount of assistance needed iraqi technicians and engineers in the high-priority missile programs are knowledgeable about and capable with state-of-theart propellant manufacturing equipment and with specialized technology used for missile nozzle production.

Iraq is improving in other less critical manufacturing areas:



businessmen were impressed by the Iraqis' ability to absorb manufacturing technology, and they commented that the Iraqi education system was apparently turning out people competent enough to operate sophisticated equipment involved in producing trucks.

The regime has used financial incentives (pay, bonuses, and bousing), increased supervision of factory production schedules, and greater discipline in lax factories—at times with barsh penalities for failure to speed improvements in production and development, according to US officials.

Some managerial and skilled manpower problems have not been overcome. For example, Iraq's managerial and technical record at the state enterprise and factory floor level is mixed. We believe that, until corrected, the shortcomings of Iraq's middle-level managers and technicians will handicap the progress of the industrialization program:

in mid-1989 as

Iraqi-requested survey of one of its munitions factories by an pehnical team concluded that
output suffered from Hoppy workmanship and as
inability to adhere to technical designs in the production process—a result of poor supervision and
the lack of skilled workers.

State Establishment munitions facility in September 1989—the second in as many years—was the result of poor safety standards and handling procedures.

managers and used their weaknesses as an excuse to delay granting licenses to produce French air-to-surface missiles in late 1988, according to an untested source.

Iraq probably lacks sufficient skilled personnel to operate most of its newer arms factories at more than minimal levels of production without continued foreign assistance. Most Iraqi programs require much foreign assistance to train and supervise Iraqi personnel. Many joint agreements often include the provision of foreign supervisory personnel even after the facilities are turned over to the Iraqis.

They apparently are particularly inadequate in completing or following designs.

We believe Iraq will continue to concentrate on modifications to major weapon systems until it increases its pool of managers and skilled labor and develops the infrastructure necessary for large-scale assembly and production. The Iraqis have shown themselves adept at modifying existing systems and are developing experience in integrating various subsystems onto a single chassis or airframe. This experience will probably result in establishing the design capabilities the Iraqis currently lack.

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Industrialization's demands probably have led Iraq to improve its system of management and technical training. According to a contractor study, Iraq is emphasizing business management, engineering, and applied science in its major universities and technical institutes. Despite the demands of the war, Iraq increased the annual number of college graduates from slightly more than 21,000 in 1980 to more than 26,000 in 1988. In addition, Iraq expanded its vocational school system from 193 to 356 technical and commercial schools-doubling the teaching staff in the process.1 The success of these measures is evidenced by the increase in technical and commercial vocational school attendance, which jumped from 47,000 in 1980 to more than 136,000 in 1988. An additional 26,000 students were admitted to six new vocational schools that opened in 1989. According to Iraqi press reports, Baghdad has found it necessary to offer incentives to encourage Iraqi youths to attend these schools because of the low prestige accorded to production workers and the technical schools in Iraq.

Impediments to Progress

We believe the small industrial base from which Iraq is starting and the competition for capital to support its programs have combined to prevent defense industrialization from progressing more rapidly. Too many technologically demanding and resource-intensive projects are stretching Iraq's ability to support the expansion, in our judgment. Inefficient production techniques resulting from managerial and technical shortcomings almost certainly keep production costs high, while the acquisition of more sophisticated technology requires increasing amounts of capital.

Industrial Capacity

Iraq's shortcomings in steel and specialty metals production affect several programs. The Ministry of Industry and Military Industries cannot support the

' Iraq's vocational school system also includes agricultural schools, but these declined in number from 30 to 34 between 1980 and 1983, according to a contractor study

domestic production of armored vehicles or chassis, large-caliber gans, or missile and aircraft airframes. Iraq has few operating plants and foundries and probably must bey most of its armor plate from abroad. For example, Iraq is trying to import metal products from Pakistan. In addition, the Iraqis have little experience with manufacturing high-temperature alloys or other special metals and must purchase these from foreign suppliers.

Iraq probably can alleviate many of these problems by the middle-to-late 1990s.


Italian company to build a small steel mill near
Taji—probably to support tank repair, assembly, or
production—and is setting up an aluminum smelting
operation. Iraq is expanding the Al Zubayr steel
complex to increase production from approximately
300,000 tons/year to at least 3 million tons/year.
When the project is complete, Iraq will be able to
manufacture alloy steel there.

Iraq has made significant progress in the past two years in developing facilities to produce weapons components. Iraqi machining centers and tool and die factories have undergone significant expansion. Computerized lather and other sophisticated production equipment have been acquired and put into use. Moreover, Iraq's electronics production facilities apparently are manufacturing components for an increasing number of weapon systems. These facilities are also adding new production and assembly lines.

Financial Constraints

Iraq's large foreign debt and difficulties securing new credit have prevented Baghdad from proceeding as quickly as it would like on its industrialization program. For example, French and Chilean companies have withheld or delayed equipment deliveries because of overdue Iraqi payments.






Negotiations with French firms for aircraft assambly and other aviation-related projects have bogged down several times because Iraq failed to service its \$6 billion commercial debt to France, according to press reports. We expect Iraq's foreign exchange shortages will continue to cause problems for the ministry.

Iraq's oil earnings—although rising gradually—are not sufficient to meet all the plans on the ministry's books, and the demands of other Iraqi economic sectors require substantial amounts of foreign exchange. Baghdad must allocate some hard currency to





avilian projects to meet postwar expectations for improvements in living standards, in our judgment. As s result, the Ministry of Industry and Military Industries eventually may be forced to scale back some one of the neutron of the state o

### Outlook.



defense industries will provide greater self-sufficiency as additional amounts of locally produced components and systems enter Iraq's military inventory. We believe import substitution and the technological stimulation of civilian industries will increase as a result of the growth of the defense industries. In addition, we expect advances in missile production and socconventional weapons will maintain Iraq's military superiority over Iran and will narrow slightly the technological gap with Israel.

Despite these gains, progress is unlikely to keep up with some of the regime's more grandiose expectations, and some Iraqi weapons programs probably will fail or be abandoned. Many of the systems displayed by Iraq at its arms fairs probably can be procured more cheaply abroad, and the benefits of domestic production probably will not outweigh the costs for some weapons, which Bagbdad will continue to import. Moreover, as a result of high local production costs and financial problems, Iraq probably will continue to emphasize certain high-priority areas, such as missiles and artillery, while progressing more slowly in others, particularly armored vehicles and aircraft. We believe the improvements in manufacturing steel and weapons components are belying Iraq build a modern industrial base that will allow continued development well into the next century

Iraq's economy probably will benefit from Baghdad's plans to convert excess capacity in the defense industries to civilian use. In addition, the demand of the defense industries for locally produced goods probably will spur production and economic growth as well as create a larger pool of skilled labor. Continued improvements in management and production techniques will reduce waste and free additional resources to help fund growth in the defense industries and the civilian economy. In our judgment, financial problems alone will not persuade Baghdad to abandon or slow its programs. The regime almost certainly will continue to believe that long-term economic benefits from its industrialization effort more than compensate for current sacrifices.

Greater defense production almost certainly will allow Iraq to increase its exports of conventional arms. We believe Iraq is positioning itself to become a significant

Iraqi Arms Exports: Arsenal for the Arab World?

During the Baghdad arms exhibition in 1989, Huseyn Kamil announced that Iraq was ready to sell weapons to friendly nations. Baghdad apparently has established potential arms relationships with several Arab states and is beginning to barter or sell some indigenous products in Europe.

Significant exports are several years of, in our judgment. Iraq probably does not produce a sufficient amount of major weapons, although other categories of military supply are increasingly available. For example, Iraq has offered hundreds of thousands of protective masks and small arms munitions and thousands of bombs and rifles for sale to defense firms in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Moreover, Iraq has sold indigenously produced military supplies to Egypt. Other Middle Eastern countries have expressed interest in Iraqi light arms and production technology.

Iraq may hope its exports will bring in needed foreign exchange, but Baghdad has resorted to countertrade arrangements to make sales. For example, Iraqi munition factories have supplied explosive materials to organizations in several European countries as payment for goods received. Iraq has tried to trade chemical protective masks, filters, and clothing to Bulgaria for a combination of raw materials and hard currency. The Iraqis were willing to accept 100-percent barter if large amounts of Iraqi equipment were ordered.

Baghdad probably does not expect exports to fund its defense industries, but we believe the Iraqis will try to increase exports as production capabilities improve.

lion costs will continue until it increases the number of trained managers and skilled laborers. Iraq's arms are likely to be less competitive in the world market for many years.



regional exporter, although the Iraqis probably do not intend to rely on sales to offset much of the costs of their arms industries. For example, we believe Iraq's licensing agreements with Brazil and Yugoslavia allow for export sales. Neither country showed competitive systems at the Bagbdad arms fair in April 1989. Prestige and the attendant political benefits from sales will be Bagbdad's most important gains.

Iraqi dependence on foreign suppliers will continue to be substantial because the gap between local production and international state-of-the-art weapon systems will remain wide, in our judgment. Key elements of Iraq's inventory, particularly aircraft, will continue to be procured from foreign suppliers. The Ministry of Industry and Military Industries is not likely to attain self-sufficiency in state-of-the-art design for most weapon components, and it will continue to depend on foreign designs for advanced weapon systems.

Iraq will be less vulnerable to arms embargoes by the mid-1990s. Although trailing the West technologically, we believe Iraq will be able to produce weapon systems, such as artillery, multiple rocket launchers, small arms, and munitions, sufficient for its needs against regional enemies. Moreover, the increased production capacity of its ammunition factories will give it a greater capability to conduct prolonged fighting without foreign resupply.

#### Implications for the United States

Iraq's military industrialization program presents a significant problem for controlling US-origin goods and technology and preventing its use in Iraqi military programs, particularly strategic projects developing missiles and nonconventional weapons. Because of the linkage between Iraq's civilian and military industries and strict control of access to military facilities, dual-use equipment and technologies can be diverted easily from civilian to strategic military programs. Moreover, Iraq almost certainly will continue its claudestine efforts to procure US-origin equipment and technology. It undoubtedly will take steps to improve its covert procurement in the aftermath of the

US-British sting operation in late March 1990 that intercepted the export to Iraq of US-origin nuclear weapons triggering components.

Bagbdad probably will measure its relations with Washington at least in part by its access to US technology with dual-use capabilities. Although Iraq has often expressed its preference for US technology, it has shown a determination to forgo US equipment—or use clandestine acquisition methods—rather than submit to stringent controls. Bagbdad resents US efforts to get other countries—particularly in Western Europe—to restrict transfer of equipment and technology to Iraq through agreements like the Missile Technology Control Regime.


Saddam probably perceives US criticism of Iraq's strategic and nonconventional weapon programs as an effort to undermine his regime, and he is likely to rebuff US pressure to end Iraqi efforts to acquire Western technology for strategic industries. Baghdad believes these weapons provide a deterrent against its enemies and—along with the defense industries that produce them and other systems—are essential to Iraqi national security. We believe Baghdad will continue to contrast US cooperation with Israel on various weapon programs, such as the Arrow missile, with restrictions placed on exports to Iraq as it argues for greater access.

Baghdad probably will continue to react strongly—as it did to the US-British sting operation—to explicit US efforts to punish Iraq. Despite its heated public rhetoric, Baghdad almost certainly would prefer to minimize damage to commercial relations because the United States is a major civilian supplier and important market for Iraqi oil. Iraq, however, would probably discontinue servicing some of its \$2 billion debt to the United States if Washington applies sanctions or cancels the agricultural credit guarantee program in response to continued Iraqi export violations.

Pages: Appendix

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# Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments

An Intelligence Assessment


















# Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments

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## Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments

Key Judgments
Islamation evaluable
as of 29 May 1990
as used in this report.

Iraq has the most aggressive and advanced ballistic missile development program in the Arab world. It already possesses two missiles—Iraqimodified Soviet Scud B's called the Al Husayn and the Al Abbas—capable of reaching Tel Aviv or Tehran, targets some 600 km away. Seeking an indigenous missile production capability, Iraq also has development well under way of five other missiles capable of greater ranges and payloads.

Foreign assistance is critical to Iraq's effort. With it, production of one or more of Iraq's new missiles could possibly begin during the early 1990s. Otherwise, production could be delayed into the mid-to-late 1990s. Iraq realizes this dependence and is working to become self-sufficient and to wean itself from foreign support—including Moscow, its only supplier of Scud B missiles.

Iraq has acquired most of its missile development and production infrastructure in less than three years. With West European design and
technical assistance, it has built over 70 buildings needed to produce and
test major missile components and to develop and produce subcomponents.

At the heart of this effort are two extensive construction projects, Project
395 and Sa'ad 16, which include facilities for solid-propellant production,
for rocket motor production and testing, for guidance and control systems
development and production, and for missile integration. Iraq still depends
on foreign suppliers for some raw materials but is pursuing production
facilities for these materials in its drive for self-sufficiency. Several
government organizations—especially the Technical Corps for Special
Projects and the Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries—
continue to seek additional equipment and materials to support Iraq's
missile program

Iraq has based its missile program on a diversified acquisition strategy, with low-risk and high-risk development projects running in parallel. At the low-risk end, three of the five missiles under development—the domestic variants of the Al Husayn and the Al Abbas and the Tamuz i—are derived from basic, proven Scud B technology. The other two—the Condor II and the Al Hamza—use more advanced Western propulsion and guidance technology. All of these developments are based on foreign technology and design. We believe Iraq will not be able to design its own missiles for a least five to 10 years.







Conducting these five missile projects at once is costly and undoubtedly stretches Iraq's financial and manpower resources. The multiple developments, however, provide a safety net and give Iraq something to fall back on if one or more missile projects fail. Working with several generations of technology, some of which Iraq will grasp very easily, reinforces this safety net.

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We believe Iraq could begin indigenous production of its variants of the Al Husayn and the Al Abbas by 1991. Both should be able to reach 600-km targets, with 300- or 660-kg warheads, respectively. In addition, some Al Abbas missiles could be equipped with a 200-kg warhead to reach targets at 900 km. In the meantime, Iraq will push to complete development of the Condor II, with production possibly beginning by the early 1990s if foreign assistance continues. If the flow of assistance is interrupted, production could be delayed until the mid-to-late 1990s. Iraq could operate development and production facilities on its own, possibly within five years of the beginning of missile production.

We judge that, in addition to high-explosives warheads, Iraq will develop and manufacture chemical and possibly biological warheads for all of its missile systems. Chemical and biological warheads are more cost effective, result in greater numbers of human casualties, provide a psychological edge, and make the missile a more effective deterrent. Iraq currently has the ability to weaponize its chemical and biological agents. It may already possess a chemical warhead for its modified Scuds

We also judge that, depending on the level of foreign assistance, Iraq may also be able to develop a nuclear warhead before the end of the decade. It is procuring equipment, materials, and technology that strongly suggest a nuclear weapons program exists. But it will not be a simple task to fit a nuclear weapon into a missile's warhead. Also, there are weaponization problems—how to ensure that a nuclear device will survive missile flight—that must be solved. If these problems are not readily solved, Iraq could face two or more years delay in fielding a nuclear payload.

In our assessment, the high-priority status of Iraq's missile program will continue to command the necessary personnel and financial resources. Iraq probably has placed some of its most capable engineers, technicians, and managers on missile projects. Iraq will continue to fund development, probably using a combination of Iraqi and foreign—probably Saudi Arabian—monies. In the future, Iraq may sell missile-related technology to garner prestige as the emerging technology leader in the Arab world.





In our judgment, current Irsqi missile projects will be difficult, if not impossible, to stop. Impeding the flow of foreign assistance, however, could slow development considerably. This would best be achieved by thwarting Iraqi attempts to secure technology in areas such as guidance and control, in which Iraq has limited, but growing, capabilities. Iraq has, however, proved itself capable of tapping into Western and other nations' acrospace industries for technology support, despite attempts by some governments to prevent it. It has effectively exploited a consortium of Western firms known as the Consen Group and has organized a covert procurement network of its own. There almost certainly is no way to block such assistance entirely. The Missile Technology Control Regime will have limited success as Iraq taps nonmember nations like China, India, or Brazil for assistance with its program. Iraq probably will also use its space program as a conduit to gain dual-use technology for its missile program.





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### Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments (V)

Introduction: A Commitment to Self-Sufficiency

He who lovaches on aggression against Irag or the Arab nation will now find someone to repel him. U we can strike him with a stone, we will. With a missile, we will ... and with all the missiles, bombs, and other means at our disposal.

Irage Provident Saddam Havest 18 April 1940 No

Iraq has made indigenous missile production one of its highest priorities. This priority is driven by two major goals. First, Iraq wants to demonstrate to its allies and enemies that it has operational missiles with sufficient ranges to threaten Middle Eastern cities. These missiles could be used to deter Israeli attacks and establish Iraq's leadership in the Arab world as a military power and a technologically advanced nation. Second, it wants to end its dependence on foreign support—both for operational missiles and related technology. Only by building its own missile R&D infrastructure of people and facilities can Iraq wean itself of this dependence.

Iraq has come a long way in pursuing these goals. In the past five years, Iraq has moved from third-hand participation in the Argentine Condor II program (inset) to implementation of a diverse, indigenous capability to develop missiles. It has also developed a large procurement network to amass the technology needed for its missiles

traq's current missile development program began to take shape in 1987. The most pressing need at that time was for a ballistic missile capable of reaching Tehran—a distance of about 600 km, or twice the range of Iraq's Soviet-supplied Scud B missiles. We believe that in early 1987 Iraqi engineers started on a project to produce a missile with this range capability. Iraq modified some of its Soviet-origin Scuds to fly to twice the nominal range—at least 600 km. These missiles, which it called Al Husaya, were used during

Argentina-Egypt-Iraq: A Cooperative Venture

In 1984, Iraq, restricted by a limited missile development and production infrastructure and the financial burden incurred during the war with Iran, focused on funding Argentina's and Egypt's missile-development program for the Condor II missile, Iraq transferred funds to Egypt as partial financing for the missile, then under development in Argentina. We do not know the exact terms of the agreement, but we believe Egypt and Iraq provided funding for the Buenos Aires program in return for some of the first missiles to be produced. In addition, both Egypt and Iraq eventually were to gain a production capability.

Iraq also began construction of its own Condor II production facilities in mid-1987. Over the next two and a half years, we believe Iraq continued to fund development of the missile in Argentina, while seeking and acquiring materials needed to produce the Condor II in Iraq. The Condor II program, however, ran into difficulty in mid-1989. International pressure, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and technical setbacks subsequently brought the program to a virtual standstill in Argentina and Expt. Repeated Argentine attempts to conduct the first flight test of the missile have failed, largely because of technical difficulties with guidance and control. The lack of progress in Argentina threatens now to scuttle the Expellan effort at well.

sor it development in both countries seems to be on hold, at least for the time being





the "war of the cities" with Tehran in 1988. Iraq later claimed to have developed and tested a 900-km-range missile, the Al Abbas. This, however, still left Iraq dependent on Moscow—its only missile supplies—for missiles and parts.


Seeking total indigenous production, Iraq also began other parallel missile development projects. It now has five missiles under development, all of which are based on foreign technology and design (figure 1). We believe that, concurrent with its 1987 decision to modify the Scud B's, Iraq began mapping out a second project for entirely Iraqi-manufactured copies of the Al Hussyn and Al Abbas missiles. It is also pursuing parallel Iraqi development of the Tamuz, and the more advanced Condor II and Al Hamza missiles, capable of greater ranges (figure 2) and payloads. Although development of the latter two missiles will be slower, they will offer frag greater Sezibility. The solid-propellant Condor II, for example, will be easier to handle, require less preparation time before launch, offer more payload options, and provide better accuracy and range than any version of the Al Husayn or the Al Abbas.

We believe Iraq's success thus far is based on the following factors:

- It has made a very determined commitment of people and resources. We estimate well over a billion dollars were invested in ballistic missile development.
- It has learned how to tap into Western and other nations' acrospace industries for technology support, despite attempts by some governments to prevent it.
- It has a diversified missile acquisition strategy with low-risk and high-risk development projects running in parallel.
- It has relied on modest changes to mature, proven, and available Scud technology as the low-risk program.
- It proved in the "war of the cities" that the low-end technology of the Scud is adequate to threaten civilian populations. High technology is desirable, but not critical; basic range capability, however, is critical.

# Iraq's Missile Program: A Multiple Approach

Underlying Iraq's ballistic missile development program is a strategy that incorporates several generations of missile technology. Three of its missile projects are based on liquid propellants and are evolutions of Scud B technology-the domestic copies of the Al Husays and Al Abbas missiles, and the 2,000-km-range Tamuz L, which is probably based on the Iraqi space launch vehicle, the Al Abid. Iraq's Scud derivatives show more imagination and creativity than that seen elsewhere in the Third World. Meanwhile, Iraq also is pursuing development of more advanced solid-propellant missiles, the 750- to 1,000km-range Condor II and the 1,200- to 1,500-kmrange Al Hamza. This multiple approach, although costly, may be a well-calculated effort to help fraq achieve its goal of indigenous missile production. Multiple developments give Iraq something to fall back on should part of the program fail.



The Condor II is a two-stage ballistic missile designed to have a range of 750 km and deliver a payload of approximately 500 kg. Original specifications called for



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a solid-propellant Arst-stage motor and a liquidpropellant second-stage consists

Iraq could begin production of the Condor II missile by the early 1990s with continued foreign assistance. It probably will face problems in areas such as guidance and control, accordistage configuration, and flight-testing as it completes development of the missile at the control of the mis-

is choice for the Condor II second stage is unclear, although we believe Iraq has engine designs for both solid- and liquid-propellant configurations. When Iraq begins flight-testing the Condor II, Iraqi engineers will need foreign help in collecting and analyzing faunch data.

Iraqi production of the Condor II could be delayed until the mid-to-late 1990s if the flow of foreign technology or components is interrupted. Hindering Iraqi procurement in these areas, however, may have only a short-term effect. Iraq is seeking an indigenous production capability for the bulk of the missile-related materials it now outchases.

cannot procure missile-related raw materials and guidance technology and components from Western sources, it probably will turn to non-Western sources, such as China or India.

We believe Iraq will strongly resist any pressure to delay or abandon development of the missile and will press ahead regardless of the status of Condor II development in Argentina or Egypt. Iraq, however, almost certainly will seek continued cooperation with Argentina and Egypt on Condor II development. It would be to Iraq's advantage to exploit its partners for the near future for the hands-on development and testing experience they can provide.

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Egyptian program, but we now expect stronger links between Buenos Aires and Baghdad as Iraq taps
Argentins as a source of assistance.

Our growing concern is that Argentina and Egypt—despite claims of withdrawing from the program—will continue development of the Condor II through Iraq. Argentine and Egyptian engineers may train at Iraqi production facilities, which are similar to those in Argentina and almost identical to ones in Egypt. Argentina and Egypt could begin indigenous production with little or no notice shortly after its engineers return from Iraq. We believe Iraq will be the first of the three to produce the Condor II. If production technology is not transferred to Argentina and Egypt by Iraq, Argentina and Egypt could purchase Condor II missiles from Iraq once Iraqi production begins.


#### The Al Hamza: Probably Building on Condor II Technology

Iraq is working on a second solid-propellant missile, called the Al Hamza. According to a source of the US defense attache in Iraq, it has two stages and a range of 1,200 to 1,500 km. Al Hamza almost certainly is of foreign design—Iraq probably will not be capable of designing ballistic missiles on its own for at least five to 10 years. Iraq reportedly is receiving Romanian technical assistance on the project. Romania has only a modest solid-propellant production capability, and it is unclear if it could lend significant assistance in the missile's development. Additional reporting on the Al Hamza is sparse.

With the Al Hamza, Iraq probably is building on its Condor II technology. Through development of the Condor II, Iraq will gain experience in producing solid propellants, rocket motors, guidance systems, and experience in technical areas such as stage teperation. Iraq undoubtedly realizes that all of this can be applied to longer range missiles. It may prefer to build














Figure 1. The Al Houses and Al Abbes—Iraqi-Modified Scuds.
Iraq's Al Houses and Al Abbes modified Scuds were displayed on
fixed lawnehers at Registed's Weapons Exhibition in 1969. These
photos show that the Al Abbes is roughly I mater longer than the
Al Hussia. Fixed leunchers that would accommodate the longer
Al Abbes are being constructed in at least wine sites in western
Iraq (Section)


on solid-propellant technology. Producing a larger solid-propellant rocket motor, such as one for the Al Hamza, probably would be simpler and quicker than producing a liquid fuel engine of an equivalent capability.

Modified Scud B's: A Quick Flx

In 1987, Iraq had a pressing need for a surface-tosurface missile delivery capability against Iran. Iraq's
300-km-range Soviet-origin Scud B missiles fell far
short of the target. There were no systems with
greater ranges available for purchase, and indigenous
missile production was a prospect several years off.
We believe Iraql engineers chose the quickest and
easiest way to fill this gap—greatly reducing the
payload of the Scud B missile to gain greater range. It
renamed the missile the Al Husayn and gave it at


least a 600-km range. Iraq also claims to have developed a variant, called the Al Abbas, with a range of 900 km (figure 3). In our judgment, Iraq may have received foreign technical assistance for this project—possibly to determine the scope and nature of the modifications.

The Al Hussyn. The Al Hussyn carries a very small payload and is highly inaccurate. It, however, quickly filled the Iraqi need for a missile capable of striking Tehran in 1988. In less than seven weeks, Iraq was






able to fire close to 200 Al Husayn missiles against from during the "war of the cities," contributing to bringing about an end to the fran-fraq war.




The Al Hussan is insecurate because Iraq probably did not modify the Scud's strapdown inertial guidance system. Our analysis indicates the Al Huszyn should have a circular error probable (CEP) of about 2,300 meters, compared with a CEP of about 1,000 meters for the nominal Seud B.



In our judgment, it is unlikely that Iraq has done more than stretch the propellant tanks on the Al-Abbas. Further changes would be more difficult and mure tince consuming. Iraq may have exaggerated the musile's expubilities for propaganda purposes. The Iraqi announcement of the Al Abbas was well timed - a few days after it called a cease fire to the "war of the cities" with Iran. Iraq probably wanted to impress Iran with the idea that Iraq could strike back with longer range missiles should Iran choose to resume its own missile attacks.

The Al Abbas, kowever, could offer Iraq other options. Our analysis indicates that it could carry a 400ke payload to roughly 600 km. We believe traq will perl arrive at estiming ended to att or one



Scud B Technology, More Innovations frag is getting the most mileage it can out of Scud B technology. The Al Hussyn and Al Abbac started as modified Scud B missiles, but Iraq is jaking this a step further. It is reverse-engineering the modified system and now will produce Al Husayn and Al Abbas missiles domestically. Iraq is also working to take Scud B technology even further-out to 2,000 km and possibly into space. The Tamer I, adoptimed in December 1989, probably is pasted by trace space. launch vehicle, the first stage of which consists of five clustered Scud B airframes

Domestically Produced Al Hussys and Al Abbas Missiles. Iraq is proceeding quickly with its plans to reverse-engineer Send components and produce Al Husayn and Al Abbas missiles chiffely within Iraq. Iraq has obtained blueprists of the Schill-Since at least June 1988, several West and East European firms have produced parts from these drawines for a fragis (figure 4)

aponents under Project 1791, w droject through which Iraq seems to be coordinating this effort.

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


Figure 4. Iraqi Al Musaya Missile Paris. Iraq has been acquiring missile paris, both foreign and dumestically produced, in its program to produce the Al Musaya and Al Abbas missiles independing Some of these paris were displayed at Iraq's Weapous Eshibition in 1969. They have been manufactured since mid-1964 by East and West European firms using fragi-supplied bluepriors. Because Iraq is producing the missiles inself, rather than modifying estiting systems, it can incorporate design changes that carry the Al Musaya and Al Abbas to the same ganges as the modified versions but with larger payloads.

fraq also is manufacturing some of the missile parts indigenously. Iraq now purchases the bulk of the parts but almost certainly wants to ultimately produce all of



Iraq probably could begin producing the missiles as early as 1991 by assembling a mix of foreign and domestically produced parts. Since mid-1989, Iraq

has launched several Scud-type missiles—possibly prototypes from Iraq's own assembly line for the Al Husaya or Al Abbas. Iraq's rapid progress in this project can be attributed to several factors. Scud B technology is very basic and Iraqi engineers probably have grasped it quickly. Iraq is shrewd in procuring components. It has spread component blueprints out among a large number of companies, reducing the chance that any one company has enough drawings to identify the true nature of the project. Our assessment is that it will be difficult to impede Iraqi progress on this project.


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In our judgment, Iraq's goal is to domestically produce its Al Husayn and Al Abbas missiles with the same ranges as the original modified versions, but with larger payloads. Because Iraq will produce the missile itself, rather than modify an explaine system, it can make design changes to reduce the overall weight of the missile without incurring such a large reduction in payload. We believe Iraq will accomplish this goal by using a high-strength aluminum alky for as much of the missile's structure as possible—including the authranic



The Chinese Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation (CPMIEC) in assisting Iraq on Project 1728. Since at least August 1988, Iraq has been working with CPMIEC on the construction of a liquid-propellant engine test stand facility in Iraq. Iraq had previously sought the equipment from several other countries—including the United States—as early as September 1987 and found a willing supplier



The Temat I/Al Abid. It ag apparently is trying to purlay Soud B technology into a medium-range ballistic missile and a space launch vehicle. In December 1989, It ag announced that it was developing a 2,000-km-range missile, called the Tamur I. The announcement came shortly after Irag's test of the first stage of its space launch vehicle, the Al Abid, on 5 December 1989. We believe that these developments are related and that Irag probably intends to use some of the Al Abid's technology in a ballistic missile.





The Iraqi space launch rehicle, however, would make for a very ungainly ballistic missile. It requires a large, fixed launchsite (figure 5), which could be susceptible to air attack. Fueling the rehicle would be time consuming. Even if Iraq decides to configure the space launch rehicle as a ballistic missile, production of the Tamuz 1 is unlikely before the mid-to-late 1990s. Iraq will have several hurdles to overcome, including developing an adequate guidance and control system and successfully igniting and separating the stages during flight.

Warbead Options: Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear

To date, Iraq has used its ballistic missiles only with high-explosives warheads. It achieved great success with its conventionally armed modified Scuds during the "war of the cities" and probably will continue to use conventional warheads on some of its missiles. We believe Iraq is also interested in developing warheads

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filled with chemical or biological agents. Because these warheads can disperse lethal concentrations over a larger area, they are more cost effective, result in greater numbers of human casualties, provide a psychological edge, and make the missile a more effective deterrent. Chemical and biological warheads are a more neur-term option, but ultimately trag may hope to produce nuclear warheads as well.

The Chemical and Biological Threat fraq almost certainly will produce a chemical and probably a biological warhead for each kind of missile it has or is developing (inset). Iraq currently has the ability to weaponize its chemical and biological





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#### Ireq's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programs

Chalcal

Iraq now has the largest chemical warfare ICW) program in the Middle East Safe Market

nearing production of the persistent nerve agent VX and to be researching production of the nerve agent vx and to be researching production of the nerve agent somen (GD) and the psychochemical BZ. According to special intelligence, the organization responsible for Iraql CW-agent production is the State Organization for Chemical Industries (referred to as SOCI or SEPP), formerly the State Establishment for Pesticide Production.

Irag's CW munitions include artillery shells, aircraft-delivered bombs, and artillery rockets. A chemical worked on a surface-to-surface missile would be highly attractive to Irag, particularly in light of the effect Irag's conventional surface-to-surface missiles had on Iranian morale during the "war of the cities" in 1988.

Biological

Iroq has a biological warfare (BW) program that we believe is in full production. Iroq may already have filled some fairly simple weapons, such as bombs.

filled some fairly simple weapons, such as born, with biological agents.

irag may be developing biological warkeass for some of its surface-to-surface missiles. The Technical Corps for Special Projects (TECO) reportedly will be involved in constructing a plant that will be used for production of BW agents. This plant will be built at a facility already associated with Irag's missile program. Given TECO's coordinating role in Irag's missile program, this information suggests that Irag is planning a biological warkead for its missiles.

A biological worked would have an even greater effect than a chemical one.



The area of contemination would increase proportionally if these agents were used in missiles with larger payloads, such as the domestic Al Huseyn and Al Abbas. Operational constraints would most likely teduce the effective area of lethal contamination. Biological weapons of modern design have not been used in battle during the 20th century, except on a small scale or in clandestine experiments.

agents. It may already possess a chemical warhead for its modified Scud Al Husayn or Al Abbas missiles and probably could produce a biological warhead as well. Iraq undoubtedly will exploit the Condor IPs submunition warhead design—one of the most effective ways to disseminate chemical or biological agents—once h begins production of the missile.

Work is under way to manufacture chemical warbeads for the domestically preduced Al Husaya and Al Abbas missiles.




#### Irag's Nuclear Program

Notwithstanding Irag's Nuclear Hon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitment, we believe the current leadership Judges a nuclear wropons capability to be essential to meet frag's security needs and to further tree's regional ambillons. Although ut have not identified a formal, coordinated nuclear weapons program, we believe Irog's activities, especially its covers nuclear procurement, strongly suggest a weap uns program exists. Iraq probably has the technical competence, when combined with clandestinely obtuined foreign technology or assistance, to develop a nuclear weapon by the late 1990s. This foreign assistance would be of the type Iron has obtained most recently, namely, individual experts assisting Irag's program rather than a country-to-country exchange.

Iraq continues to have an interest in reprocessing spent nuclear fuel but is now apparently concentrating on establishing a wranium enrichment capability and purchasing equipment suitable for wrapons develupment.

Still, we believe frog is at least five years from

enriched uranium production on a small scale. Nuclear wrapons activities, so far unconfirmed, are probably centered at Tuwaliha, near Iraq, which houses Iraq's peaceful nuclear efforts.



Iraq, as a party to the NPT, is obligated to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) before nuclear materials are moved into new or existing facilities. Iraq's flagrant disregard for the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons in war, however, suggests that Saddam Husayn would not refrain from conducting activities in violation of Iraq's NPT assurances



Iraq probably would need to test a chemical or biological warhead on each of its missile types before being confident that the warhead would function properly on it. The missile's flight could produce instability in the liquid fill, and physical extremes, such as heat, could cause deterioration of the agent. Iraq also will have to develop or purchase a different furing mechanism because these agents are optimally dispensed at altitude, preferably as an acrosol or in bomblets.

A Nuclear Payload

We believe Iraq may hope to eventually deploy a missile with a nuclear payload. We estimate that Iraq

has the technical competence to develop a nuclear weapon by the late 1990s, with the sid of clandestinely obtained foreign technology and assistance. Fitting that nuclear weapon in a missile's warbend, however, will not be a simple task. Unless Iraq solves weaponization problems—that is, engineering the nuclear device so it can survive the missile flight—it could face two or more years of delay in fielding a nuclear payload.

lrag is procuring equipment, materials, and technology that strongly suggest that a nuclear weapons program exists (inset). However, we have not identified a formal effort that would integrate and coordinate the various nuclear activities now under way.






#### Irag's Missile Production Infrastructures Procuring Equipment and Constructing Sites

Acquiring the Infrastructure
Iraq is not content with its dependence on foreign
suppliers or with modifying existing systems for a
long-range delivery capability. Acquisition efforts
over the past several years strongly indicate a drive
for greater self-sufficiency in the military and industrial sectors of Iraq's economy. To that end, several
Iraqi Government organizations—including the Technical Corps for Special Projects (TECO) and the
Nasser State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries
(NEMI)—are procuring much of the needed materials, equipment, and technology for Iraq's ballistic
missile industry.

Technical Corps for Special Projects. TECO appears to be responsible for coordinating Iraq's ballistic missile development program. The Corps is subordinate to Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Military Industries (MIMI) and was established in 1987, probably to expedite high-priority Iraqi military and civillan projects. Once a project is identified, TECO apparently marshals the efforts of individual Iraqi military establishments to complete the task.



TECO and Dr. Al Saudi also help to procure equipment and technology needed to build Iraq's missile production infrastructure



this technology clearly is directed at its current development efforts. Some of the technology—such as filement-wound rocket motor cases—would not be used in production of either the Condor II or the homegrown Al Hussyn or Al Abbas. The equipment may be intended for development and production of longer range missiles, such as the Al Hamza.



Through the efforts of TECO and NEMI, Iraq is rapidly acquiring the accessary infrastructure for indigenous production of surface-to-surface missiles (figure 7). This capability requires production and test




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facilities for major missile co. .gov.ens., such as the elemotors and engines; guidance and actival systems;
nececones and airframes; and materials and subcomponents, such as propellants, ablative materials, accelerometers, and motor cases. Iraq has gained facilities
to do most of the research, development, and production through two extensive construction projects—
Project 195 and Salad 16. Progress, particularly on
Project 195 and Salad 16. Progress, particularly on
Project 195 and continues to seek additional
equipment and production facilities and probably will
upgrade and use existing plants to support its infinite
programs.

Production and Test Facilities


Project 395: The Road to Self-Safficiercy. The construction of the majority of Irag's missile production. Tacilities has been coordinated under Project 395.... also known as Project DOT. In mid-July 1987, TECO. signed a contract with Condor Projekt Ag (CPAG) to provide designs, drawings, and specifications for the buildings; equipment; and raw materials needed for the project. Condor Projekt Ag-later renamed Conchem Projekte Ag-is part of the S+iss-based Consen-Group responsible for econdinating the Condor II missile program in Argenting and Egype, Irag's Al-Fee General Establishment probably organized the construction forces for Project 395. The bulk of the construction is for Condor II production facilities, but we believe some of the facilities will support leag's extended-range Soud project 25 300 1955















Sold 16: The Al Kindi Research Center. The Al Kindi research center, north of Mosul, will support missile-related research and development.















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The network services a wide spectrum of Iraqi needs. Some of its acquinitions support the civilian industry, but others, including that for anthrax samples, uranium enrichment technology and materials, and sophisticated machine tool equipment, clearly have military applications. The United States has received applications made through the network for equipment intended for Iraq's missile program, specifically for the Central Tool Room Plant. These applications were denied, but Iraq undoubtedly will turn to another machine tool supplier to meet its need.

The Iraqi network has suffered setbacks in the past year, but shutting it down completely will be difficult. In early 1990 part of the network was exposed in a thwarted attempt to acquire components well suited for nuclear weapons applications from the United States. Key members of the network were arrested—including Iraqi, British, and French citizens. Other portions of the network remain, apparently untouched.



Public exposure of the network—including names of several of the cover firms—will make it more difficult for the organization to operate in the near term. We believe, however, that the network has the resources available to effect a reorganization, possibly in another country, in a very short period of time. Iraq used a British registration agent to establish most of the companies, a commonplace practice in the United

Kingdom. Through this agent, the network's companies have already changed names and addresses several times within the past two years and undoubtedly could do so again quickly.

### Ovrlook

In the 1990s, Iraq will continue to aggressively pursue misslie development and production capubilities. Although its overlapping developments undoubtedly attenth its resources, they provide a safety net, should a project fail. Because of the basic nature of technology used in its Soud B effort, we believe fraq will undoubtedly see success with these missiles first—particularly the homegrown Al Husaya and Al Abbas. Working with this basic technology will give Iraq some of the experience it needs for more advanced missile development.

frag will push for a more robust missile capability over the next decade. This will involve technology with which Iraq has little or no experience, such as solid rocket propellants, improved guidance systems, multiple stages, and reentry vehicles. Iraq's success in these areas probably will be slower and more dependent on foreign technical assistance. This pace, however, will not discourage or deter Iraq from secking improved missile capabilities. The solid-propellant Condor II, for example, will be easier to handle, require less preparation time before bunch, offer more payload options, and provide better accuracy and range than any version of the Al Husaya or Al Abbas. Iraq will be motivated as well by a desire to assert itself as a leader of the Arab world and a perceived need to keep pace with Israeli developments.

We believe Iraq's program may be too far along to be stopped. Iraq's missile production facilities are virtually completed and much of the equipment has been received and installed. It also is seeking production facilities for raw materials, such as ammonlum perchlorate and carbon fiber, for which it now depends on foreign suppliers. We believe Iraq will need foreign



assistance to operate and maintain its facilities initially but probably will be able to operate them independently within five years of the beginning of missile production.



Iraq's economy may have difficulty keeping pace with its military desires. Although missile development is a high priority, Iraq's resources eventually may be stretched to the limit. Rather than abandon a portion of its program, Iraq may opt to sell missile-related

technology or operational missiles to other developing astions. If Iraq chooses this route, in addition to funding its own program, it will increase our difficulty in hindering Third World ballistic missile proliferation.

In the coming years, improving our collection ability inside Iraq will be accessary in order to keep abreast of Iraqi missile developments. Our analysis is largely based on Iraq's procurement list outside of its borders. Although this information is invaluable, it frequently imparts only a shadow of Iraqi activities and intentions. Over the next 10 years, competition for collection and analytical resources will further frustrate our ability to monitor Iraq's program.

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# Terrorism Review

10 February 1986

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### Terrorism Review

### 10 February 1986

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This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence.

Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US intelligence Community will be considered for publication.

Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor

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Terrorism Review

10 February 1986

The Arrests in Belglum—Filling in the Terrorism Puzzle (C NF)

Belgian police arrested four key members of the Communist Combatant Cells. (CCC) terrorist group on 16 December 1985. Since then they have achieved several major breakthroughs in their investigations of indigenous terrorism, including the arrest of an important additional suspect and the discovery of three safehouses arrest of an important additional suspect and the discovery of three safehouses accontaining explosives, weapons, and documents. These developments allow us to containing explosives, weapons, and documents. These developments allow us to answer questions about the CCC and give us some insight into another group, the Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action (FRAP)

The term "Eurotetrorism" refers to a short-lived compaign of terrorism that showed some sign of chargeration between the CCC, the RAF, and the French Action Directs, it is

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Septe

Belgium

Arab Arms Cache Discovered
On 30 December,
Arabs, in connection with an arms and explosives cache discovered in a video store
in Hasselt.

The video store

owner, who met the Arabs at Brussels' Zaventem Airport, had previously been arrested for illegal arms possession and in 1983 had been convicted for trafficking in Middle Eastern hashish.

Although the arrested Arabs have not been linked to any terrorist organization, the video store may have served as a safehouse for Fatah Force 17.

safehouse in Brussels had been safehouse in Brussels had been and Force 17 member.

arrested were planning an attack against the Brussels airport.

Three Spanish Embassy Officials Kidnaped The three men were seized in West Beirut on 17 January. Two hostages are Lebanese citizens; the third, a Spanish citizen, is a member of Spain's Special Operations Group sent to Beirut to protect the Embassy. The kidnapers are demanding the release of relatives, two Shis Muslims imprisoned for a 1983 assassination attempt on a Libyan diplomat in Madrid.

Pasco, presumed SL terrorists set off approximately 10 bombs against a mining center, a political party office, a police station, and several other public buildings. The bombing spree caused extensive property damage and numerous injuries but no deaths.

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### Italian Rightwing Terrorism

Though often overshadowed by violence from the left, rightist terrorism remains a problem for Italian authorities. Since the train bombing in December 1984 that killed 15 passengers and wounded more than 100, most activity by rightwing groups has consisted of low-level armed and incendiary attacks against domestic targets. We expect this trend to continue throughout 1986 unless a number of exiled rightist terrorists return to Italy—and we have no indication that they will. In the past we have detected no particular pattern to periodic upsurges in Italian rightwing terrorism, although in some cases these appear to have been in response to intensified leftist activity.

### Background

Rightist violence in Italy has a long history dating back to the 19th century and exemplified by the activities of Mussolini's Black Shirts in the early 1920s. The most recent resurgence began in the late 1960s as a response to a leftward national political drift and escalated to the point that rightwing violence was responsible for the majority of deaths and injuries attributed to terrorism in Italy during the 1970s. Although rightwing terrorism is not as active today as it was in the last decade, it remains a serious threat to Italian society. Italian officials recently listed 68 rightist terrorists still at large.


Since rightwing terrorism reemerged in the late 1960s, six groups apparently have been responsible for most of the violence: the New Order, the National Vanguard, the Black Order, the Third Position, the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR), and the Popular Revolutionary Movement. Most of these rightwing groups borrow their symbols from Roman and Fascist mythology and history and claim to represent

Many of the same individuals receive through ransons septiminal groups, most of which tend to discard old names for new ones or operate satultaneously under saveral names. For example, the New Order argumently created the National Vangaund before becoming the Black Order, which in turn gave life to the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei. The latter group has also conducted terrorisminals, under the name of the Papular Revolutionary Movement.

### The Aftermath of Rightwing Terrorism

The unsolved 1980 Bologna railway station massacre that killed 85 people is still a sensitive topic in Italian politics five years after the event. In August 1985, thousands of people attended an annual demonstration in Bologna to protest the unsuccessful police investigatio. Although there is no solid evidence in recent years linking Italian security services to rightwing terrorists, two former military intelligence servicemen are now under indicinent for obstructing the judicial investigation into the bombing. Similar accusations by politicians and newspapers have fueled the Italian people's frustrations.

nationalism, anticommunism, anticapitalism, and rigid order. Just as Italian Fascists did in the past, these new groups seek to create an atmosphere of tension in order to make the government appear impotent and thus provoke popular demands for the restoration of law and order.



Until recently, the targeting and tactics of rightist terrorists have been neither as selective nor as sophisticated as those of their leftist counterparts. The





### Italian Rightwing Terrorist Organizations

Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari)

Third Position (Terza Posizone)

Popular Revolutionary Movement (Movimento Popolare Rivoluzionario)

Black Order (Ordine Nero)

New Order (Ordine Nuovo)

National Vanguard (Avanuardia Nazionale)

Armed Revolutionary Movement (Movimento Armato Rivoluzionario)

Compass Card (Rosa dei Venti)

National Front (Fronte Nazionale)

Mussolini Action Squads (Squadre d'Azione Mussolini)

The Phoenix (La Fenice)

Tolfa Brigands (Briganti della Tolfa)

Italians' Protection Association (Associazione Protezione Italiani)

Aryan Brotherhood (Fratellanza Ariana)


Executioners of Italy (Giustizieri d'Italia)

Fascist Revolutionary Nuclei (Nuclei Fascisti Rivoluzionari)

Popular Revolutionary Opposition (Opposizione Popolare Rivoluzionario)

South Tyrolean Homeland League (Suedtiroler Heimstbandı

most spectacular rightist terrorist operations during the previous two decades involved the indiscriminate use of explusive devices in public places and on public conveyances. Five high-casualty bombings-train stations in Milan in 1969. Bresilia in 1974, and Bologna in 1980; and express trains in 1974 and December 1984-were attributed to the right. although neither police investigations nor judicial procedures have succeeded in positively identifying or punishing the perpetrators. Rightist groups in Italy have not been known to target US persons or interests.



Dangerous Prospects

In large measure, the new wave of Italian rightwing terrorists consists mainly of youths who are fascinated with the doctrine and trappings of the Fascist movement and are responding to the perceived cultural and political challenge posed by their more radicalized -- and publicized--leftist peers. This younger generation, however, suffered a severe blow in May when 53 rightists-mostly in their early twenties-received sentences of 18 months to 23 years in prison.

More serious is the potential threat that could come from "old guard" rightists -those active in the late 1960s and 1970s-many of whom are now living abroad as fugitives. Members of this older generation have recently been reported in France. Ecuador, and Paraguay. If the old guard were to return to action and assume leadership of the new recruits, the tempo





## West German Rightwing Extremists

Unlike the situation in Italy, violence by rightwing extremust groups in West Germany has been almost nonexistent in recent months—no more than some vandalism and threats against foreign guest workers—and is unlikely to pose even an indirect threat to the West German Government or US interests in 1986. Indeed, most of the groups appear to be concerned that an outbreak of rightwing terrorism could create an anti-Nazi backlash. The last rightwing attacks involving US facilities and personnel in West Germany occurred in 1982 agantst the privately owned vehicles of US servicemen.

Kexel-Hepp. The best known practitioner of rightwing terrorism, the "Kexel-Hepp Group," was put out of business in mid-1983. That group had been founded in June 1982 by two West German rightwing activists. Walther Kexel and Odfried Hepp. They had been members of separate neo-Nazi groups, Kexel in the People's Socialist Movement/Workers' Party and Hepp with the Military Sports Group Hoffman. The new group first committed robberies in November 1982 and then bombed US military targets in December, severely injuring two US soldiers.

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# Terrorism Comes to Luxembourg

Luxembourg is the most recent European victim of terrorism. Since April 1985, unknown persons have carried out 14 bombings against domestic targets. The attacks have caused only minor injuries and no fatalities, but in several cases substantial property damage resulted. So far, US or NATO interests have not been targeted, but future attacks cannot be ruled out. Government officials are increasingly under pressure to put a stop to the bombings.

### Terrorism Emerges

The first indication of nescent terrorism in Luxembourg was a series of thefts of explosives from quarries that took place in early February 1985. In several separate incidents, thieves stole almost 400 kilograms of explosives, detonators, detonator cord, and related material.

bombings began two months after the thefts (see

accompanying chronology). The stolen explosives apparently were not used in the initial attacks, but they have turned up in the most recent bombings.

The first two bombings were against pylons supporting powerlines and were thought to be part of an extortion campaign directed against the state-owned electric company. An unknown group—the "Fighting Ecological Movement"—claimed responsibility for the attacks, but not consider the claims to be legitimate.

Since this modest beginning, however, the bombers have struck a variety of targets, including the telephone network, a newspaper, a gas generating

### Chronology of Bombings in Laxembourg, 1985

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279.44.0 (30)			1111	150
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7 May	Eb	ectrical py	lons	2000
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	a.	ndormeri	building	3
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28 May		ectrocan p	72.50	240% Y.S
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23 June	, r	atural gas	HARE	4.9X4
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


plant, gendarmerie and police posts, a swimming pool complex, and the airport. Whereas the initial attacks generally were carried out during nights with full cioons and against unprotected targets, the most recent bombings have been against occupied targets during daylight hours. The attack on 2 December near the European Common Market building-while a meeting of European chiefs of state was in progress-suggests that the bombers are growing bolder and are capable of striking even in the face of maximum security measures.

Who Are These Guys?

Luxembourg officials believe the perpetrators are indigenous terrorists, with no links to international movements or other European terrorist groups, but they are by no means certain that all the bombings were conducted by the same persons. One view is that the bombers are disgruntled civil servants who hold deep-seated grudges against the government. Some have speculated that the culprits are rightists, whose purpose is to harass and embarrass the government. This view is based on the lack of claims in these bombings, coupled with a theory that leftists typically issue political statements or communiques attempting to justify their use of violence, while rightists tend to remain silent. Also brought forward as circumstantial evidence for the rightists' case is the choice of targets: it is argued that, if the terrorists were leftists, they would have attacked NATO targets or established contact with their ideological counterparts in Belgium, France, or West Germany,

The terrorists-whoever they are or whatever political persuasion they represent—probably have extensive training in explosives gained from either service in the military or the police forces, because their devices have been constructed in a professional manner and most of them have gone off as planned. Moreover, the bombers show a high degree of sophistication in controlled. In the attack on the swimming pool, for example, the bomb could have collapsed the entire the perpetrator also demonstrated athletic skills and climbing ability. At the same time, the terrorists




appear to have been consciously attempting to avoid serious injury to the public.

Counterterrorist Response

The government's previous complacent approach to terrorism has given way to serious efforts to improve its counterterrorist capabilities.

recent steps include regrouping the Gendarmerie and the police under a new unified command, recruiting additional personnel, beefing up controls at the airport and access roads, and offering substantial monetary rewards for information.





# Outlook

Lexembourg—until recently one of Europe's most tranquil states—is now coming to grips with a persistent domestic terrorism. With little training or experience to start with, its security services have been unable to cope with the bombing epidemic. Unless the counterterrorist forces achieve some success in their efforts, we would expect the bombings to continue. So far there are no indications that the terrorists are interested in attacking US or NATO interests, although there are many US businesses in the country and the upcoming Reforger military exercises could provide them with attractive targets. The government is coming under increasing internal political pressure to counter the threat

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Pages: /9+ 10

Exemptions: (6)(1) (8)(2)

# The Terrorism Diary for March

Below is a compendium of March dates of known or conceivable significance to terrorists around the world. Our fuclusion of a date or event should not by itself be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist

1 March 1878	Balgaria. Independence Day.
2 March 1956	Morocce. Independence Day (termination of Treaty of Fez).
2 March 1972	El Salvador, Founding of People's Revolutionary Army (ERP).
2 March 1977	Libye. Establishment of People's Congresses.
3 March 1961	Morocco. Accession of King Hassan to throne.
4 March 1982	Colombia, United States. Effective date of extradition treaty aimed at narcotics traffickers.
6 March 1957	Ghana. Independence Day.
6 March 1975	Kurdish regions. Algerian Accord between Iran and Iraq abandoning support to the Kurds.
10 March 1979	Kurdish regions. Death of Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani.
11 March 1966	Indonesia. President Sukarno turns over power to Socharto.
12 March 1880	Tarkey. Birthday of Ataturk.
12 March	Gabon. National Day.
12 March 1968	Mestrities, Independence Day.
13 March 1979	Grenada. Coup d'etat by Maurice Bishop (national day).
14 March 1975	Japan, Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction) Secretary General Honda assassinated by rival radical groups.
15 March 1962	Angels. Founding of National Front for the Liberation of Angela (FNLA).

establishing a separate independent state.

freland. St. Patrick's Day (national day).

Armenians, Signing of Soviet-Turkish border treaty that ended Armenian hopes of

16 March 1921

17 Merch



20 March 1956	Tunisia. Independence Day.			
20 March 1981	Colombia. Death of M-19 terrorist Carmenza Londono ("La Chiqui").			
21 March	Kurdish regions. Kurdish New Year.			
21 March	Palestinians. "International Day of Solidarity With the Struggle of the Arab People of Palestine Against Israeli Aggressors."			
21 March 1960	South Africa. "Sharpeville Massacre" of black demonstrators by security forces.			
22 March 1945	Areh League. Founding of Arab League (original members: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria).			
23 March 1956	Pakistan. Pakistan Day (founding of Islamic republic).			
24 March 1976	Argentina. President Isabel Peron ousted by Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla.			
24 March 1980	El Salvador. Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero assassinated by rightists.			
24 March 1972	Northern Ireland. Beginning of direct rule by the British Government.			
25 March 1980	El Salvador. US Embassy attacked by Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) in response to assassination of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero the previous day. Since then, FPL attacks have been relatively more frequent between 25 March and 6 April than during rest of year.			
25 March 1821	Greece. Greek Revolution Memorial Day (commemorating independence from Turkey).			
25 March 1932	Iraq. Independence Day.			
25 March 1975	Saudi Arabia. Assassination of King Faisal and accession of King Khalid.			
26 March 1971	Bangladesh. Independence Day.			
26 March 1978	Egypt, Israel. Peace agreement ratified.			
28 March 1980	El Salvador. Government expropriates plantations: Salvation Movement of 28 March (MS-28) takes its name from this event.			
28 March 1980	Italy. Four members of Red Brigades die in shootout with Carabinieri in Genoa.			
28 March	Palestinians. National Day.			
29 March 1969	Philippines. Founding of New People's Army, military arm of Communist Party of the Philippines.			



30 March

Christian world. Easter Sunday.

30 March 1974

Turkey. Death of terrorist Mahir Cayan, member of Turkish People's Liberation Party.

30 March 1976

Palestinians. Day of the Homeland.

31 March 1964

Brazil. President Goulart ousted by military cosp.

31 March

Malta. National Day.

(REVERSE BLANK)

### Chronology of Terrorism—1985 and 1986

Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light slace our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.

19 December

20 December

Philippines: Armed assailants kill minister and lay worker near Cagayan del Ore. The victim, paster of a United Church of Christ church, had received death threats. No one has claimed credit for the murder, but the standard believe the atjackers—who numbered about 15—were members of the New People's Army.

23 December

Japan: Police arrest Chukaku-ha member, two other men in arrow attempt. The three had placed a timed incendiary device under a construction company vehicle in Tokyo and were arrested for violating an explosive devices control law and obstructing police officers. The construction company is working on the Narita Irrigation System of the New Tokyo International Airport.

23-29 December

26 December

Cyprus: Attempted assassination of PLO representative in Nicosia failed. A PLO security officer fired on three unidentified men attempting to plant a bomb under a vehicle belonging to the PLO representative. An anonymous caller later claimed the "Eagles of the Revolution" had condemned the representative to death.

2 January

India: Fire suspected Sikh extremists kill one constable, wound another abourd Punjab bus. The assailants escaped after robbing the passengers and taking the victims' weapons.

Burma: Karen reparatists kill 46 persons, injure 136 others in ferryboat attack.

The Inland Waterways Transport Corporation ferry was hit by rebel fire while on a regular run from Moulmein to Kya-in Seikkyi. The Karen ethnic minority has been fighting for an independent state since Burma gained independence from Britain in 1948.

In telepary 1946

•

3 January

Pakistan: Bomb blast in market kills four men in Khyber Puss tribal area. The bombing came after Pakistani troops launched a crackdown in the region against dissident tribesmen who were receiving arms from the Afghan Government. Although no one has claimed credit for the bombing, local authorities suspect that an agent of Khad, the Afghan security service, was responsible.

Pakistan: Time bomb found in Aina Cinema in Peshawar. The device was set to detonate shortly after intermission, when the theater would be filled with moviegoers. An Aighan suspect has been arrested in the case.

Philippines: Body of kidnaped Australian businessman found near village of Tignapoloan. He had been abducted on 20 December, probably by members of the New People's Army (NPA), near the city of Cagayan del Oro. Australian aid workers were withdrawn from Samar Island last year after they received a lengthy "lecture" by armed members of the NPA.

India: Police chief, two other persons killed in Punjab attack. Extremists fighting for a separate Sikh state in Punjab are suspected.

5 January

é January

West Germany: Three armed men hold up two border patrol members in Luebeck. The assailants took two submachineguns, two pistols, and a police radio. Police have conflicting evidence as to responsibility

Early to mid-January

Pakistan: Authorities conduct brief campaign to X-ray all diplomatic pouches. The government, reacting to a report that the terrorist group Al-Zulfikar planned to smuggle weapons into the country in a diplomatic pouch, carried out the procedure for about two weeks. The practice spurred sharp protests from foreign embassies, but the government said it felt the blanket treatment was more defensible than attempting to target only those pouches belonging to Libya or the Palestine I iberation Organizatio..., the most likely suspects.

6 January

India: Suspected Sikh extremist gunmen wound three persons near bus stop in Sangrur District. No one has claimed responsibility for the attack.

Sycret

20



7 January

South Africa: Police kill suspected African National Congress member near East London. According to press accounts, a large but unspecified quantity of Soviet or Bloc weapons were seized.

8 January

South Africa: Police kill member of African National Congress in abortive grenade attack in Seweto. They reportedly found a variety of weapons in the dead man's possession.

9 January

West Bank: Ramallah Military Court sentences Palestinian terrorist to nine-year prison term for incendiary attacks. The terrorist, a member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, had attacked, among other targets, a tourist bus and an army reservist.

Pakistan: Landmine kills 15, injures 10 Afghan refugees in North-West Frontier Province. The mine exploded under their vehicle as they were returning to camp from Sadda. No one has claimed responsibility.

Pakistan: Bomb explodes near movie theater, injuring four persons in Peshawar.

Police reportedly suspect agents of Khad, the Afghan security services

10 January

Colombia: Three cattle ranchers killed in Huila and Santander Departments. The first victim was killed when he resisted guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia who were attempting to kidnap him. The two other ranchers were reportedly killed for refusing to pay 1 million pesos in kidnap protection money

India: Four suspected Sikk militants kill opponent in Kapurthala District. At the time of the attack, the victim had been speaking against a campaign by the radical All-India Sikh Students Federation. Police chased the attackers and killed one.

11 January

Spain: Terra Lliure claims responsibility for bomb attacks in Barcelona and Matero. The blasts caused considerable damage, but no injuries

14 January

Spain: Bombing of French Peugeot auto showroom in San Sebastian causes damage but no injuries. The Basque terrorist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), which has attacked other French business concerns, is suspected.

Spain: Bomb destroys French truck in Irun. Police removed and detonated a second bomb found under another truck. Police suspect the Basque terrorist group ETA.

West Bank: Police dismantle small explosive device in northern Jerusalem warehouse complex. No group has claimed responsibility.

15 January

Spain: Three suspected members of ETA-Military Wing killed near San Sebastian. A civil guard patrol observed two men and a woman machine-gunning a French-registered truck. When the attackers resisted arrest, the patrol returned fire and killed all three.

16 January

United Kingdom: Unidentified gunnan wounds prominent member of Britain's Sikh community putside his west London home. The victim was shot in the right eye and ear.

Netherlands: Amsterdam police seite large arms cache and arrest three men linked to Provisional Irish Republican Army. One of the men, Brendan McFarlane, reportedly was behind the IRA's Maze Prison escape in 1983.

United Arab Emirates: Small explosion damages Abu Dhabi building housing airline offices of Pan Am, Syrian, and South Yemeni airlines. No injuries were reported and no group claimed responsibility

19 January

Chile: US-Chilean Cultural Institute, train station, and bus terminal in Vina del Mar damaged by explosions. No organization claimed responsibility for these dynamite attacks, but in December the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front claimed responsibility for three similar attacks, one of which caused the death of a guard.


21 January

Northern Ireland: Mortar attack on headquarters of Ulster Defense Regiment in Dungannon injures two members. The Provisional IRA claimed responsibility.

Northern Ireland: Provisional Irish Republican Army attacks British Army border patrol near Crossmagles in south Armagh. The Army denied the Provisional IRA's claim that several soldiers were wounded in the attack.

Spain: Grenade attack on civil guard convoy near San Sebastian seriously injures two guardsmen. The attack took place on the same highway where three suspected members of the Basque terrorist group Fatherland and Liberty-Military Wing were killed on 15 January.

23 January



Greece: Letter bomb explodes at Athens Public Power Company in Athens; another defined at the Federation of Greek Industries. The terrorist group Revolutionary People's Struggle claimed responsibility.

25 January

Northern Ireland: Bomb explodes as police investigate activated burglar alarm at service station in Omagh. Five police officers were treated for shock. No group claimed responsibility.

26 January

Ireland: Police seize large quantity of arms in three raids in Slige and Rescommon Counties. According to press reports, police believe the guns and ammunition belong to the Provisional Irish Republican Army.


Israel: Bomb explodes near outdoor market in Haifa frequented by Arab day laborers. The blast caused no casualties and 100 group claimed responsibility.

27 January

Chile: Vina del Mar resort town hit by more homb attacks. Two downtown movie theaters were damaged, but there were no casualties. Several dynamite and incendiary bomb attacks had destroyed three buses within the previous three days in Valparaiso and Vina del Mar. No group has claimed responsibility for these attacks.

28 January

West Bank: Father and daughter shot outside their home near Hebron by unknown attackers. A Jerusalem radiobroadcast said the victims, presumably Arabs, may have been targeted because they were suspected of cooperating with Israeli authorities.




### Highlights

facilities in Iraq have suffered significant damage from coalition air attacks.

- -- About one-third of Iraq's 670,000-b/d oil refining capacity has been put out of operation.
- -- An estimated one-third of the country's electrical generating capacity and about 90 percent of Baghdad's generating capacity have been knocked out.
- --Strategic and nonconventional weapons facilities have been the hardest hit of Iraq's defense industries.

Daily life for residents of Baghdad and other areas hit by coalitions attacks reportedly has become bleak.

- -- The regime halted the sale of gasoline and other petroleum products this week.
- --Blectricity and telephone service are unavailable in most parts of Baghdad, and water supplies there also have been disrupted, according to press reports.
- -- Food supplies reportedly are tightening.





Bany residents of the arrivent sections of Baghdad fled to the north or to shia holy cities of Najaf and Kerbala in the south before or during the early days of the coalition air attacks. In contrast, Iraqis in the poorer--probably shia--sections of the capital are hunkering down and trying to cope.

We do not have accurate figures for refugees or civilian casualties.

- --Press reports indicate several thousand Iraqis already have fled to neighboring countries. Iran is now the only viable refuge, however, because of Iraq's closure of the Jordanian border to refugees this week, its complete closure of the Turkish border last week, and its closure of the Syrian border for years.
- --The US Mission in Geneva reports the International Red Cross and Red Cresent Society are preparing shelter and supplies in neighboring countries for up to 300,000 displaced people.
- -- Iraq's ambassador to the UN claimed that 41 civilians had died and 191 had been wounded as of 22 January.

  however, neither Iraqi authorities nor civilian witnesses would verify this count.

### Political Climate

Reporting on the political climate in Iraq is fragmentary—the regime has restricted the movement of civilians and requires reporters to clear all news items with Iraqi censors—but the regime appears fully in control. There have been no credible reports of unrest since the war began.


--According to Yugoslav press, Iraqi citizens in Baghdad are scared but not totally demoralized; they listen to authorities and are disciplined.

Iraqis remain steadfast in not voicing disagreement with the regime, especially to Westerners.

--Saddam has only his most loyal military and security personnel in Baghdad, reducing the threat of a military coup. The military forces in the capital are drawn from the elite Republican Guards.

Baghdad continues to try to mobilize Arab support in the hope of weakening coalition resolve.





UN economic sanctions are becoming an increasing burden to the Iraqi middle class, causing some to emigrate. On the Iran-Iraq border, the UN estimates that as many as 12,000 refugees have arrived after the recent fighting in northern Iraq. Cuvait will resume oil exports on a small scale this week.

Hardships in Iraq Spreading To the Middle Class


Economic hardships apparently are taking an increasing toll on middle-class Tragis. Many professionals, whose salaries are set by the state, are switching jobs to earn more money to cover increased living expenses or attempting to emigrate,

According to Jordanian press, many
Iraqis travelling to Jordan are settling into spartments or
seeking visas to Western countries. Others stay for a short time
to escape economic hardships and then return to Iraq.

COMMENT: The number of Iraqis currently in Jordan is unknown.


Prices in Iraq are so high that it is cheaper for Iraqis to

travel to Amman to buy essential consumer goods. Some Iraqis are
also fleeing in anticipation of a US military attack against






Iraq. Baghdad will probably continue to allow Iraqi citizens to visit Jordan to buy essential consumer goods, but may tighten travel restrictions to prevent a large share of its educated



Kuwait to Resume Oil Exports

Kuwait this week will resume token amounts of crude oil exports for the first time in nearly a year, according to press. Gulf shipping services indicate two tankers capable of carrying about 3.5 million barrels of crude oil are scheduled to load at the Mina As-Ahmadi oil terminal within a few days. Despite this





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# Moscow's Tilt Toward Baghdad: The USSR and the War Between Iran and Iraq

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by ... of the Office of Soviet Analysis. The statistics were compiled by ... of the Office of Global Issues.

The paper was coordinated with the Directoral of Operations.

Comments and queries are welcome and may be , . directed to SOVA.

Moscow's Tilt Toward Baghdad: The USSR and the War Between Iran and Iraq

### **Key Judgments**

information eveileble es of 36 August 1983 was used in this repors, The USSR has altered its policies toward Iran and Iraq in Baghdad's favor during the past year and a half. In spring 1982 Moscow began a major effort to improve ties with Iraq, emphasizing closer military cooperation—particularly arms sales and deliveries. In 1982, for example, the number of Soviet seaborne arms deliveries to Iraq tripled.

The Kicking wiso has supported magnitudes can for a negotiated settlement of the war between Iran and Iraq. Relations have improved to the point where Soviet and Iraqi leaders have recently made laudatory public statements about bilateral ties

During the same period, Soviet-Iranian relations have steadily deteriorated to their lowest level since the Shah's reign. The most telling indicators of this decline are Tehran's recent abolition of the Tudeh (Iran's Communist party) and expulsion of Soviet officials from Iran and Moscow's counter-expulsion of Iranian officials

Moscow's tilt toward Baghdad is a marked departure from its policy of trying to maintain stable relations with the two while probing for better ties
with Iran. At the outset of the war in September 1980, the Soviets thought
they saw an opportunity to make some gains in Tehran. Their embargo of
arms deliveries to both countries benefited Iran because Iraq had been
receiving considerably more arms. The Kremlin coupled this with a
renewed effort to improve political ties with Tehran. When the gambit
produced no immediate results, the Soviets in spring 1981 lifted the
embargo but refused to conclude any new arms deals

In the spring of 1982, however, Moscow began to take steps that eventually amounted to a clear tilt toward Baghdad. The Soviet move stemmed from various factors:

- Iran's major battlefield victories in late 1981 and the first half of 1982 temporarily disadvantaged traq. The Soviets may have believed at that time that if they did not aid Baghdad, Iraq might decide it had no choice but to accelerate its turn toward Western Europe, China, and even the United States.
- The USSR feared that an transan victory would lead to the spread of Khomeini's type of Islamic fundamentalism near its southern border.

- The risk that a Soviet tilt toward fraq would impel fran to turn back toward the United States seemed much lower in the spring of 1982 than it had earlier in the revolution. By that time, Khomeini had crushed all major opposition, including the relatively pro-Western Bani-Sadr, and the regime's anti-American rhetoric was as shrill as ever.
- The Soviets had concluded that the prospects for the franian revolution swinging to the left were becoming slimmer and that the outlook for good biliteral ties was poor. They apparently believed that as long as Khomeini or his supporters remained in power Soviet influence would be minimal.

There are, however, some important constraints on the improvement in Soviet-Iraqi relations:

- Mutual distrust between Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and Moscow remains great.
- The Soviets do not want to antagonize Syria—their principal ally in the Middle East—by developing too close a relationship with its archenemy, Iraq.
- Most important, we believe the Kremlin, despite the deterioration of its relations with the Khomeini regime, still considers Iran more important geopelitically than Iraq and will want to avoid providing an opening for the United States in Tehran.

Although the Soviets are likely during the next year to continue supplying political and military backing to Iraq, they will attempt to avoid a complete break in relations with Iran.

The course of the war will have a major effect on Soviet policies toward the two countries during the next year. A prolongation of the military stalemate—the most likely scenario—probably would strain Moscow's relations with Iran even further and lead to continued improvement in its ties with Iran.

the Soviets consistently call for an end to the war, even though they realize that cossation of the conflict would yield them liabilities as well as benefits. A peaceful settlement would:

- Reduce the significance of one of the prime irritants in Soviet-Iranian relations—Moscow's weapons sales to Baghdad.
- Probably make the Persian Gulf states less nervous about Iranian expansionism, which would decrease their need and willingness to cooperate militarily with the United States.

- Result in probably greater contributions from Iran and Iraq to the struggle against Israel, thereby strengthening the pro-Soviet radical Arab states.
- Possibly improve the prospects for a rapprochement between Baghdad and Damascus.

The potential liabilities for the Kremlin from an end to the war, however, would be at least as significant:

- Iraq, without as acute a need for weaponry, might accelerate its diversification of weapons suppliers and become less dependent on Moscow.
- · Iraq would probably improve its relations with the United States.
- Although a dramatic improvement in Iranian ties with Washington is a
  remote possibility. Moscow might worry that the absence of the unifying
  factor of the war could weaken the fundamentalist regime to the point
  that more pragmatic clerics, who are not as averse to dealing with the
  United States, would gain the upper hand.

But the Soviets have learned to live with the war and can continue to do so as long as neither side gains a decisive military advantage. Although Moscow would significantly enhance its position in the Middle East if it became an honest broker negotiating a settlement, the prospects of that occurring are slim.

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Moscow's Tilt Toward Baghdad: The USSR and the War Between Iran and Iraq

#### Entroduction

The USSR's primary aim in the Persian Gulf region since 1979 has been to capitalize on the windfall it received from the elimination of US influence in Iran without jeopardizing its shaky, though important, relationship with Iraq. The war between Iran and Iraq, which began in September 1980, has created a major impediment to the accomplishment of this objective.

We believe that the Soviet Union has seen the war as, on balance, detrimental to its interests. On the one hand, the conflict has increased fran's dependence on Soviet and East European trade and transit roetes, weakened the position of the anti-Soviet Saddam Husayn, and boosted Soviet hard currency earnings from arms sales. Nevertheless, the Soviets probably believe that these benefits are outweighed by other factors. In particular, Moscow's shifting policy toward the war has angered both Iran and Iraq. Only since spring 1982 has Baghdad's attitude softened as the Soviets have begun to favor Iraq.

Another of the war's liabilities is that it has made a US military presence in the region less objectionable to the conservative Persian Gulf states, who fear franken expansionism. As the Soviets have often lamented, the war has also benefited the United States and Israel by bleeding two anti-US countries and by diverting Arab and Iranian energies from the confrontation with Zionism.

Although the USSR has maintained an official, public policy of neutrality throughout the war, at different points during the conflict it has leaned toward one side or the other depending on its evaluation of the fighting. Up until 1982, however, the Soviets refrained from taking a decisive stance on the side of either belligerent.

This paper analyzes why Moscow abandoned its relatively evenhanded stance toward the two belligerents in spring 1982 and adopted a policy that clearly

favors Iraq. It briefly examines Soviet interests in each country and the policy the Kremlin followed during the first year and a half of the war. It also points out the factors that will limit Moscow's tilt toward Baghdad—most important of which is Iran's geopolitical significance to the USSR. Finally, the paper discusses different scenarios for the course of the war and how Soviet interests and policies will be affected in each.

#### Background: Soviet Policy Before the War

Moscow's relations with the Shah's regime after 1962 were relatively friendly despite the Shah's deep-scated anti-Communism and suspicion of the USSR. Trade expanded rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, and, beginning in 1966, Tehran started purchasing Soviet arms. By the time of the Shah's ouster in February 1979, the Iranians had ordered \$1.7 billion worth of Soviet weapons—mostly ground force support equipment. (See table on page 10.)

Strains began to reappear in Swiet-Iranian relations after 1973, however, when the Shah started to use his oil wealth to build Iran into the predominant military power in the Persian Gulf region. The Shah's strategy involved a much closer alliance with the United States and resulted in a more assertive frontan policy, which often clashed with Soviet interests in the region. Thus, Moseow, although surprised by the Shah's rapid demise, welcomed it as a major blow to US influence in the area.

The Soviets expended considerable effort after the Shah fell in February 1979 in an attempt to court the regime of Ayutollah Khomeini. The Islamic government's decision to allow the previously illegal Tudeh (tran's Communist party) to operate openly and its expousal of radical "anti-imperialist" and anti-Israeli views presumably bolstered the Kremlin's hopes. Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979,

however, severely set back whatever prospects existed for genuinely close relations with the Khomeini regime. During 1980 Tehran spoke out often against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, closed down Iran's natural gas pipeline to the USSR, and reduced the number of Soviet nationals serving in Iran.

Soviet-Iraqi relations- -- which had expanded during the first half of the 1970s with the signing of a Friendship and Cooperation Treats in 1972 and the sale of large quantities of suphisticated Soviet weapons to Baghdad-worsened during the last few years of the decade. Iraq opposed the Soviet-Cuban involvement in Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978, the Marxist coupin Kabul in 1978, and Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan the following year. The impi baders' growing disenchantment with the USSR convinced them in 1978 to execute some 40 Traqi Communist Party (CPI) members arrested three years earlier on charges of recruiting among the armed forces. The only CPI member holding a cabinet post was removed. Even more worrisome for the Soviets, however, was Iraq's effort to reduce its overwhelming dependence on the USSR, for across—the only real basis of their relationship by purchasing major weapons systems from the West.

The War: Early Soviet Muneivering
The Kremlin clearly disapproved of the truch decision
to attack from in September 1980 

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Soviet officials have complained f
that the Iraqis did not consult with the USS as
they were supposed to according to the Soviet-Iraqi
treaty, before invading.

The Kremlin's decision in the early days of the war to cut off direct arms shipments to both sides reflected its opposition to the Iraqi invasion as well as its efforts to curry favor in Iraq. Iraq bore the brunt of this decision because it had been receiving substantial amounts of Soviet arms, while Iran had been getting far less. From the start, however, Moscow attempted to attenuate the negative effects of the arms embargo, which it never publicized, on both countries. It allowed small amounts of Soviet arms to filter through to them in the first few months of the war and also permitted, and probably encouraged, countries—such as Libya, Syria. North Korea, Bulgaria, and Poland—to ship Soviet-origin weapons to them.

Despite this attempt to soften its impact. Iraq resented the Soviet embargo. A Soviet of 1 told 5 1-in December 1980 that Saddam was "furious" over the arms cutoff 5

Moscow's "betrayet" means bilateral ries could "never again be the same."

1, at the same time, were spreading the idea that Saddam's days were numbered, apparently with the aim of creding confidence in his rule. The Sawiets also signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Syrin in early October despite the open hustility between Damuseus and Baghdad.

Moscow's willingness to risk a repriete with Iraq apparently stemmed, in part, from its belief that the tragis could not afford to break with the USSR completely and from its displeatore with Saddam personally. In the tall of 1980, \$\mathcal{L}\$

Jaim the Middle East said L Jaimbured the embargo to Moscow's desire to reach the "ungrateful" Iraqis a lesson. 

told 

uround the same time that the Kremlin considered 
Saddam "defiant."

Perhaps even more important in the Soviet decision to undertake these anti-Iraqi steps was Moscow's apparent perception of Iraq's invasion as an opportunity to make some gains in Tehran. The Soviets began a new effort to court the Khomeini regime. For instance, Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov met with then Prime Minister Rajai and Speaker of the Majlis Rafsanjani on separate occasions in October and stressed Moscow's interest in improving relations. Tehran, however, was not receptive, and the effort foundered.

#### Reassessment of Policy: Spring 1981 Through February 1982

In a major tactical shift, the Soviets lifted the arms embargo in spring 1981. Removing the embargo clearly favored Iraq because it bought much more than Iran did from the USSR. We believe the Soviets apparently feared that continuation of the embargo was prompting Iraq to accelerate its arms purchases from China and the West and could turn Baghdad irrevocably away from the USSR. Their decision was probably also influenced by worries about the growing rapprochement between Baghdad and moderate Arab states, signs that the United States was seeking to improve relations with Iraq, and Moscow's own failure to make immediate headway with Iraq.

During the next 12 months, until spring 1982, the Soviets delivered over \( \begin{align\*} \mathcal{J}\text{worth of weapons to } \\ \align{align\*} \mathcal{L}\text{worth of weapons} \end{align\*}

All of these arms apparently were bought under contracts signed before the war. During the same period, Iran, despite its appeals for arms, received from Moscow much smaller amounts of military equipment, including small arms, ammunition, trucks, and spare parts.

Lifting the embargo removed a major irritant in the USSR's relations with Iran and Iraq and helped slow Baghdad's shift from Societ to Western weapons, but it created new problems for Moscow, Both Baghdad and Tehran presumably viewed the move as the raghting of a wrong. The Iranians now had good

reason to criticize Moscow for arming their enemy and did so frequently. Baghdad, **C**2 strongly resented Moscow's

failure to curb arms shipments made to Iran by Soviet allies and clients.

In addition to the resumption of the arms deliveries, the Kremlin sent out other signals that it was interested in mending fences with Baghdad. In April 1981, Brezhnev—for the first time since 1978—signed the annual message to the Iraqi leadership commemorating the signing of the 1972 Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets repaired a critical electric-generating facility in Iraq damaged during the war, and they signed a few new economic cooperation agreements.

Nonetheless. Soviet-Iraqi political relations remained chilly throughout the rest of 1981. Although Baghdad sent First Deputy Premier Ramadan to Moscow in June, it remained suspicious of the Soviets. For example.

despite improved relations with Moscow, the Soviets remained determined to destabilize Iraq.

were instructed to increase efforts to monitor Soviet subversive activities.

claimed that Iraqi officials believed Moscow was using Syria to orge Iran to continue the war.

Meanwhile, the Kremfin probably was antisvalent about the course of political developments in Iran, It publicly applianded the ouster in June 1983 of Prime Minister Bani-Sadr, whom Moscow considered anti-Soviet and capable of turning Iran back toward the West. At the same time, it shed no tears over the Iranian cleries' crosbing of the Islamic, leftist opposition—the Mojahedin-c Khala—in the summer and early fall. The Soviets had repeatedly crimicized the Mojahedin for refusing to unite with other teftist forces in Iran and were especially skeptical of its attempts to overthrow the Khomeini regime by force.

But some Soviets recognized that the consolidation of clerical control would not necessarily benefit the USSR. For example, Izvestiya political commentator Aleksandr Bovin warned in an article in June 1981 and on a Moscow television program in July that the fundamentalist clerics who were becoming dominant in Tehran were virulently anti-Soviet.

Whatever reservations it had, however, Moscow continued to court the Khomeini regime. When Iran's new President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister took office late in the summer of 1981, they, unlike many of their predecestors, did not speak out publicly against the Soviets. In addition, trade increased in 1981 to slightly above prerevolutionary levels, the two countries exchanged visits of various low-level delegations, and Ambassador Visogradov was granted a number of meetings with Iranian leaders. This period, however, turned out to be the calm before the storm:

Moscow Changes Course: March Through July 1982 In our judgment, the lifting of the arms embargo in spring 1981 was essentially a damage-limiting move by Moscow. Its previous policy, which had been more favorable to Iran, failed to produce benefits for the Soviets in Tehran and further damaged their already poor standing in Baghdad. Ending the embargo, however, slowed but did not reverse the deterioration in Soviet-Iraqi ties, partly because the Soviets continued to court Khomeini. It was not until the spring of 1982 that the Kremlin began to move from this policy of equidistance between the belligerents to one of clear support for Iraq.

Iraq. The most important indicator of the Soviet till toward Baghdad was the conclusion of a major new arms contract—the first since before the war began.

In part because of abuse moves, political relations with Bachdad also began to improve

Between March and June, the Soviets hosted visits from the Iraci Deputy Trade Minister and Minister of Industry and from Deputy Prime Minister Aziz. During the same period, Iraq received a number of high-ranking East European officials and the Chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Near East Department, Oleg Grinevskiy—the highest level Soviet official to visit Baghdad since before the war

In late May Moscow began praising Iraq's publicly expressed willingness to end the war. Moscow Radio, for example, in a broadcast in Arabic on 21 June, welcomed Saddam's announcement that Iraq would withdraw its troops from all Iranian territory, calling it a "positive step" that could lead to "ending the bloody conflict as soon as possible." The Soviets supported the Iraqi-inspired UN Security Council resolution on 12 July calling for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of forces to prewar boundaries. Soviet media commentary on the major Iranian offensive at Basrah that began on 14 July—the first time in the war that Iranian forces crossed into Iraq—was implicitly critical of Tehran and supportive of Baghdad

Iran. Moscow's frustration with the Khomeini regime's failure to respond to its continual overtures for closer relations and with Tehran's recurrent anti-Soviet gestures was an important factor in the decision to tilt toward Iraq. The Soviets began to voice these frustrations publicly at about the same time this tilt toward frag was becoming evident. On 9 March 1982 Prayda published an authorisative article by its senior Third World commentator, Pavel Demehenko. who listed in stark detail Moscow's griovances against Iranian policy toward the USSR. Demehenko charged that there were "extreme right" factions, opposed to improving Soviet-Iranian relations, operating around the Ayatollah. He also warned that criticism of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was "futile" and that Moscow would not withdraw its troops until outside intervention - "including intervention from Iranian soil"—endes

A indicates Moscow intended this raid to

serve as a deliberate warning to Iran to cease its stronger involvement in behalf of Afghan insurgents.

Soviet media criticism of Iranian repression of the Tudeh also began to increase. Such complaints, common in broadcasts of the National Voice of Iran (NVOI)—the Baku-based Soviet radio station purporting to be Iranian—now began appearing more frequently in official Soviet media

Societ Marivations. Various factors accounted for this clear tilt toward fraq. In our judgment, probably the most compelling was Moscow's concern over the shift in the war's military balance toward fran. The shift was occurring at a time when Moscow's own ties with fran were fraying

Statements by Soviet officials indicate Moscow was wary of an Iranian victory. Iran's impressive string of triumphs on the battlefield beginning in September 1981 made the threat of overall victory a reality. In our judgment, the Kremlin probably thought un Iranian defeat of Iraq and establishment of a pro-Iranian regime in Baghdad would have undermined Soviet influence in Iraq and strengthened the Khomeini regime, making it even less susteptible to Soviet incoads. Furthermore, Moscow did not want to see an anti-Soviet Iranian regime, whose Islamic functions might potentially attract adherents among the USSR's own 43 million Muslims, spread its influence beyond Iranian borders.

Sowet leaders also probably feared that a threatened lead would accelerate its turn toward the West, China, and moderate Arabs. If Moveov would not come to its aid, Baghdad might even appeal to Washington Latin early May 1982 the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat did a study that concluded the United

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#### Soviet Reassessment of the Iranian Revolution

An article in the CPSU journal Kommunist (published in the July 1982 issue but probably written before May) is a landmark in the Soviets' reassessment of the Iranian revolution. It criticized the Iranian clerics' consolidation of power in the summer of 1981 as a negative turning point in the revolutionary process. The author, Rostislav Ulyanovskiy, a deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department and one of the USSR's senior experts on the Third World, stated that the triumph of the fundamentalist clerics marked the end of the revolution's "genuinely people's anti-imperialist" nature and the beginning of an "illusory" quest for an Islamic "third path" between capitalism and socialism.

The article stated that the February 1979 revolution was "bourgeois democratic," and, with the right kind of leadership, could have been surned in an "anticupitalist" (that is, pro-Saviet) direction. Unfortunately, lamented Ulyanovskiy, the complete triumph

of the Shitte clergy stuted the revolution's "progressive" tendencies. In his words:

The more the new organization's power with its specifically Islamic features (to which the ruling clergy paid paramount attention) strengthened, the more rapidly the foundations of the revolution as a truly people's anti-imperialist and democratic revolution were croded...

Perhaps engaging in wishful thinking, Ulyanovskiy claimed that the clergy's policies were intensifying the class struggle in Iran and suggested that "sharp turnarounds in the future" were always possible. He admitted, however, that the leftwing forces in Iran were in discreas.

The article, which had to have high-level authorization to run in Kommunist, was a rationalization and, at the same time, a confirmation of the negative shift in the Soviets' view of Khomeini's Iran.

States had no interest in seeing Iran invade Iraq. If the Soviets believed this, they might have feared that Washington, to prevent an Iranian victory, would take steps that might boost US influence in Baghdad. This action could have left Moscow a net lover in Baghdad at a time when its relations with Tehran were deteriorating:

The blow the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 inflicted upon Soviet interests and credibility in the Middle East also may have contributed to Moscow's tilt toward Iraq. The Soviets may have thought that, if they did not increase support to Baghdad, it would appear to the Arab world that Moscow was failing all its Arab partners.

All of this was occurring at a time when Moscow concluded that the Iranian revolution was swinging to the right and that, as long as Khomeini or his supporters remained in power, Soviet influence in Iran would remain minimal. The Soviets had come to this

conclusion by spring 1982, as evidenced by an authoritative article in the CPSU journal in July (see box) and by their increasingly frank media criticism of Iranian anti-Sovietism indicates that this public assessment was also neivately held. He noted that. C c I Iranian opposition to the Soviet Union was deep and strong. The Soviets also recognized that leftist forces remaining in Iran were no match for the clerical regime. I stated that the Soviets believed the Iranian left was so weak and disunited that, even if the Khomeini regime collapsed, the left probably would be unable to seize power.

The Soviets apparently concluded, moreover, that Iranian hatred of the United States was still strong.

in spring 1982 the Soviets betieved Iran would remain hostile to the United

States for a long time. Although the Soviets probably remained early about a potential improvement in ties with the United States, they evidently thought that a Soviet tilt toward fraq would not produce an immediate move by Tehran back toward the United States.

Since Baseab: Intensification of the Tilt
The improvement in the USSR's ties with Iraq and
deterioration in its relations with Iran have accelerated since Iranian forces first crossed into Iraq at
Baseah in July 1982.

The War. While maintaining an official stance of neutrality, Moscow has become increasingly critical both publicly and privately of Iran's refusal to consider a negotiated settlement. The Soviets in October 1982 again voted for an Iraqi-inspired UN Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire, Iraqi Forcign Ministry officials.

The Soviets also have begun to confront the franians on the war more directly and authoritatively in privilege.

Gromyko received the Iranian and Iraqi envoys to Moscow separately on 5 March 1983. Gromyko stated in no uncertain terms to the transan Charge the USSR's desire for a quick end to the war. In

The Iranians have responded with harsher public 2 ... criticism of Moscow's stance on the war. The regimesponsored Tehran newspaper Ettelwar blasted the Soviets in late December for allowing Iraq to use Soviet-made missiles in an attack on Dezful. At a Friday prayer service in January, Speaker of the Iranian Majlis Rafsanjani accused the "Western and Eastern superpowers" of providing arms that allow Iraq to continue the war. Ayatollah Meshkini was even more blunt in the Friday prayer services in Qom on 25 February, when he claimed that Moscow had "spaced no effort in assisting our enemy," which had "caused the deaths of our dear youths." Subsequent fragi missile attacks on Dezful and other Iranian cities in April and May brought sharp condemnations of Moscow by the clerical leaders.

Other Frictions With Iran. The USSR's relations with Iran have become increasingly strained over a host of other matters in addition to the war. The Khomeini regime, as it had in 1980, allowed Afghan refugees to march on the Soviet Embassy in Tehran on the 27 December 1982 anniversary of the Soviet invasion. They tore down and burned the Soviet flag flying over the Embassy's front gate. Moscow filed an official protest, but the Iranian Foreign Ministry publicly condened the attack on the Embassy by suggesting it was justified by the USSR's occupation of Muslim Afghanistan.

The Soviets have shown increasing concern over Tehrae's aid to the Afghan insurgents and are sow publicly and directly criticizing the Khomeini regime over the issue

... Although the statements were clearly overdramatized for effect. Moscow's worries on this score are genuine.

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Moscow has also protested a series of Iranian measures to restrict and-harass Soviet activities

The most telling indicators of the depths to which Soviet-Iranian relations have sunk, however, have been Tehran's arrest of the Tudeh's leaders, dissolution of the party, and expulsion of 18 Soviet diplomats in May 1983. Tudch General Secretary Kianur! and other party members were arrested by the Khomeini government on 6 February on charges of spying for the KGB. Moscow lodged an official protest and called, thus far unsuppossfully, for their release, Inlate April and early May, Kianuri and other Tudeh leaders "confessed" on franian television to being agents of the USSR, intent upon overthrowing the elerical regime. On 4 May the government dissolved the party, a move Khomeini endorsed publicly. The same day Tehran expelled 18 Soviet diplomats---close to half the officially accredited Soviet diplomats in tran -- for interfering in fran's internal affairs.

Moscow's response to the May actions was restrained, limited to private and media protests and the symbolic expulsion of three frantan diplomats. This restraint reflects the Kremlin's unwillingness to write off Iran totally and possibly a belief that dissolving the Tudch had more to do with frantan internal than with

The transport announced in fate June that Tehran University was reopening the hospital and remaining it after Kuchuk Khan Jungali, whose rebellion against the Study's father as the early 1930s, francas medic mixed, tailed when the Simers withdrew their resport foreign policies. Grompko, however, in his speech to a session of the Supreme Soviet in mid-June, implicitly warned Tehran that the USSR would respond in kind to any future unfriendly frances pers.

Expanding Military Ties With Iraq. In contrast to sharply deteriorating relations with Iran. Moscow's relations with Iraq have been continually improving. Both sides' public rhotoric has reflected this. Gromy-ko, during the same mid-June speech in which he criticized Iran, stated that Iraq and the USSR "are linked by relations of friendship." In an early July interview with a French newspaper. Saddam lauded the Iraqi-Soviet "rapprochement." The most concrete indicators of the rapprochement, however, are the heavy flow of Soviet weapons to Iraq and the conclusion of a major new arms deal

Among the weapons delivered in 1923 Ifighter aircraft.... ank, some of which were the

improved model equipped with laser rangefragers.

Hundreds of surface-to-air missales and rockers.

Societ arms, vales to frag. at since the war began. have made an important confribution to iraq's ability to carry on the war. Nevertheless. Soviet arms represent only one-sixth of Bughdad's total purchases since the war started (see table) Hoghdad has contracted for \$11 billion from Western countries and an additional Tream China since the war began, true's purchases from Beijiss undoubtedly are particularly galling to Moscow

Iran-Iraq: Arms Purchases, 1977-June 1983

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#### Has Andropov Made a Difference?

Brezhnev was still at the helm when the Soviets decided in the spring of 1982 to alter their policy toward from and Iraq. However, Andropov's rise to the top of the Soviet party began at around the same time. Although we do not know his role in this change in policy, as KGB chief and a Politburo member, he undoubtedly had a say in the matter. The fact that his regime has pursued it even more vigorously suggests that he supported the change.

The increasingly pro-Iraqi tilt, together with other information, suggests that Andropov may be more inclined to support Iraq and less convinced of opportunities for the Soviets in Iran than was Brezhnev. Andropov has not publicly expressed his views on Iran, but Izvestia commentator Alekzandr Bovin, reportedly one of his advisers, has been a critic of the

clerical regime. Furthermore, we know L.

2 that the KGB, while Andropov
was its chief, had a low regard for the left's political
prospects in Iran and was deeply concerned by both
anti-Sovies and allegedly pro-US sentiment within
the clerical leadership

There is some evidence that the Iraqis believe Andropov has made a difference. The Iraqi delegation that visited Moscow in December 1982.

taus andropov's regime is much more sympathetic to Iraq's interests than was Brezhnev's. The chief of the US Interests Section in Baghdad noted in February 1983 that Iraqi officials have made similar remarks to Westerners

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The Soviets may also have moved to help traq by urging Syria to reopen the traut pipeline that ero its territors.  The Soviets may also have moved to help traq by urging Syria to reopen the traut pipeline that ero its territors.  The Soviets may also have moved to help traq by urging that ero its territors.  The Soviets may also have moved to help traq by urging the solution of t	tactical plans for Iraq duri along the Doveyrich River I has claim flying Iraqi MIG-25s, alth reconnaissance or combat tors. Although none of the	eict military advisers have widing frag with combat.  et military officers outlined ing the April 1983 battle from

Top Source

Limitations to the Soviet-Iraqi Rapprochement Some important constraints will limit the improvement in Soviet-Iraqi relations. First, great mutual distrust still exists between Moscow and Saddam. The Soviets have not forgotten Saddam's execution of Iraqi Communists in 1978 and his continuing tight restrictions on CPI activity in Iraq. Although numerous sources reported that Saddam released some CPI members from jail in late spring 1982—some sources claim the release was quid pro quo for the April arms deal—the CPI still does not operate openly in Iraq. As recently as 14 June, Saddam publicly condemned the CPI. Moscow also remains wary of Baghdad's increasing military, economic, and political contacts with China and Western powers.

Saddam apparently still deeply resents Moscow's arms embargo early in the war. This sentiment is never far from the surface in his public statements on relations with the Soviets. He also continues in these statements to chastise Moscow on various issues. An article in the Ba'th Party newspaper in mid-August criticized the USSR's foreign policy, sparking a Soviet rejoinder and an Iraqi counter-rejoinder

Second, the Soviets have to weigh the effects of a full rapprochement with Baghdad on their ties with Syria. They will want to avoid antagonizing President Assed, their most important ally in the Middle East and a strong supporter of Iran, by developing too close a relationship with his archenemy. Saddam Husayn. Optimally, of course, Moseow would like to see Bushdad and Damascus mend fence.

pressed the hope [

That Iraq and Syria would end'their mutual hostility, but he was at a loss as to how this would be accomplished. As noted earlier, there are unconfirmed reports that Moscow has unsuccessfully sought Syrian agreement to reopen the Iraqi nipeline.

In asking Damasous to moderate its policy toward Iraq, the Kremlin is likely to argue that such a change would foster Arab unity and lure Iraq back into the radical Arab fold. The Soviets' apparent failure to push Syria more forcefully, however, indicates the value they put on their ties with Damasous.

Third, and most important, we believe Moscow still considers Iran more important geogoditically than Iraq, if for no other reason than that the USSR and Iran share a border of more than 1,500 miles (and Iran, in addition, borders Afghanistan). The Khomeini regime's virulent anti-Americanism and its growing ties to radical Third World regimes serve Soviet interests. Moscow will want to be careful not to tilt so far toward Baghdad that it convinces some Iranian leaders to rethink their hostility toward the United States

Although states that, as of spring 1982. Moscow believed fran would remain hustile to the United States for a long time, Iran's improving ties with Western Europe and Japan appear to be giving Moscow second thoughts. A Soviet Foreign Ministry official, for example, expressed concern

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in February 1983 that Iran is in-Creasingly curning to Western technology and that its leaders were at heart oriented toward the Western economic system. This is apparently leading Moscow to think that better ties with Washington could comnext. A senior Pravda editor, for example, voiced suspicion of alleged US encouragement of South tran has been appearing more frequently in Soviet scholarly and media articles. Krasnaya Zvezda, for example, claimed on 8 June that the United States is providing Iran arms via Israel

Outlook

If the Stalemate Continues. The course of the war will have a major effect on Soviet policy toward Iran and Iraq over the next year

A prolongation of the stalemate on the battlefield is the most likely scenario. A major Iranian breakthrough is now only a very slim possibility. Tehran's fundamental disadvantages in materiel have become obvious as the Iraqis have stabilized the front and bolstered their defensive fortifications. Chances are almost as stim that fran and frag will settle the war at the negotiating table. Despite Iraq's declared willingness to settle the war peacefully and growing weariness of war in Iran, Khomeini's hatred of Saddam impels him to accept nothing less than the Iraqi leader's ouster, tran's most tikely course of action is to fight a war of attrition coupled with increased subversion, hoping thereby to erode Iraqi morale, further strain frag's economy, and eventually bring about the overthrow of Saddan


Although the Soviets did not welcome the war and have persistently called for the conflict's end, both publicly and privately, they have learned to live with it and can continue to do so indefinitely as long as neither side gains a decisive military advantage. The Soviets do not want to write off either Iran or Iraq. For at least the next year, however, Moscow, while probably attempting to stabilize relations with Tehran, is almost certain to continue pursuing a policy more favorable to Baghdad. As long as Khomeini and

The Soviets sent Safronehuk, Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Middle East Department, to Tehran on 5 April. He is one of the highest level Soviet officials to visit Iran since the revolution. The Iranian  $\sum$ 

Since his visit, despite the Tuden episode and expulsion of diplomats, there have been some additional small signs--such as the resumption of Aeroflot flights to Tehran-that the Soviets and franians are not interested in a total break in rela-

Moscow also continues to sell limited amounts of military equipment to Iran 🌈

And, as noted. Tehran . services so obtain Soviet military equipment from countries such as Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia almost certainly with Muscow's approval.



his supporters remain in power, the Soviets stand little chance of increasing their influence in Iran. The Soviets have already improved their relations with Bachdad and may believe that their arms sales will increase Iraqi dependence on the USSR and eventually translate into Soviet leverage.

If the War Ends. Although the Soviets consistently have called for an end to the war, they probably would view its cessation as a mixed blessing.

The Soviets probably would welcome an end to a major and unpredictable war on their border that could redound to the United States' benefit. A peaceful settlement would:

- Reduce the significance of one of the prime irritants in Soviet-Iranian relations—Moscow's weapons sales to Baghdad.
- Probably make the Persian Gulf states less nervous about Iranian expansionism, which would decrease their need and willingness to cooperate militarily with the United States.
- Result in probably greater contributions from Iran and Irac to the struggle against Israel, thereby strengthening the pro-Soviet radical Arab states.
- Possibly improve the prospects for a rapprochement between Baghdad and Damaseus

An end to the war, however, would also carry potential liabilities for the Kremlin:

- fraq, without as acute a need for weaponry, might accelerate its diversification of weapons suppliers and become less dependent on Museuw. Saddam might then have a freer hand to resume his effort to distance fruq from the USSR.
- Iraq would probably improve its relations with the United States. Saddam, for example, has stated publicly that full diplomatic relations will be reestablished as soon as the war ends.
- Although a dramatic improvement in Iranian ties
  with Washington is a remote possibility, Moscow
  might worry that the absence of the unifying factor
  of the war could weaken the present fundamentalist
  regime. Moscow may be concerned that in these
  circumstances more pragmatic eleries, who are not
  as averse to dealing with the United States, would
  gain the upper hand.

 Iran might have a freer hand to increase its aid to Afghan insurgents.

The Soviets think it unlikely that peace negotiations will begin any time soon,

Eistern Specialist scarce on Soviet television on 30 July that there is "no end to the war yet in sight."

Moscow, however, is likely to probe Iran's position to see if the costs of continued stalemate might move it to agree to negotiations and possibly to Soviet mediation. Although Iranian suspicions of the USSR make a Soviet role of honest broker unlikely, it would be the most damaging scenario from the US point of view. A role for the USSR in mediation—akin to that which it played between India and Pakistan at Tashkent in 1965—would be a substantial boost to its objective of becoming a major player in the Middle East, not to mention to its standing with both Iran and Iran.

Moscow will try to ensure that pro-Soviet Third World states rather than US friends, such as Turkey and Pakistan, play central roles in any mediation. Early in the war, for example, the Soviets backed a mediation effort of the Nonaligned Movement led by Cuba.

The war's end almost certainly also would be accompanied by intensified Soviet efforts to improve bilateral ties with both fran and Iraq, probably through arms sales, economic deals, and increased political contacts. Moscow, in addition, is likely to work through both diplomatic means and active measures to try to sustain Iran's hostility toward the United States and to forestall a significant upturn in US-Iraqi relations.

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#### Appendix

# Chronology of Soviet Policy Toward Iran and Iraq, 1980-83

Date	Major Events	ltan	Iraq
1760			
22 September Late September	Iraq invades Iran.	Soviets embargo arms deliveries.	Deputy Premier Azit visits Moscow. Soviets embargo arms deliveries.
October	Soviets and Syrians sign Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.		
Occember		Afghan refugees in Iran, deman- strating on first anniversary of Soviet invation of Alghanistan, in- flict misor damage on Soviet Embassy in Tehran.	2
1981			
Spring		Soviets lift arms embargo.	Sovieta lift arms embargo.
June		Iranians and Scivicts agree on some minor arms deals.	First Deputy Premier Ramadan visits Mescow
June through September		tranian Prime Minister Bani-Safe flees country; wave of Mujahedon assassinations of Iranian leaders; President Kharmenei and Prime Minister Mutavi assume cower.	
September	First major tranian victory 44 Abadan		
October through	tranian victory at Bostan.	Soviet Ambassador Vinogrador secto to cultivator new branism leaders.	
1983			
Murch	Iranian victory of Shesh- Deafut.	Authoritative Pranda article lists Soviet grievances against fran	
April		Soviet troops operating against Afghan insurgenes cross frantan border for first sime.	Soviets and Iraqis sign first new arms deal – G a visce was began.
Mas	Buttle of Khorramshuhr begins.	1-	Oleg Grinevskiy, Chief of Foreign Ministry's Near East Department, vic- its Baghdad. He is the highest sevel Suriet official to call since the war began.
June	fractions win bastle of Khor- ramebahr: they push fragis out of all but small pockets of fragi- an terrinors.	Soviets begin publicly criticizing fran's mance on the war.	Soviets begin publicly praising fragis- stated withingness to end the war.
June through August	War in Lebanon.		Atit visits Museum.
Jule	femium cross trayi burder for first sime in major busile of the war at Bayra,	Landstark article in the CPSU journal Kommunist criticises the Khomeini regione.	Societs support fraqi-mapired UN Security Council resolution calling for immediate cease-free and withdrawal to prevan boundaries.

## Chronology of Soviet Policy Toward Iran and Iraq, 1980-83 (continued)

et distribution of sta-

Major Events Dave tree frag Iraqi defenses at Batta hold and transan offenive fails. August September From stabilizes. October Soviets support another translinspired cease-fire resolution in the UN Security Council. Jarms deal. Brezhnev dies and Andropov becomes CPSU kader. November December Ramedan, Aziz, and Army Chief of Staff Shanshal visit Mescow and acceestrators in Tehran burn the Seriet Embassy flag on the suni-worsery of the Soviet investor of Alghanistan; Mascow lodges offitiate a major trms deal. cial protest. 1963 January Soviets protest frantant' expelsion of a TASS correspondent. Iranians\* first Doveytick River offenive fails with heavy l'ebruary Tudeh leader Kianuri and other Shanshal makes follower visit to Tudeh members are arrested on charges of spying for the KGR. Moscow. casualnes. hospital in Tehran, March April Second Doveyrich River affen-Azu travels to Moscow to work of sive stalls ofter early gains. payment for Iraqi arms purchases. May No major buetles, lesaissa Tedeh leaders make "confessions" Servets agree to recept fragi and Saudi scope "war of attrition" strateon Iranian selevision of spaing for Smith oil for arms. es of constant, but limited, probes at excious points along the front. Iraq stees up its air Tudch is dissolved. attacks on Iranian cities, ship-ping and oil facilities. Iran capels 18 Soviet diplomate for ties with Tudch and interference in francun internal affairs. The USSK expels three transan diplomats in retaliation. Greenska meets with the new tenni-an Ambassador to the USSR.

Foreign companies have been instrumental in Iraq's defense industrialization program during the past decade. Large-scale assistance has provided necessary technology, equipment, and management techniques. Companies from at least 20 countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas—including the United States—have been involved in all phases of Iraq's defense program.

Iraq has established extensive clandestine procurement networks for foreign technology assistance, advanced industrial machinery, and weapon systems components. These networks use front companies and intermediaties to avoid controls on dual-use technologies and other sensitive material.

Despite some problems with the size of its industrial base and with limited capital resources, Iraq's industrialization program is likely to maintain its current pace, providing greater self-sufficiency and attaining other Iraqi goals by the mid-1990s:

- Advances in ballistic missile production and nonconventional weapons would help maintain Iraq's military superiority over Iran and narrow slightly the technological gap with Israel.
- If deterrence fails, the size and scope of Iraq's industrialization suggest it
  wants to be prepared for a lengthy, large-scale war.
- The defense industries' demands for locally produced goods and the creation of a skilled labor pool will spur domestic production and economic growth, benefiting Iraq's economy.
- Increased defense production will allow Baghdad to boost its arms
  exports, although these sales probably will earn more good will than
  revenue.

Iraq will continue to depend heavily on foreign suppliers for at least the next five years, and the technological gap between locally produced arms and foreign state-of-the-art weapon systems will remain wide.

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIAST DATE BASE

SCUD B STUDY (U)

AUGUST 1974

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PREPARED BY

MISSILE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY U.S. ARMY MISSILE COMMAND REDSTONE ARSENAL, ALABAMA

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SCUD B STUDY (U)

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DIA TASK NO. T74-10-04

AUGUST 1974

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EXEMPT CATEGORY: T.B. PART IVDECLASSIEY ON: N/A

#### PREFACE (U)

(S) This study presents an assessment of the Soviet SCUD B short range ballistic missile (SRBM) system. The scope of this study is intended to fulfill the requirements of all consumers for scientific and technical intelligence on the Soviet SRBM systems within the limits of the available information. Comments related to increasing the usefulness of the study are encouraged and should be forwarded to DIA (ATTN: DT), Washington, D.C. 20301.

(5) This study was prepared by the Missile Intelligence Agency of the U.S. Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

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#### SUMMARY (U)

# Background (U)

Among the weapons used for the first time was a Soviet short range ballistic missile (SRBM). This firing was the first combat use of a guided ballistic missile system since World War II.

## (S-NFD)

an SRBM was fired

The results of the exploitation and its significance are discussed in this study.

#### Data Sources (U)

(S NFD) The missile exploited consisted of tank skin and propulsion equipment from the aft portion of the missile.

#### (S-NFD)


## Conclusions (U)

(S\_NFD) The missile was probably a Soviet SCUD B SRBM system.

(5) The SCUD B SRBM is now assessed to have the capability to deliver a 2,200-1b payload to a range of 30 to 160 nm (60 to 300 km). The payload options are nuclear, high explosive, and chemical.

187 The propulsion system is a lightweight, bipropellant, turbopump fed, liquid rocket engine.

vii (Reverse Blank)



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# SCUD B Missile Description (%)



Configuration

Gross Lift-off Weight

Guidance

Control

Propulsion

Single stage, nonseparating payload

13,000 lb (5.9 metric tons)

Inertial

Four jet vanes

Single nozzle, fixed position, liquid fueled rocket engine. Sea level and vacuum specific impulses are 226 and 258 seconds, respectively, Total thrust delivered at sea level is about 21,000 lb.


#### SECTION I

### BACKGROUND (U)

 Introduction (U) <del>(S\_NFD)</del>\_ a Soviet short range ballistic missile (SRBM) was fired to about 50 nm (100 km) -(S NFD) 2. Major Exploitable Items (U) (S NFD) Items which have been identified are as follows: a) Combustion chamber - related: b) Turbopump assembly - related:

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c) Missile skin structure:



## Exploitation Results (U)

-(S-NFB) As a result of the exploitation, the following is known about the missile:


- a) It uses a skin of relatively heavy stainless steel.
- b) The propellant tanks have no integral stiffeners.
- c) It uses a turbopump propellant feed system.
- d) The engine is relatively small and lightweight.
- e) The airframe is an (SCUD B) airframe.
- f) The gas generator uses a mixture of missile oxidizer and fuel rather than a separately stored propellant.

## SECTION II

# SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS (U)

·
1. <u>General</u> (U)
(S-NFB) From shortly after the Second World War until the late fifties or early sixties,
ground forces systems
(S-NFD)
the airframe of the system is probably a SCUD B airframe. However, because of the age of the SCUD B system, many changes could have been made to the original system with little or no external differences which would indicate a newer and a modified SCUD B system.
- (S-NED)
-(3-NPU)
—(S-NPD) Because the SCUD A could deliver its nuclear warhead to a reduced range of 160 km (86 nm) versus a lighter conventional warhead to 300 km (162 nm), and since the SCUD B had about 7 percent more propellant tankage, it was assessed that the SCUD A had been modified (into the SCUD B configuration) in order to deliver a nuclear warhead to the full design range of the SCUD system i.e., 300 km.
Thus, the SCUD B was estimated to be a simple outgrowth of the SCUD A, capable,
of delivering an 1.800-lb warhead
section to the 300 km.
2. SCUD B Warhead Considerations (S)
(S-NFB) There has never been any confirmation of the 1,800-16 SCUD B warhead section weight.
<del>(5)</del>

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- (U) An increase in the specific impulse (without changing the propellant combination) can be accomplished by increasing the vacuum specific impulse ( $Isp_V$ ), or increasing the sea level specific impulse ( $Isp_{S1}$ ), or a combination of both.
- (U) The  $Isp_V$  can be increased by increasing the expansion ratio at the expense, however, of increased nozzle weight and more importantly a decrease in  $Isp_{s1}$ . Obviously this method is self-defeating.
- (U) The Isps; can be increased by increasing the chamber pressure. Everything else being equal this causes a reduction in the throat area. Obviously, this step requires a major engine modification or, strictly speaking, forces the adoption of a new engine.
- (U) To increase both  $Isp_v$  and  $Isp_{S1}$ , both methods stated above would have to be used. In this case, however, the designer must be careful such that the increase in  $Isp_v$ , obtained by increasing the expansion ratio, does not at the same time reduce the  $Isp_{S1}$  more than the increase in chamber pressure raises the  $Isp_{S1}$ .
- (U) Ultimately, to increase the specific impulse it becomes necessary to adopt a new engine.
- (3) There is a third method to provide more energy to the sytem; i.e., by changing the propellant combination

The remainder have approximately the same characteristics.

(U) Therefore, the most probable and practical method to increase the total system energy is to provide a new engine.

(S-NFP) The engine assembly was the only item exploited from which some missile operating characteristics could be obtained.

(S) If the assumption is made that the missile exploited and the SCUD B are the same, then the use of the engine provides the SCUD B the capability to deliver a 2,200-lb (I metric ton) warhead section to the 160-nm (300 km) design range. A range versus payload trade-off is involved and the system will carry more weight to a shorter range, or achieve a greater range with a lighter payload. Thus, by using the engine, the SCUD B can deliver a metric ton payload to 300 km,

3. Missile Skin Considerations (U)

(S NFP)

The material of the propellant tank has a probable yield stress of about 142 KSI. Thus, the maximum tank pressure is about 650 psi.

Therefore, the SCUD B with the engine must have a turbopump feed system.


(S) However, a majority of turbopump systems operate with tank pressures of 75 to 100 psi.

(S-NFD)

(S-NFD) At present it seems that the last postulation is the most plausible

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of the three for the following reasons:



# 4. Conclusions (U)

(S NFD) Thus, at present it seems that the engine assembly was part of the original equipment on the SCUD B and that the missile fired was probably the SCUD B.

#### SECTION III



might be the might be the

## Background (U)

(S-NFD) In 1961, a Marshal of the Soviet Ground forces made reference to a need for a 600-km Army missile system and also for a 1,000-km FRONT missile system. Because the SS-12 (SCALEBOARD) program which evolved from the FRONT missile requirement was the most visible SRBM, the requirement for the Army missile system was essentially downplayed to the extent that it was lost from view. The fact remains, however, that the need for two systems was recognized. The position and authority of the individual recognizing the requirement are such that at least some design work on these systems is indicated.

(S-NFD)

(S-NFD). The first public appearance of the MAZ-543 TEL occurred in 1965. At that time the missile which the TEL was carrying was identified as being a SCUD B missile.

(S-NFB) Since the SS-12 probably attained IOC in 1965, and since the SS-12 was probably part of a dual development program; i.e., a 600-km system and a 1,000-km system (the SS-12)

(S-NFD) There have been reports about SCUD missiles having ranges considerably above the ranges presently assessed.

the longer ranges reported are inconsistent with one anothers

Additionally,

While the latter system is the SS-12, the former system

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system is an unknown missile.

2. Conclusions (U)

- (S-NFD) is a basic SCUD B booster with a lighter warhead, 1100 lb (0.5 metric tons), capable of obtaining a range of 275 to 325 nm (500 to 600 km).

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#### Soriet and Radical Threats

The signing of the Libyan-Ethiopian-South Yemeni Pact in August has intensified the radical, Soviet-backed threat to pro-Western countries in the southern Red Sea area. The Tripartite Pact caps Soviet efforts since 1977 to bring about closer ties between South Yemen and Ethiopia and, more recently, Ethiopia and Libya. The Pact probably will the Ethiopia more closely to the radical community and increase Ethiopian-backed military and terrorist activity by the Somali Salvation Front against the government of Somali President Stad

South Yerren continues to support insurgents against the North Yerrent Government of President Salih. Libya mounts subversive activities against President Nimeiri of Sudan, and Ethiopia may be considering support to Sudanese dissidents. External pressures may heighten political tensions within Djibouti.

The radical states act in the shadow of an impressive Soviet military presence. The USSR has furnished substantial military aid and training to South Yemen since the early 1970s and to Ethiopia since 1977 (the Ogaden war); at present, there are approximately 1,000 Soviet military advisers in each country. Soviet military aircraft regularly use Aden airport to patrol the Indian Ocean, and Soviet warships from the Indian Ocean Squadron make regular use of Aden port and of the anchorage at South Yemen's Socotra island. In Ethiopia, Soviet aircraft use Asmara for reconnaissance flights, and the Soviet Navy regularly visits Dahlak island in the southern Red Sea. Soviet warships transit the Suez Canal en route between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. This continuous land, air, and naval presence stands in contrast to the Soviet failure to develup a comparable presence in or around the entrance to the Persian Gulf

The Soviets could substantially improve their overall military posture in this region by introducing relatively small numbers of men in selected types of military units. The deployment of two or three Soviet squadrons of combat aircraft to Ethiopian or South Yemeni

For regional reactions to the Tripartite Pact, see SNIE 34/76.1-81
4 November 1981, The Libyan-Ethiopies-South
Yemen Fact: Short-Term Prospers

ground support capabilities to a range of about 300 kilometers. A much more sustained buildup would be necessary for Soviet forces to match the kind of forces the United States and its allies can bring into the region

airfields, for example, could provide air defense and

## A Red Sea Strategic Consessus?

These threats give several Arab countries a stake in Red Sea security. Egypt, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia explicitly recognize the strategic importance of the region. All three countries see Soviet activities in the Middle East as designed to weaken pro-Western governments and gain control of the strategic sea lanes and Persian Gulf oilfields. Cairo, Khartoum, and Riyadh also believe that the Tripartite Alliance of South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Libya was probably instigated by the Soviet Union and pursues similar objectives to the USSR

Jordan's traditional distrust of Soviet goals has been strengthened by Moscow's strong support for Syria. Despite its recent purchase of arms from the USSR, Amman has worked to limit Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and the Yemens and is sensitive to any threat to its trade route through the Gulf of Aqaba.

Most dramatic, Iraq has been forced to recognize common security interests with its traditional rivals. the moderate Arab countries. Even though fraq does not border on the Red Sea, its war with Iran has made the Red Sea an important alternative route for exports and imports. Baghdad has received large quantities of civilian and military supplies from Jordanian and Saudi Red Sea ports and is pursuing several road and rail projects-as well as the oil pipeline-across Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. No matter how the war ends, Iraq will still have to contend with its longstanding strategic problem-Iran's ability to cut Iraq's trade lifeline through the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. These military and economic incentives for rapprochement with the moderate Arabs coincide with an estrangement from the USSR--prompted by the Soviet cutoff of supplies to Iraq during the war as well as Iraqi worry over Soviet expansionism in the region-and from the radical Arab states-which refused to support Iraq, a fellow Arab country, against fran.

Sylve





# A Red Sea Security System: Political, Military, and Economic Issues

An Intelligence Assessment

Information available as of 8 December 1981 has been used in the preparation of this report.



A Red Sea Security System: Political, Military, and Economic Issues

# Key Judgments

The strategic importance of the Red Sea is likely to grow substantially over the next few years as a result of recent military and economic developments:

- US Rapid Deployment Forces rely on military facilities in the region to help counter Soviet expansionism.
- Saudi Arabia has just completed an oil pipeline to the Red Sea that will enable it to export a substantial share of its crude without going through the vulnerable Strait of Hormuz.
- Riyadh has agreed to finance a pipeline to the Red Sea from Iraqi oilfields.
- At the same time the Libyan-Ethiopian-South Yemeni pact as well as the Soviet presence in South Yemen and Ethiopia threaten the stability of the southern Red Sea basin

These developments give Arab countries from Egypt through Saudi Arabia to Iraq a stake in Red Sea security. At present, security cooperation among these and other Arab countries faces major obstacles, including longstanding political and ideological rivalries and disagreement over the role of US military power in the Middle East. If the Soviet and radical threats became more menacing, however, neutral and pro-Western countries might make common cause. In the absence of Arab cooperation, Israel probably will cite the growing importance of the Red Sea shipping lanes to the West to strengthen its argument for broader US-Israeli strategic cooperation in the region.





A Red Sea Security System: Political, Military, and Economic Issues

Military Factors

The Red Sea is critical to Western efforts to stop Soviet expansionism in southwest Asia and to guard the oil supply routes from the Persian Gulf. The US Navy prefers the Suez Canal to the longer and costlier route around the Cape of Good Hope when sending ships between the North Atlantic-Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf. These transitswhich have included conventionally powered aircraft carriers-will increase in number as the United States develops facilities in Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and Diego Garcia. The United States and Egypt plan a massive improvement in Ras Banas, a small airstrip and harbor area on Egypt's southern Red Sea coast, to make it suitable for use as a staging area for US forces moving into the Persian Gulf.' The collapse of US influence in Ethiopia has dramatically increased the importance of Sudan and Somalia as bases for projecting Western power into the southern Red Sea and northwest Indian Ocean. The United States plans to use air and naval facilities at Berbera, Somalia, to monitor the sea lanes along the southern coast of the Arabian peninsula and the east coast of Africa.

France stations about 4,000 troops and air units at Djibouti at the southern end of the Red Sea on the Strait of Bab-el-Mandel. Djibouti serves as the home port for the French Indian Ocean fleet of 14 warships, the second largest Western naval force in the Indian Ocean.

## Economic Factors

The Red Sea is becoming an increasingly important transit route for oil. Both Saudi Arabia and Iraq look to the Red Sea to provide a secure alternative route for oil exports from the Persian Gulf. The new Trans-Peninsula Saudi pipeline terminating at the port of Yanbu supplies 1.1 million barrels per day, and this will soon increase to the pipeline's capacity of 1.85 million barrels per day. Riyadh plans to double the capacity by the mid-1980s. Moreover, the Saudis have

agreed with Iraq to finance construction of a pipeline with a capacity of from 1.6 to 1.9 million barrels per day to carry crude oil from Iraq's southern oilfields to a terminal near Yanbu. This pipeline could be in operation by 1986. If the second Saudi line and the Iraqi line are completed, Red Sea terminals could furnish close to 5.5 million barrels per day of oil by the mid-1980s; at present about 12 million barrels per day move through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Riyadh plans a 1.5-billion-barrel oil storage facility on the Red Sea near Yanbu, although costs and technical considerations will delay completion until about 1990. Saudi Arabia is also building a petrochemical complex at Yanbu, which will make that port a major product export center and the strait of the port of the product export center and the strait of the port a major product export center and the strait of the port a major product export center and the strait of the strait of the product export center and the strait of the

The Red Sea basin also furnishes oil of its own.
Egypt's most important oilfields are near the upper
Red Sea in the Gulf of Suez, and oil exploration is
under way along the Red Sea coast of Egypt and
Sudan interest.

As a result, the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal are regaining the strategic importance they held before the closing of the Canal in 1967 and the nearsimultaneous appearance of supertankers which made economical the shipment of Persian Gulf oil around the Cape of Good Hope. Present oil shipments through the Canal are about 700,000 barrels per day. Shipments through the Sucz-Mediterranean (Sumed) pipeline-which crosses Egypt from the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean coast near Alexandria and is jointly owned by Egypt and several major oil-producing countries-are at the pipuline's capacity of 1.6 million barrels per day. Egypt has enlarged the Canal to permit transit by larger oil tankers, and there is discussion of further expanding the Canal as well as increasing the capacity of the Sumed pipeline. Cairo's revenues from the Canal-an estimated \$1 billion this year, about one-tenth of foreign earnings-will grow steadily; Sumed pipeline earnings-an estimated \$75 million this year-can also be expected to rise as more oil is moved through the Red Seal

\* See foldout map at end of report

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# A Red Sea Security System: Political, Military, and Economic Issues (U)

An Intelligence Assessment

Specret .

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Soviet Tactical Air Coverage From Selected Airfields in Ethiopia and South Yemen į,ve

Syde



Military Advantages of Regional Cooperation Regional cooperation would offer important military benefits to each country, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. All of the Arab countries involved wish to limit Soviet and radical activity. At the same time, separate military problems make the Red Sea only a . The military and financial strains of the war with Iran secondary consideration for each of them)

وأحمد وأواد فينوؤ بأروال With its major forces deployed to stop a potential Israeli attack across the Sinai and a potential Libyan thrust from the west, Egypt has little available to guard Red Sea routes. Cairo has no plans for a strong naval presence in the Red Sea. Moreover, it lacks the capability to project or resupply forces over long distances. Egypt would respond to Libyan adventurism abroad—such as an invasion of Sudan—mainly by threatening a direct attack across the Egyptian-Libran border rather than by confronting Libya in a third country.

Although to date Saudi Arabia has concentrated on guarding its eastern border.—through measures such as formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council and purchase of the US AWACS-it has indicated a concern about its western scacoast by beginning construction of naval stations and ship repair facilities at Jiddah on the Red Sea as well as at Jubayl on the Gulf. Saudi oil revenues could help Egypt develop sufficient forces to protect the Red Sea. The Saudis presumably see the potential military advantages in cooperating with Egypt in naval training and patrolling, with Egypt concentrating on the northern half of the Red Sea and Saudi Arabia-from its base at Jiddah-concentrating on the southern half

Saudi Arabia could also strengthen air desense of the southern Red Sea by shifting AWACS coverage from the northeast approaches to the country to the southwest approaches. Such a redeployment would be supported by Oman, which has long argued that Soviet-backed South Yemen is the most serious threat to the security of the Arabian peninsula. Any such

Longstanding Egyptian contingency plans call, however, for Cairo to respond to a Libyan attack on Sudan by senditwo brigades of commandes and a squadron of MIG lighters

and on Saudi judgments of their future relations with Iraq-es well as on discussions with the United States, whose personnel will remain on the AWACS.

mean that for the foresecable future Iraq is unlikely to contribute support for Red Sea security

Obstacles to Regional Arab Cooperation Two major political obstacles would make it difficult to translate common security concerns into effective regional cooperation unless Soviet and radical activity appeared more threatening than at present

a law is not give in the track

Saudi Arabia and Iraq are traditional rivals for influence in the northern Persian Gulf. Riyadh took advantage of the Iran-Iraq war to establish the Gulf Cooperation Council, which excludes both Iran and Iraq. While the Saudis welcome Iraq's increased economic ties with Riyadh and other moderate states, they are still uncertain about their long-term relations with Baghdad

shift would depend on the course of the Iran-Iraq war Security cooperation could also be undercut by differences over the proper US military role in the region and the related issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt-backed by Sudan-supports a US-sponsored strategic consensus to limit Soviet influence. Both countries favor a high level of US military aid and

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participate in joint military exercises with the United States such as Bright Star 82. Cairo allows the United States to preposition equipment in Egypt and has pushed for substantial US assistance in developing a large military and communications facility at the Red Sea port of Ras Ranas. In effect, Egypt and Sudan argue that pro-Western countries need a US military presence to counter the presence of Soviet and Soviet Bloc military advisers in South Yemen, Libya, and Ethiopia. Moreover, Cairo and Khartoum defend the Camp David Accords, which help both countries coment their relationship with the United States and which guarantee the return of the Sinai to Egypt

Jordan fears an attack from what it considers an increasingly aggressive Israel as much as it fears a conflict with Soviet-armed Syria or turnoil in the southern Red Sea basin. Amman's recent purchase of air defense equipment from the USSR was designed to introduce some balance into its arms supply relationship with the United States—both to avoid criticism from radical Arab states and to avoid the restrictions that the United States has placed on deployment of weapons sold to Jordan.

Iraq opposes a Western military presence in the region because it aims at a leadership role in the Gulf, the Arab world, and the Nonaligned Movement. Riyadh, Amman, and Baghdad all charge that the Camp David Accords cannot produce a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement; all three countries criticize Egypt for not pushing Israel hard enough on West Bank and Gaza autonomy


Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even Iraq might cooperate with Egypt and Sudan if Soviet and radical activities threatened their national interests directly. Such actions might include a major buildup of Soviet military forces to crush a rebellion in South Yemen or Ethiopia or to threaten or coerce states close to South

Yemen or Ethiopia; a seizure of power by pro-Soviet groups in Djibouti or North Yemen that threatened radical control of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb and perhaps of the southern Red Sea; or an ouster of Nimeiri and a turn to the left in Sudan

Such developments could drive home to Riyadh, Amman, and Baghdad their increasing stake in Red Sea security and overshadow-at least for a timelongstanding Arab rivalries. A dramatic change in the present regional balance of forces could lead Egypt and Saudi Arabia to recall that they overcame earlier antagonisms during the period between the war with Israel in 1973 and the Camp David Accords in 1978. Iraq has moved far enough from its dogmatically radical stance of the 1960s and early 1970s that ecoperation with Saudi Arabia and even with Egypt against a common military threat seems plausible. Baghdad has displayed its pragmatism by refraining from criticizing growing Omani military ties with the United States because Oman has supported Iraq on several issues during the Iran-Iraq war

A small-scale regional precedent for cooperation among political rivals is the Gulf Cooperation Council. In that case, the threat of the Iran-Iraq war and a series of Soviet advances in the region brought together countries that differed as widely on foreign policy as Oman and Kuwait and lessened—even if it did not remove—the concern of the smaller Gulf countries about potential Saudi dominance.






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# Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East

A Research Paper

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#### Summary

Information available as of 5 December 1986 was used in this report. By 1970 the Soviets had good reason to be happy with their accomplishments in the Middle East during the decade and a half since their first inroads with the Arabs. They had developed strong relationships with Nasser's Egypt—the most important Arab country—and with Syria, Iraq, and Algeria. Moscow had also steadily improved its relations with the non-Arab "northern tier" countries of Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey

Since then, however, Soviet fortunes in the region have been mixed. The USSR's position has become far stronger in the northern tier, with the United States out of Iran and the Soviets controlling the destiny of Afghanistan. But in the Arab-Israeli theater, the Soviets' position is markedly inferior to that of the United States, because they have failed to make themselves a factor in a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict or to appeal to the Arabs ideologically or economicall

Thus far in the 1980s, the Soviets have not made significant progress in capitalizing on the gains they made in the northern tier in the late 1970s or in compensating for the setbacks they suffered in the Arab world earlier in the 1970s. They have been unable to replace US influence in Iran with their own or consolidate Marxist rule in Afghanistan despite seven years of military occupation. Their increased presence in Syria, Libya, and South Yemen has not balanced the USSR's loss of influence in Egypt

General Secretary Gorbachev has yet to make any major innovations in Soviet policy toward the region—save perhaps beginning a tentative dialogue with Israel. But he has demonstrated through his military support for Moscow's Arab and Afghan clients, his frequent meetings with Middle Eastern leaders, and the numerous envoys he has dispatched to the area that the Kremlin intends to be more assertive in promoting Soviet interests. The USSR's primary policy goals in the Middle East during the rest of the 1980s are likely to be:

- · Consolidating control in Afghanistan.
- Blocking any US-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace settlement that leaves Moscow out and, optimally, regaining a voice in the peace process.
- Unifying the Arabs into a pro-Soviet front by ending the isolation of the Kremlin's Arab clients: Syria, Libya, and South Yemen.
- Stemming the drift of Algeria and Iraq toward lesser dependence on the Soviet Union and closer ties to the United States.
- · Expanding influence in Moscow's key regional targets: Egypt and Iran.
- · Eroding Turkey's security ties to the United State:

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Gorbachev's best chances for success seem to be in preventing a USsponsored Arab-Israeli settlement, in a modest expansion of Soviet influence in Egypt and Iran, and—possibly—in consolidating control in Afghanistan:

- Regaining a major voice in the Arab-Israeli peace process—a primary Soviet goal in the region since 1973—would greatly enhance the USSR's ability to be a major actor in the Middle East. In particular, it would enable the Soviets to block any US-sponsored settlement they believed harmful to their interests. We believe that Soviet concern about the Syrian reaction has prevented Moscow from taking the one step—reestablishment of relations with Israel—that would be most likely to overcome US and Israeli opposition to Soviet participation in the peace process. It appears, however, that Gorbachev is thinking seriously about correcting the blunder the Soviets privately acknowledge they made by breaking relations in 1967. He is likely to move very gradually to give the Arabs time to get used to the idea of better Soviet-Israeli ties before reestablishing full diplomatic relations.
- The USSR faces formidable obstacles in increasing its influence in Egypt and Iran. Soviet officials acknowledge there will be no return to the late 1960s' heyday of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Barring major internal unrest in Egypt, the best the Kremlin probably can hope for during the next few years is a marginal improvement in bilateral ties and a growing Egyptian disenchantment with the United States. In Iran, the Soviets seem convinced there can be no significant improvement in relations as long as Ayatollah Khomeini remains in power. This will not preclude an expansion of economic ties, however, and Moscow is certain to attempt to exploit Iranian weakness or domestic turmoil in the post-Khomeini era, which cannot be far off.
- Gorbachev appears determined to stanch what he has described publicly
  as the "running sore" of Afghanistan. His moves thus far have included a
  more aggressive pursuit of the rebels, increased military pressure on
  Pakistan, improved training of the Afghan military, replacement of the
  Afghan leader, and a diplomatic/propaganda campaign to portray the
  USSR as flexible about withdrawing. It is too early to tell whether this
  strategy eventually will allow Moscow to withdraw its forces without
  undermining the regime in Kabul, but it will take an adroit and





determined effort to carry it off. The odds are still high that, barring a collapse of Pakistani will, the Soviets will not yet have consolidated Marxist rule in Afghanistan as the 1990s arrive

The Soviets are likely to continue their efforts to remedy their overdependence on Syria in the Arab world by courting moderate Arab regimes. Moscow could become more willing to buck Damascus' interests if Egypt, other Arab moderates, or Israel make concessions to the USSR that they have avoided thus far, or if a successor regime in Syria proves less stable or more friendly to the West than President Assad's. Even so, Syria would be likely to remain the Soviet Union's most important ally in the Middle East, prompting Moscow to tailor its moves to avoid serious damage to bilateral relations

Soviet influence in Iraq and Algeria probably will continue to erode—despite Moscow's importance as an arms supplier—as Baghdad and Algiers pursue more moderate foreign policies and more Western-oriented economic policies. These trends appear to be strategic shifts rather than tactical adjustments, and the USSR, in our view, does not have enough to offer economically to reverse them

Finally, the long-term nature of Turkey's internal problems, the rivalry between Turkey and Greece, and Ankara's doubts about the intensity of US commitments to Turkey promise to continue to provide the Soviets openings to exploit Turkey's weaknesses and to attempt to woo it away from NATO. Nevertheless, Ankara, despite its frictions with Washington, is extremely wary of its northern neighbor and is likely to remain closely linked to the United States, barring an unforeseen breakdown in internal order

Despite the obstacles it faces, the Soviet Union is certain to be a major actor in the Middle East for years to come. The Soviets regard the Middle East as the most important region of the Third World because of its proximity to the USSR, its vast reserves of oil and gas, and its economic and geostrategic significance to the West and Japan. The Middle East is the Soviet Union's most volatile borderland, and its explosiveness poses dangers because of the high stakes for the USSR and the United States in the region and the possibility that uncontrolled events could lead to a military confrontation between the two. At the same time, this volatility offers opportunities for expansion of Soviet influence that are not present on the USSR's other borders.



Moscow attaches considerable importance to becoming a coequal of Washington in the Middle East, as the statements of Soviet leaders attest. This competition with the United States is a major determinant of Soviet policy toward the region. Soviet writings and remarks of Soviet officials make it clear that Moscow regards the increased US military presence in the Middle East since the late 1970s as a major security concern and will devote considerable effort to counter it

This superpower competition and the Soviet leaders' Marxist-Leninist "strategic view" are common denominators that bring a degree of unity to Moscow's policies toward the Middle East. Moreover, the USSR's position on some major regional issues—such as the Arab-Israeli conflict—affects its policies throughout the Middle East. Beyond these unifying factors, however, we believe the Kremlin does not have a "grand strategy" for the Middle East as a whole. Rather it has related but distinct policies toward the widely divergent regions and issues of the Middle East. These policies reflect specific Soviet equities and interests in each region and on each issue, as well as local conditions



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# Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East

### Introduction

Expressing a view that we share, a Soviet specialist on US policy toward the Middle East commented C in October 1985 that:

Moscow's role in the Middle East has been much smaller than it could be, given the Soviet Union's interests in the region, its superpower status, and the Middle East's location on the USSR's southern borders.

This paper explores why this has been the case and assesses the prospects for the USSR playing a more prominent role in the Middle East under General Secretary Gorbachev. Thus, the paper looks at the degree of influence the Soviets wield in different countries. Where have they developed strong influence in the country's military, ruling party, and economic sector? What influence do they have in the country's leadership decisionmaking, especially on questions of foreign policy? How do the Soviets rate the relative importance of the different countries in the region? In which countries do they consider a military presence vital to the projection of Soviet force in the Middle East? In which countries might they consider intervening militarily to protect their investment against internal threat, external invasion, or to expand Soviet influence into a new area?

The paper also examines possible new directions in Soviet Middle Eastern policy during the rest of the 1980s. It pays particular attention to the Soviet view of US influence and intentions in the region—one of the most important factors affecting the Kremlin's formulation of policy toward the Middle East. It concludes with a look at some developments that could have a major impact on Soviet and US interests in the region

## The Middle East as Seen From Moscow

Soviet interests in the Middle East stem first of all from its proximity to the USSR (see foldout map figure 9 at back). As Soviet officials have stressed [ 7. Moscow considers the Middle East to be a Soviet porderland comparable to Latin America for the United States. One Soviet official told a the USSR considers the Mediterranean area to be as strategically important to the Soviet Union as the Caribbean area is to the United States. The Soviets repeatedly have made public declarations of their vital interests in the Middle East since 1955, when a Foreign Ministry statement contended that US attempts to establish military blocs and bases in the "Near and Middle East have a direct relation to the security of the USSR . . . [which is] located in direct proximity" to the region. In arguing that the entire Middle East is their borderland, the Soviets capitalize on the ambiguities of the geographic scope of the region and its different connotations in Soviet and Western usage (see inset).

Other factors that make the Middle East important to the USSR include:

- Energy. The region's vast deposits of oil and natural
  gas make it vital to the functioning of the economies
  of many Western and Third World countries. The
  USSR itself is self-sufficient in oil and natural gas
  but frequently has considered it cost effective to
  purchase these commodities in the Middle East or,
  in the case of oil, to accept it as payment for arms.'
  Soviet domestic oil production peaked in 1983.
- The Soviets resell most of this oi

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# "Middle" or "Near"?

The Soviets divide the Middle East into three regions. They define the "Middle East" as Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan—the three countries of the area that border the USSR. They classify the countries of the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel) and the Arabian Peninsula, along with Iraq, Egypt, and Sudan under the "Near East," and the rest of the countries of North Africa west of Egypt under the term "North Africa." Correspondingly, coverage of the region in the Soviet Foreign Ministry is broken down into one department for the "Middle East," and another for the "Near East" and "North Africa." This paper examines Soviet policy in all three areas and, for sake of clarity, defines the entire region as the Middle East (see foldout map figure 10 at the back!

Although the downward trend was halted in 1986, the questionable prospects for a sustained rebound in output suggest that the Soviet Union will increase its purchases of Middle Eastern oil in the next few years.

 Hard currency. Despite the relative insignificance of the Middle East in overall Soviet trade (about 5 percent of dollar value), arms sales to the countries in the region have been a major hard currency earner. Since 1955 the Soviets have signed arms deals worth approximately \$67 billion with Middle Eastern states—about 70 percent of total Soviet arms sales to the non-Communist Third Work

Earnings from these sales (in hard currency or its equivalent) have averaged about \$5 billion annually during recent years, or 15 to 20 percent of total Soviet hard currency earnings. These earnings have declined steadily, however, from the peak year of 1981 both in dollar terms and as a percentage of Soviet arms deliveries to Third World countries (see table 1).

 Islam. Beside the natural concerns any country has with a neighboring region, the USSR has the added concern that the Middle East contains many of the same religious and ethnic groups found within its own borders (see figure 2). The approximately 45 million members of Islamic ethnic groups in the Soviet Union (roughly 16 percent of the total Soviet population) by and large have not been a security threat to the Communist regime since it subdued the Central Asian Basmachi rebels in the 1920s. Since the late 1970s, however, signs of increasing religious awareness among Soviet Muslims, coupled with the upsurge in Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, have prompted Soviet leaders to pay closer attention to the "Islamic factor" and to increase anti-Islamic propaganda. Just how seriously Soviet leaders regard the threat of "contamination" of



Table 1
Soviet Arms

Table 1
Soviet Arms Deliveries to Middle Eastern Countries

,	Value (billion US \$)	As percentage of Soviet Arms Deliveries to the Non-Communist Third World
1978	4.3	67
1979	7,1	80
1980	5.8	70
1981	6.3	75
1982	6.6	74
1983	5.3	68
1984	4,6	61
1985	3.3	57
1986	1,4 4	

. Through August.

their Muslim population is unclear. A senior Soviet official [

that concern over the impact that islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and the Middle East as a whole could have on Soviet Muslims played a role in the Kremlin's decision to intervene. At any rate, it seems safe to conclude that the primarity Slavic leaders in the Kremlin view this issue with some concern. It gives a foreign policy question a domestic security angle and decisions about the treatment of a domestic minority implications for Soviet relations with Muslim countries.


 Western and Japanese involvement. Beyond its intrinsic value, the Middle East takes on added significance for the USSR because of the longstanding interest the Western powers and Japan have had in the region. The West European colonial powers dominated the Middle East until World War II, and the United States has been the predominant outside power since. Turkey represents NATO's southeastern flank, and the Levant and North Africa lie opposite NATO's entire southern flank. The West and Japan are vitally interested in the Middle East because of its vast reserves of oil and natural gas and its geostrategic location at the confluence of Asia, Africa, and Europe. The Western military presence-mainly US-is a primary concern to Mosco:

For all these reasons, we believe the Soviets regard the Middle East as the most important region in the Third World. Yet, in the context of overall Soviet foreign policy, the Middle East takes a backseat to control over Eastern Europe, the strategic competition with the United States, the relationship with China. and relations with Western Europe.

The potential security threat to the Soviet homeland from the Middle East pales in comparison with those faced from the USSR's Central European and Far Eastern border regions. The overwhelming bulk of the Soviets' conventional forces and all of their intermediate-range nuclear missiles are stationed in these areas. The Middle East, however, is the USSR's most volatile borderland. The region's explosiveness poses potential dangers to the Soviets because the high stakes both the USSR and the United States have in the area mean that uncontrolled events could precipitate a military confrontation between the two superpowers. At the same time, the Middle East's volatility offers potential opportunities for rapid expansion of Soviet influence that are not present on the USSR's other border,



Figure 2 Muslim Peoples in the Soviet Union



Turkic Peoples	1979 Papulation jin sheesendel
Uzbeks	12,456
Kazakhs	6,556
Tatara	6,317
Azerbaijanis	5.477
Turkmens	2,028
Kirghiz	1,906
Bashkirs	1,371
Karakalpaks	303
3 Kumyks	228
16. Uighurs	211
ti: Karachaya	131
112 Balkars	66
is Nogays	60
Iranian Peoples	1979 Population In thomselds! 2.898
RY Tajiks	
B Osetins	
kis Kurds	
Fig. Francisco	
10 Tats	
ig Baluch	19

cot	oles of the Caucasus	(in thousands)
70	Chechens	756
21	Kaberdians	322
72	Ingush	186
23	Adygeys	109
24	Abkhaz	91
25	Cherkess	46
25	Abazins	. 29
27	Dagestani peoples:	
	Avars	483
	Lezgins	383
	Dargins	287
	Laks	100
	Tabasarans	
	Rutula	. 15
	Tsakhurs	14
	Agula	

Sparsely populated or uninhabited areas are shown in white.

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# The Ideological Dimension

The Middle East has not proved to be fertile ground for the export of Marxism-Leninism. Only in South Yemen and Afghanistan have Marxist regimes emerged, and even in those countries ideological roots do not run deep. The Communist parties in most of the other countries of the region have been largely irrelevant. The Soviets continue to support Communist parties and leftist movements in the region and undoubtedly seek the establishment of additional Marxist regimes. They have consistently shown, however, that they are willing to tolerate the suppression of the left if a Middle Eastern regime adopts a pro-Soviet foreign policy

# A Key Factor: Competition With Washington

A leading Soviet expert on the United States told a Kuwaiti newspaper in December 1984:

When Kissinger was dealing with the Middle East, he did not consider Israel, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia, but he considered only the United States and the Soviet Union. This is the view of the current US Administration.

We believe this bipolar perspective also has long been the view of the leaders in the Kremlin. The Soviets' desire to erode US influence and replace it with their own has played a major role in most moves they have made in the Middle East since the decline of British, influence in the region following World War 1)

For decades the Soviets have expressed open resentment and ridicule of Washington's claims that the United States has vital interests in the Middle East. The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement of 1955 asserting that the Middle East was vital to Soviet security because of the USSR's proximity went on to state that the same could not be said "about the USA, located thousands of kilometers from this region." A quarter of a century later, then Foreign Minister Gromyko stated during a speech two months after the Carter Doctrine was pronounced that US foreign policy circles

... are stressing more and more often and with greater importunity the "vital interests" of the USA. It is asserted that in the Persian Gulf and, for that matter, anyplace where there are sources of oil are areas where US "vital interests" are involved . . . . It is said that the same "vital interests" are present in the Middle East. In all parts of Asia—south of our borders—it is the same thing.

Gorbachev made a similar remark in October 1985 in the joint press conference he held with French President Mitterrand during their meetings in Paris

Despite this resentment, Soviet leaders clearly recognize that the United States is, indeed, vitally interested in the Middle East. Soviet commentaries note the importance US presidents have attached to the region dating from the Truman Doctrine of the 1940s, through the Eisenhower Doctrine of the 1950s, and the Carter and Reagan Doctrines of the 1980s. One scholarly Soviet study of US Middle Eastern policy in the 1970s highlights President Nixon's statement to Congress in May 1973 that "no other crisis region of the world has greater importance or priority for the USA than the Middle East.

The Soviets attach vital importance to the increased US military presence in the Middle East that began in the late 1970s. Ignoring US concerns over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and possible Soviet exploitation of turmoil in post-Shah Iran, Moscow has portrayed all the recent deployments of US forces to the Middle East as "bridgeheads" for the future use of US military power in regional states and against the USSR itself. Soviet propaganda, for example, depicts the battalion of the US 82nd Airborne Division that participates in the Multinational Force of Observers monitoring the Egyptian-Israeli border in the Sinai as



a "shock unit of the US 'Rapid Deployment Force' "
(RDF). A 1983 Soviet study of US policy in the Third
World claims that the Reagan administration's goal is

the establishment of US military control over the resources of the Near and Middle East; the creation of a hotbed of tension close to the Soviet border; the imposition of constant pressure on the USSR from the south

Despite the self-serving exaggeration of such thetoric, the Soviets have apparently regarded Washington's actions as a serious challenge to their position in the region. Lebanon is a case in point. Brezhnev stated publicly just prior to the formal US announcement that a contingent of Marines would be deployed to Beirut in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of 1982 that the Soviet Union was "categorically opposed" to such a move, which, if it occurred, would force the USSR "to build its policy taking this fact into account." The Soviet decision to deploy SA-5 surfaceto-air-missile (SAM) units to Syria was taken shortly after Brezhnev's warning. The Kremlin probably would have sent the SA-5s even without the US military deployment given the damaged state of Syria's defenses and Soviet-Syrian relations, but the Marine deployment may have erased any doubts the Soviets had about the necessity of such a move.

The creation of the RDF and later the US Central Command (CENTCOM) appears to be a particularly worrisome development for Moscow

Soviet media continually focus on CENTCOM's activities in the Middle East, particularly on its alleged creation of bridgeheads for future military action against region-

al countries—including the USSF

In addition to the US forces in this region, the Soviets also have to consider the military potential of US allies France, Great Britain, and Italy, not to mention Turkey. The Soviets realize, however, that the United



A US B-52 bomber drops bombs in Egyptian desert during last day <u>of J</u>oint US-Egyptian "Bright Star" exercise

States and the West Europeans do not always agree on Middle Eastern matters, thus reducing the usefulness to Washington of the West European forces in the region. Moreover, Moscow's own East European and Cuban allies have numerous military, security, and economic advisers in Middle Eastern countries who complement the USSR's presence and give the Kremlin another lever with which to influence regional governments, insurgents, and terrorist groups. Unlike Washington's allies, though, none of these Soviet allies—with the possible exception of Cuba—iş capable of force projection in the Middle East

# Overview of Soviet Fortunes in the Middle East Since 1970

To evaluate the Soviets' current position in the Middle East, their past record in the region should be examined, especially during the period since the



height of Soviet influence in 1970. The Soviet successes in the late 1960s in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, coupled with the steady improvement in relations with the northern tier countries, gave Moscow the strongest position it has ever enjoyed in the Middle East. The comment of one Western scholar that the USSR's status in the region at the start of the 1970s "can only be regarded as a singular triumph from the perspective of the past" is representative of the generally held view in the West at that time


#### 1970-78

Nasser's death in September 1970 marked the beginning of the decline of Soviet influence in Egypt and in the Arab world in general. His successor, Anwar Sadat, did not share his view of the importance of Soviet support for Egypt and resented Moscow's intrusive presence in the country, Sadat—at first tentatively, then decisively—moved to reduce Soviet influence. His first step in May 1971 was to remove the pro-Soviet faction hearled by Ali Sabry, who sought to replace Sadat.

Two months after Sabry's removal, the Soviets suffered another blow, this time in Sudan. The Sudanese Communist Party—then the largest and most influential in the Middle East—backed a military coup against President Nimeiri and subsequently was decimated after he managed, with Sadat's help, to restore control. Soviet influence in Sudan declined precipitatel

For background on Russian/Sovietiaxobrement in the Middle East prior to 1970, see appendix ?

\*Aaron S. Klieman, Sovier Russia ah.....e Middle East, Studies in International Affairs No. 14 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 17



Over the next few years, Sadat made a decisive break with Moscow and threw Egypt's lot in with the United States. He sent most of the Soviet military personnel stationed in Egypt home in July 1972 and deprived the Soviets of the use of Egyptian air bases and most naval facilities.5 Although Soviet weapons enabled Egypt to score early gains in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Sadat turned to Washington at the end of the fighting to obtain a settlement with Israel. Soviet-Egyptian relations steadily deteriorated as the United States brokered Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements in 1974 and 1975. The process culminated in Sadat's abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship and cooperation treaty in 1976 and his decision a year later to seek a separate peace with Israel using the United States as a middleman. Within a short span, the Soviets saw their premier relationship in the Middle East-one that had taken 15 years and extensive military and economic aid to build-crumble and Washington pick up the pieces, and they were unable to do anything to prevent it

The loss of Egypt forced the Soviets to shift their support to the more radical Arabs, who also opposed Sadat's willingness to negotiate unilaterally with Israel. Syria and the PLO became the USSR's primary clients in the region beginning in the mid-1970s. Moscow also developed closer ties to Libya and

<sup>&#</sup>x27; Sactor completely out off Soviet use of Egyptian naval facilities in 193

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Bilateral trade soared, and the two signed an accord on "Good Neighborly and Friendly Cooperation" in 1978.

#### 1979-86

Since 1979 the Soviets have improved their position in the northern tier and benefited from US setbacks in the Middle East as a whole. Moscow's position in the Arab-Israeli arena, however, has not markedly improved.

The USSR received a strategic windfall in the northern tier in 1979 with the demise of the Shah and the loss of US influence in Iran. An article in the Soviet scholarly journal Narody Azil i Afriki in 1979 stated that:

As a result of the Iranian Revolution, a change has taken place in the balance of power in the Near and Middle East. The liquidation of the pro-Western . . . regime of the Shah and the collapse of the military-political bloc, CENTO, has weakened the economic and strategic position of the West, and especially that of the United States, in the region and in the entire world.

Instead of an Iran that acted as a US "gendarme" in the region

the Soviets now had a neighbor that was viscerally opposed to the United States. Moscow, however, was able to make little headway of its own in Tehran during the first three years of Ayatollah Khomeini's rule. By the spring of 1982, the Soviets—evidently concluding that as long as Khomeini was in power their prospects for increasing influence in Tehran would remain poor—abandoned attempts to court the regime and tilted toward Iraq in its war with Iran. Since then, relations have remained frigid.

The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 put Soviet forces in control of Kabul for the first time. The Afghan resistance, however, grew even stronger

Algeria, while South Yemen became the first Arab country to be ruled by a Marxist regime when 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il seized power in 1978. Although Iraq was a major Soviet arms client and signed a friend-ship and cooperation treaty with the USSR, by 1978 it had begun buying arms from the West and cracking down on the Iraqi Communist Party.

The Soviets were unable to duplicate elsewhere in the Middle East the naval and air facilities they lost in Egypt (and in Somalia in 1977). Through wider use of port facilities in Syria, South Yemen, and other countries and greater dependence on replenishment at sea, however, they continued to maintain sizable naval contingents in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

The Afghan Marxists' seizure of power in 1978 was a breakthrough for Moscow in the northern tier. Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, already extensive, grew markedly under the Taraki regime. The Marxist takeover in Kabul, however, strained Soviet ties to the Shah of Iran. The cordial relations they had developed in the 1960s and early 1970s had already begun to sour as a result of Iran's expanding military ties to the United States and more assertive regional policy, which often clashed with Soviet interests. With Turkey, on the other hand, the Soviets managed to continue and even broaden the detente of the 1960s.

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after the invasion and prevented the Soviets from consolidating control, much less capitalizing throughout the region on their military presence. The invasion, in fact, made most Middle Eastern states even more suspicious of Soviet intentions and, coupled with the Iranian revolution and the outbreak of the war between Iran and Iraq, convinced some Arab countries (as well as Pakistan) to increase military cooperation with the United States.

The Soviets reaped some benefits from the anti-US backlash generated by the 1978 Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel and by Washington's abortive attempt to establish a pro-US central government in Lebanon following Israel's 1982 invasion. The USSR and Syria moved even closer together than they had been prior to the late 1970s. They signed a friendship and cooperation treaty in 1980, and Moscow qualitatively increased its involvement by sending two SA-5 SAM units to Syria in 1983 menned by approximately 2,000 Soviet personnel.

The USSR's other main Arab client, the PLO, underwent a serious decline beginning in 1982 with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which was aimed at eradicating PLO influence in that country. The jolt of the PLO's defeat led to a rift within Fatab, the PLO's main faction, and a falling out between PLO leader Arafat and Syrian President Assad. Moscow's failure to help Arafat during the invasion and its unwillingness to jeopardize its relationship with Damascus by
stepping in forcefully to resolve the Arafat-Assad feud
strained its relations with the PLO chief. Arafat's
setbacks led him to consider a political solution to the
Palestinian problem through joint action with Jordan
and—potentially—cooperation with the United
States, a move that further chilled Soviet-PLO relations. The USSR moved no closer to its goal of being
included in Arab-Israeli negotiations on the Palestinian issue but took solace from Washington's inability
to convince other Arabs to join the Camp David
framework for peace talks with Israel

Libyan leader Qadhafi's growing fear of US intentions after US Navy jets shot down two Libyan aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra in 1981 prompted him to grant the Soviets wider access to Libyan naval and air facilities. That same year, Muslim fundamentalists in Egypt assassinated the Soviets' most formidable opponent in the Arab world, Anwar Sadat. The death of such an important US ally was a windfall for Moscow, but Egyptian President Mubarak has maintained his country's close links to Washington. Mubarak has avoided Sadat's outspoken anti-Sovietism but moved much more slowly in normalizing relations than the Soviets had hoped. Although ambassadorial ties were resumed in the summer of 1984, there has been no significant improvement in overall relations.

Perhaps one of the USSR's most significant achievements in the Arab world over the last few years has been its improvement in relations with Iraq. Seeing no prospects for gains in Iran and fearing an Iranian victory over Iraq, the Soviets began in 1982 to provide Baghdad with the weaponry it required to pursue the war. Political relations have improved as a result, but the legacy of past disputes has only been put aside, not forgotten. The relationship remains narrowly based on the supply of arms, and the Soviets continue to be worried about Iraq's increasing political, economic, and military contacts with the West—including the United States

Secret



Moscow similarly has been concerned over Algeria's drift Westward since President Bendjedid took over in 1979. The Soviets have tried hard to arrest the drift but with little success. The care and thoroughness with which Bendjedid has shifted Algeria's economy away from the socialist model and its foreign policy from a heavily pro-Soviet "nonaligned" stance suggest that these are strategic rather than tactical moves.

On the Arabian peninsula, the Soviet Union maintained its position in South Yemen despite the ouster of the staunchly pro-Soviet Isma'il in 1980 and the bloody coup against his successor, Hasani, in January 1986. The Soviets also managed to move closer to the regime in North Yemen without reducing their support for the South. Moscow and Sanaa signed a major arms deal in 1979 and a friendship and cooperation treaty in 1984. That positive trend has been jeopardized, however, by the frictions that the most recent coup in Aden has generated in Soviet-North Yemeni relations

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the war between Iran and Iraq initially prompted most of the conservative Gulf states to increase security cooperation with the United States and shun establishing relations with the USSR. By 1985, however, the effects of these shocks had lessened, and the Gulf states' disenchantment with US support for Israel had increased to the point where Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) established relations with the Soviet Union. The other Gulf states appear to be moving in the same direction, although suspicion of Soviet complicity in Hasani's ouster is likely to slow the process

Gorbachev's record since assuming power in March 1985 suggests that the United States can expect a more activist and tactically flexible Soviet policy in the Middle East than it has faced since the early 1970s. He has yet to make any major innovations in Soviet policy toward the region—save, perhaps, beginning a tentative dialogue with Israel. But he has demonstrated through his military support for Moscow's Arab and Afghan clients, his frequent meetings with Middle Eastern leaders, and the numerous envoys he has dispatched to the area that the Kremlin intends to be much more assertive in promoting Soviet interests

# The Soviet Balance Sheet Today

### The Arab World

The Strategic Prize: Egypt

The Soviets have yet to recover fully in the Arab world from their loss of Egypt. Soviet influence in Syria, Libya, and South Yemen hardly replaces the loss of influence in Egypt, which Moscow openly acknowledges, in the words of one Soviet scholar, as "the key and most important country of the Arab world." The Arabs' chances of winning or even holding their own in a war with Israel without Egyptian participation are slim

Middle East, the Soviets are devoting considerable effort to rebuilding their influence there or, at least, reducing Cairo's dependence on the United States. Since the return of ambassadors in the summer of 1984, the foreign ministers have met at the United Nations

Moscow also has toned down its media criticism or Egyptian policies.

Recognizing Egypt's strategic importance in the

Obstacles to Closer Relations. Egypt's estimated \$2.5

billion debt for past military purchases from the USSR appears to be the most immediate obstacle hindering an expansion of bilateral ties. The Egyptians have not serviced the debt since 1977, when Sadat unilaterally declared a 10-year moratorium on payments. The Soviets have made resolution of the debt a precondition for meeting Egyptian requests for expanded trade and military equipment. Moscow, in our view, does not expect to recover the entire debt, but it wants the



# Factsheet on Soviet-Egyptian Relations

Soviet Ambassador: Gennadiy Zhuravlev (assumed post in September 1986) Egyptian Ambassador: Salah Hasan Bassiouni (assumed post in September 1984)

Estimated Number of Soviet Personnel in Egypt (excluding dependents)		Estimated Number of Egyptian Personnel Receiving Military Training in USSR		
Diplomatic a	170	1980	0	
Military advisers and technicians	0	1981	0	
Economic advisers and technicians	200	1982	0	
Total	370	1983	0	
		1984	o	
4		1985	0	

Soviet Trade With Egypt (million US \$) b

	Exports	Imports	Total	
1975	364	623	987	
1980	266	325	591	
1981	339	372	711	
1982	302	417	719	
1983	345	482	827	
1984	341	332	673	
1985	338	364	702	
1981 1982 1983 1984	339 302 345 341	372 417 482 332	711 719 827 673	

Military Sales (million US \$)

Facilities Used by Soviet Military

None

Secret

Soviet Economic Credits/Grants Extended (million US \$)
1975 0
1980 0
1981 0
1982 0
1983 0
1984 0
1985 0

nu officials—politicus, economic, muniary, interingence—who
work in the Embassy, as well as media and trade representatives.
 From official Soviet statistics, which do not include all military
trade.



Egyptians to begin making at least minimal payments on the principal before it is willing to engage in major new transactions. Although bilateral trade is likely to expand, Egypt's growing financial difficulties and the USSR's own economic stringencies limit both sides' ability to compromise on the debt issue and probably will constrain any significant expansion of overall trade.

Despite Cairo's hope to use the "Soviet card" in bargaining with Washington, Egyptian leaders have repeatedly stated in public that they are not about to reduce Egypt's strong political, military, and economic ties to the United States. Although the Egyptians need spare parts to keep their Soviet weapons purchased in the 1960s and 1970s functioning, they have made the expensive and disruptive shift to dependence on Western arms and do not appear anxious to purchase major weapon systems from the Soviets. Such purchases would not only create more logistic problems for the Egyptians and risk making them dependent on Moscow again but also might undermine their access to US arms. Cairo is likely during the next five years to purchase relatively small amounts of Soviet weapons and only those types that do not require a sizable Soviet advisory presence in Egypt. 🐔

Fundamental political differences between Moscow and Cairo also stand in the way of a major improvement in relations, and those differences are unlikely to abate significantly. The two sides take different approaches to resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute. Although the Egyptians endorse the concept of an international conference on the question—the Kremlin's pet project—they see greater merit in direct negotiatons between the parties (what the Soviets criticize as "separate deals") to pave the way for a comprehensive settlement. In addition

as one of a guarantor than as an active participant in the formulation of a final settlement.

Moscow's ties to Syria and Libya—Cairo's two main rivals—also impose some limits on any significant improvement in Soviet-Egyptian relations. The Soviets probably would justify any move closer to Egypt by trying to convince Damascus that they were drawing Cairo away from Washington. The prospects for major Soviet advances in Egypt during the next few years are unlikely to be good enough, however, for the Soviets to risk undermining their position in Syria, which has taken so long to build. Moscow is less concerned about upsetting Libyan leader Qadhafi but still will not want to jeopardize its growing military access to Libya for uncertain gains in Egypt.

Moscow's Goals. The Soviets are likely to downplay these political differences with the Fermina -

It appears, however, that Moscow, although the suitor, is not prepared to give something for nothing. Karen Brutents, senior Middle Eastern specialist in the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, noted in an interview in October 1984 that the improvement of bilateral relations "depends more on Egypt." That view apparently holds today. The Soviets' immediate aims seem to be:

- Poisoning US-Egyptian relations.
- Undermining Egypt's commitment to the Camp David accords.



- Achieving at least minimal progress in economic relations.
- Fostering a rapprochement between Cairo and Damascus.

Achievement of these goals would clear the path for a broader improvement in bilateral ties and minimize the risk of undercutting Soviet relations with Syria.

The Soviets apparently do not expect major progress any time soon in realizing these goals We believe that Egypt, while giving greater emphasis to its nonalignment, will almost certainly remain in the US camp for at least the next few years. Further limited improvement in Soviet-Egyptian ties is probable, but 1 -there wai be no return to the view relationship of the late 1960s. The Egyptians have ....de it clear that they do not intend to repeat that experience

#### The Linchpin: Syria

Syria has been central to the Soviets' interests in the Middle East since the early 1970s. Their relationship with Syria-by far the most powerful Arab "confrontation" state opposing Israel—has provided them entree into the Middle East and influence in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Moscow and Damascus have been drawn together by some common objectivesabove all, to prevent Israel and the United States from achieving separate peace settlements between Tel Aviv and each of its Arab neighbors—as well as by the USSR's lack of alternative avenues of influence in the region and Syria's lack of alternative sources of military support. To achieve their objectives, they have had nowhere else to turn but toward each other. In our view, it is this mutual dependence rather than affinity or ideological compatibility that has solidified the relationship

Military Backing: The Tie That Binds. The dominant factor in the Soviet-Syrian relationship is Moscow's willingness to provide military support. The Soviets have delivered almost \$17 billion worth of weapons through 1985 to Syria, more than to any other Third World client. The USSR and its East European allies provide Syria with virtually all of its arms and, in recent years, have ensured that it is among the first to receive newly exported versions of Soviet weapons.

The dollar value of Soviet weaponry delivered has decreased since the peak year of 1980. hut the decline probably will be reversed soon

Syrians will soon receive their first MIG-29s (see figure 3 and foldout figure 11 at the back).

Beyond the approximately 3,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians with Syrian forces (see inset, page 15), the USSR has some independent military units of its own in Syria. The most significant were the two SA-5 SAM units the Soviets sent to Syria in early 1983. There were some 2,000 Soviet personnel manning the SA-5 complexes at Hims and Dumayr until they began leaving in October 1984

strongly suggest that there now are 50 to 100 Soviet advisers and technicians at each complex and that they-along with the Soviets at the Syrian air defense headquarters in Damascus-maintain a primary role in the command and control of the missiles. Final control over firing the missiles,

See figures in inset on mage 18 For

Figure 3 Selected Weapon Systems the Soviets Might Provide Syria During the Rest of the 1980s

	Description	Introduced in Soviet Forces
Air/Air Defense Systems		
SA-10	Transportable, medium-range (100 km) SAM. Newest, most capable Soviet system. Effective against aircraft at all altitudes. Radar can be used with other SAMs against low-altitude targets.	e 1980
SA-11	Mobile low-to-medium altitude, medium-range (30 km) SAM.	1982
MIG-27 Flogger D/J		
	Improved MIG-23 ground attack aircraft with greater payload and better navigation system. J variant equipped with laser range- finder and target designator.	1975/1978
MIG-29 Fulcrum		
	Latest Soviet combat aircraft. Designed for close air-to-air combat. May also serve as a fighter-bomber. Only small number produced thus far.	1984
SU-25 Frogfoot		
0 T	Latest Soviet ground attack aircraft. In use with Soviet forces in Afghanistan and exported to Iraq in 1985.	1981
Ground Forces Systems		
T-80		
	Latest Soviet medium tank with gas turbine engine, improved armor protection, and better mobility than earlier tanks. Able to fire antitank guided missile through gun tube.	1981
Naval Systems		
F-Class Submarine	Diesel-powered attack submarine. Already exported to several countries outside the Warsaw Pact.	1958

Note: Data based on information as of November 1986.



# Soviet Military Advisory Presence

To assist the Syrians in operating and maintaining Soviet equipment, as well as to train them in genera military tactics and doctrine, Moscow maintains approximately 3,000 military advisers and technicians in Syria. They are present at virtually every level of the Syrian armed forces, from battalion to general command. The Soviets, themselves, assist in manning—and in some cases exclusively operate—most of the advanced electronic warfare equipment and the air defense early warning and command-and control network in Syria

Moscow also maintains a aozen or so advisers and technicians with Syrian combat and early warning radar units in Lebanon, according to liaison source:

In addition, the Soviets provide Damascus with military intelligence d

We assume that, since 1981, during periods of Syrian-Israeli tensions, the Soviets have passed intelligence to the Syrians gleaned by intelligence collection ships and aircraft deployed to the area

however, probably has been turned over to the Syrians. Remaining independent Soviet units in Syria

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aconomic Aid. Soviet economic assistance to Syria has been highly visible but, when compared to Arab and Iranian aid, relatively modest. Since the late 1950s, the Soviets have focused their assistance on such large-scale projects as the Euphrates hydroelectric complex, the Tartus-Hims railway, the Syrian oil industry, and land reclamation. Today there are approximately 1,000 Soviet economic technicians working in Syria. Moscow has extended about \$2 billion in economic credits since 1957. (By way of comparison, Arab government disbursements to Damascus since 1979 have averaged \$1.3 billion annually, and Iran has provided an average of \$1 billion a year since 1982.) The Soviets did not extend any credits to Syria from 1977 through 1982, but the more than \$1 billion provided since then and the recent negotiations over building a nuclear power reactor and research center in Syria are leading to a significant expansion of Soviet economic involvement in the countr

The Syrian Quid Pro Quo. In return for this assistance, the Syrians have granted the Soviets some access to the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia and

Secret .





Scoret

the military airfield at Tiyas. The Soviet Mediterranean Flotilla regularly receives support from Soviet
logistic ships stationed in Tartus. The Soviets have
used Tiyas airfield since 1972. They deployed
IL-38 antisubmarine warfare and naval reconnaissance aircraft there
in 1981 and have
done so eight times since mid-1983 on what now
appears to be a regular basis. TU-16 Badger reconnaissance aircraft also deployed to Tiyas
in 1981
and six times since early 1985

Outside the military sphere, the Soviets receive Syrian support in international forums on many issues, including Afghanistan and Moscow's perennial "peace" offensives. In addition to the hard currency the Soviets earn from arms sales to Syria, the Syrians also apparently give Soviet bids on economic projects in Syria preferential consideration because of the USSR's importance of arms

Limited Soviet Influence. Despite the wide scope of their presence in Syria, the Soviets have little sway over important decisions made by the Assad regime.

Soviet Arms: How They Are Paid For

On the one

to use its military relationship to pressure the Syrians to change their policy—during Syria's military intervention in Lebanon in 1976-77—it failed.

Damascus, in retaina-

Damascus, in retailation for Prioscow's cutoack on arms deliveries, threatened in January 1977 to bar Soviet use of the port of Tartus. Assad's threat eventually led to a resumption of arms shipment

A major factor behind the USSR's lack of influence over Syrian policymaking is the mutual distrust that has marked relations since Assad's seizure of power in 1970. The Soviets favored the man Assad ousted,

\* The Soviets strongly opposed the Syrian intervention on the side of the Christians against the PLO and Lebanese leftist

1



#### Factsheet on Soviet-Syrian Relations

Soviet Ambassador: Aleksandr Dzasokhov (assumed post in October 1986) Syrian Ambassador: Muhammad Ali Halabi (assumed post in March 1983)

#### Estimated Number of Soviet Personnel in Syria (excluding dependents)

Diplomatic a	90
Military advisers and technicians	3,000
Independent Soviet military units	400
Economic advisers and technicians	1,000
Total	4,490

#### Soviet Trade With Syria (million US \$) 5

	Exports	Imports	Total
1975	138	96	234
1980	258	236	494
1981	387	350	737
1982	291	415	706
1983	277	405	683
1984	306	271	577
1985	384	227	611

#### Military Sales (million US 3)

# Estimated Number of Syrian Personnel Receiving Military Training in USSR

1980	50
1981	75
1982	100
1983	NA
1984	1,500
1985	NA

# Soviet Economic Credits/Grants Extended

(míllion US \$)	
1975	7
1980	0
1981	56
1982	0
1983	273
1984	820
1985	0

#### Facilities Used by Soviet Military

Latakia	Major port of call
Tartus	Naval support/repair
	facility
Tiyas Airfield	Used by Soviet IL-38
	and TU-16 naval re-
	connaissance aircraft
Al Mazzah Airfield	Used by Soviet elec-
(Damascus)	tronic countermea-
	sures helicopter unit

All officials—political, economic, military, intelligence—who work in the Embassy and Consulate (Aleppo), as well as media and trade representatives. • From official Soviet statistics, which do not include all military



Salah Jedid, the leader of the radical left wing of the Syrian Ba'th Party, who, during his 1966-70 tenure, moved Syria closer to the Soviet Union.

State of Soviets were deeply suspicious of Assad when he first took power. They learned to live with him, but the suspicions remained

Both sides have kept each other in the dark about major issues. Former Secretary of State Kissinger tells in his memoirs how Assad blocked the Soviets from any involvement in the 1974 Golan Heights disengagement agreement with Israel that the United States had mediated. In January 1977

Perhaps the most striking examples of failure to consult were the Syrian military actions in 1976 and 1980. Syrian troops began their move into Lebanon in June 1976 as a shocked Soviet Premier Kosygin arrived in Damascus. Four years later a similar embarrassment for the Soviets occurred when Syrian troops advanced toward the Jordanian border just as Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Kuznetsov was about to arrive in Damascus for ratification of the Soviet-Syrian treaty of friendship and cooperation.

Brezhnev personally contacted Assad to ask why the Soviets had not been consulted before Syria took this step

This lack of consultation evidently continues. Soviet officials frequently complain that Damascus does not discuss its policy in Lebanon or contacts with the United States with them. Moscow, for its part, did not brief the Syrians fully on the US-Soviet talks on the Middle East in Geneva in February 1985.

#### With Friends Like These . . .

Henry Kissinger describes in his memoirs President Assad's actions denying the Soviets a role in the Golan Heights disengagement talks between Syria and Israel in 1974. Kissinger, using "shuttle diplomacy," brokered the talks. Gromyko traveled to Damascus for the express purpose of obtaining a voice in the negotiations. But Assad, according to Kissinger, did not want to give Moscow a voice, "as he made clear by telling me proudly and in great detail how he had prevented Gromyko from visiting Damascus while I was there," Kissinger sums up the incident:

I have no idea how we could have insisted on an exclusively American mediation had Asad chosen otherwise. Nothing so much demonstrated the weakness of the Soviet position than the fact that Asad did not.... The President of Syria, remarkably, preferred to negotiate without his principal ally.

Soviet-Syrian ties have become closer since 1974, but the Soviets still worry that Assad, if he gets the right terms, will reach an agreement with the United States and Israel behind the USSR's back.

 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Bigwn and Company, 1982), pp. 936, 1033-3.

Despite the 1980 Soviet-Syrian friendship and cooperation treaty and all the entphasis Soviet media give to the development of socialism in Syria, the Soviets apparently do not see Syria as a secure base of Soviet influence or fertile ground for socialism. They have commented in the past that Syria is unlikely to develop a socialist system, given the lack of an organized working class and with the bourgeoisic firmly in power. They also have made it clear they have no illusions about the depth and durability of socialism in Syria. They regard Ba'thist socialism as a charade and the Syrians as traders and capitalists whose political dependability is suspect. In recent



years, there also have been reports

of Soviet leaders urging Assad to limit capitalist practices in Syria

Policy Differences. On policy issues, Soviet-Syrian differences center on the extent of Soviet military support for Syrian strategic objectives and on specific policy toward the PLO and Iraq and—to a lesser extent—Egypt, Lebanon, and the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Soviets have claimed that a primary source of tension in the Soviet-Syrian relationship is the Assad regime's attempts to broaden the 1980 treaty to commit the USSR to come to Syria's defense militarily in the event of war. Soon after the announcement in 1981 of the US-Israeli "strategic cooperation" agreement, the Syrians began


Jealling for a similar accord between syria and the USSR. They have also sought Moscow's backing for their goal of "strategic parity" with Israel

The Soviets have been elusive, however.

sovices out of what Damascus considered a feeble response to a Syrian study of the Soviet position in the event of a US military move back into Lebanon.

and past Soviet behavior strongly suggest that Moscow is still determined not to tie its hands to a specific response in the event of another Syrian-Israeli war. Although the dispatch to Syria of Soviet SA-5 units in 1983 committed Moscow to a much greater degree than ever before, it evidently continued to referrin from putting that commitment in writing

Different perspectives on the PLO have led to some of the sharpest Soviet-Syrian differences over the past decade. Moscow has consistently opposed Syrian attempts to dominate the organization, from the Syrian intervention against PLO forces in Lebanon in 1976 to the Damascus-backed attacks on Palestinian camps



Syrran President Hapz Assaa and Somei General Secretary Mikhall Garbachev during their June 1985 meeting in the Kremli.

there beginning in the spring of 1985 [

The poviets, however, have nad little success in tempering Syrian moves against the PLO and have mixed feelings because they have many of the same grievances with Arafat."

Moscow, similarly, has had no success in convincing Assad to mend fences with Iraq and Egypt. As for Lebanon, the Soviets have suppressed their misgivings about Syrian policy there since the Israeli invasion in 1982, but they still oppose long-term Syrian domination of the country. They have made it clear that under no conditions would the USSR support the partition of Lebanon for the benefit of a "Greater Syria".

Differing Perspectives on the Peace Process. Soviet-Syrian difficulties over the Arab-Israeli peace process have usually not been over the final terms of a settlement but over how best to obtain those terms. Moscow has sought a comprehensive settlement at an



international conference that it would chair jointly with Washington—the solution that would give the USSR the greatest voice. Damascus refused to attend the only international conference on the issue that has ever been held—at Geneva in December 1973—and would not support the US-Soviet call in October 1977 for reconvening the conference. The Syrians have publicly expressed support for the USSR's current effort to convene a conference, but Assad told

I that an international conference would be meaningless until the Arabs unite and achieve military parity with Israel. The Deputy Chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Near East and North Africa Administration admitted

that Syria was one of the few Arab countries that was not showing continuing interest in Moscow's proposed international conference

In our view, the Soviets cannot risk endorsing any peace initiative that does not meet most of Syria's objectives, even if by doing so they could achieve their main objective—gaining a voice in the peace process. Alienating Damascus to gain entree into the peace process would be an empty victory. The Soviets would have a seat at the peace conference but no ally to represent. At the same time, Moscow has not shown the ability to convince Damascus to soften its position. Thus, the Soviets are left with little choice but to follow the Syrian lead, and the Syrians appear in no hurry to engage in negotiations

More broadly, the Soviets' overwhelming dependence on Syria for influence in the region requires them, no matter how much they dislike it, to follow or at least acquiesce in Damascus' lead on most major issues'in the Arab world. In our view, as long as Syria remains the centerpiece of Soviet strategy—which we believe it will for many years to come unless the Soviets can reestablish a close relationship with Egypt—Moscow will continue to adjust its policies toward other countries to mesh with its Syrian policy. This will not prevent improvement in the USSR's ties to Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, or Yasir Arafat, but it will limit such developments."


See "Impact of Future Developments" section for discussion of Soviet policy toward Syria after Assad and of the impact a breakthrough to Moscow's relations with Egypt would have on Soviet-Syrian ties. Footholds on the Periphery: Libya and South Yemen <sup>11</sup> The USSR has devoted considerable resources to expanding its military presence in Libya and South Yemen and probably sees them as useful footholds for complicating US policy and, potentially, expanding Soviet influence in the region. Nonetheless, the fact that the USSR's only Arab clients beside Syria are Libya and South Yemen speaks volumes about the decline of Moscow's influence in the Middle East since the early 1970s. Both countries are geographically and politically on the fringes of the Arab world and the Arab-Israeli dispute

Libya. Libya is one of Moscow's consolation prizes in the Middle East. When the grand prize-Egyptbegan to slip away from the Soviets in the early 1970s, they attempted to compensate for the loss wherever they could. Qadhafi's Libya, despite its pan-Islamic goals and virulent anti-Communism, was a logical candidate for Soviet courting. Both states opposed Sadat's Egypt, "separate deals" with Israel, and the US presence in the Middle East. Qadhafi saw, and still sees, the USSR as a primary source of the modern weapons he believes he needs to achieve his ambitious goals. For Moscow, Qadhafi's desire to buy arms and Libya's vast oil wealth make the country a lucrative source of hard currency. In recent years, the Soviets have also begun to make greater use of Libyan ports and airfields, although Moscow's access hardly replaces what it lost in Egypt. Finally, the Kremlin often benefits-without having to bear the risk or cost-from Qadhafi's worldwide subversive activities against friends of the United States



As with Syria, Iraq, and Algeria, the military component is the core of the Soviet-Libyan relationship. The USSR has sold more arms to Libya (deliveries estimated to be worth over \$11 billion through 1985-all since 1970) than to any other Third World country except Syria and Iraq. Tripoli paid strictly in hard currency until 1982, when it began meeting part of its bill in oil." Since then Libya has provided Moscow an average of about 115,000 barrels of oil a day, which was worth about \$1.2 billion annually before this year's precipitate drop in the world price of oil. In addition, the Soviets maintain approximately 2,000 military advisers and technicians throughout Libya's armed forces. They have provided limited intelligence and logistic support to Libya for its forays into Chad and during the US-Libyan military confrontations in the Gulf of Sidra this year. Soviet pilots fly training flights with Libyans, and Soviet advisers help maintain and possibly operate Libyan naval ships. Substantial numbers of Libyans are sent to the USSR each year for military trainin:

Since mid-1981, Qadhafi has allowed the Soviets



however, that KGB officials sum saw the Libyan leader as "crazy, unpredictable, uncontrollable" and capable of acting against Soviet interests

Some of the Libyan leader's activities confirm the KGB officials' belief that he is capable of undermining Soviet interests. Qadhafi:

- Publicly criticized the USSR for insufficient military aid to the Arabs during the October 1973 War and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
- Has given military, financial, and political aid to Palestinian rebels bent on ousting PLO leader Arafat, whom Moscow still supports.
- Transferred Soviet-supplied surface-to-surface missiles to Iran in 1985.

-

 Signed a "union" with Morocco in 1984, over which Soviet officials expressed concern, fearing that it would increase Libyan-Algerian tensions.

Soviet Union and, in some cases, behaved as an ally The Sovieta resell virtually all the oil they obtain from Libya.



#### Factsheet on Soviet-Libyan Relations

Soviet Ambassador: Pogos Akopov (assumed post in October 1986)

Libyan Ambassador: Muhammad Humud (assumed post in November 1986)

Estimated Number of Soviet Personnel in Libya (excluding dependents)			-	Libyan Military Personnel Receiving Training in USSR	
Diplomatic *			50	1980	1,150
Military adv	isers and technic	cians	2,000	1981	1,150
		5,000	1982	1,150	
Total			7,050	1983	900
			-	1984	750
	1			1985	600
Soviet Trade	With Libya (mi	llion US \$)	ь	Soviet Econon	nic Credits/Grants Extended
Exports Imports Total		Total	(million US \$)	1	
1975	26	0	26		
1980	252	443	695	1980	0
1981	264	502	766	1981	0
1982	305	1,554	1,859	1982	0
1983	357	1,368	1,725	1983	0
1984	172	1,394	1,566	1984	o

Military Sales (million US \$)

100

1,053

1,154

1985

# Facilities Used by Soviet Military

1985

Tobruk	Occasional use by
1 ooruk	· ·
	Soviet submarines
	and submarine
	tenders for repairs
	and replenishment
Umm Aitiqah	Used by Soviet 1L-38
Airfield (Tripoli)	ASW/naval reconnais
	sance aircraft 📘

<sup>\*</sup> All afficials—political, economic, military, intelligence—who work in the Embassy, as well as media and trade representatives. 
\* From afficial Soviet statistics, which do not include all military trade.



- Sent home in 1985

  Ill but 40 to 50 or the approximately 400

  Seviet technicians working at the Tajura nuclear research center.
- Offered to intervene militarily in South Yemen on behalf of former President Hasani during the coup in January 1986 and on at least one other occasion sinc. Moscow vigorously protested North Yemen and Ethiopian attempts to do the same, and we assume that the Soviets weighed in similarly with Qadhafi.

Some of Libya's other actions, such as the shooting of Libyan dissidents and a British policewoman in London in 1984, while possibly benefiting Moscow by disrupting friends of the United States, have placed the Soviets in awkward positions

condemned the London shootings and disprayed unease over the widely publicized Egyptian charges in the summer of 1984 that Qadhafi had planted Soviet mines in the Red Sea. (The first ship struck by a mine, in fact, was a Soviet one.)

Frictions between the two have not prevented the Soviets from increasing their support for Libya during the last year. The most visible sign of this was the delivery late last year of Soviet SA-5 missiles. The Soviets also displayed a slightly greater readiness than earlier to back Qadhafi during US-Libyan tensions in January and April of this year. They sent a few ships to the central Mediterranean—some to Libyan coastal waters—to monitor the movements of the US Sixth Fleet and presumably passed tracking data to the Libyans. This Soviet monitoring activity was more

extensive than during past crises involving Libya.

And, following the US airstrikes on Libya in April,
the Kremlin postponed a meeting between Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz.

Nonetheless, the Soviets' continued determination to keep some distance from Qadhafi was clearly evident during the US-Libyan clashes. Moscow was careful in its public comments not to commit itself to take any action in support of Libya. Qadhafi requested Soviet military support to oppose the US attacks, but Gorbachev refused

that Qadhafi was incensed over Moss stand and over its determination—despite the US attacks—that Libya clear up its past military debt before concluding a new arms deat,

The Soviets have subsequently signaled Washington that they want to stand clear of any future US-Libyan class a Soviet diplomat

Qadhafi is moral only and that the USSR has no desire to get involved in the US-Libyan conflict.

Other Soviet officials repeated these remarks during Septembe

Disputes over arms payments and concern over Qadhafi's unpredictability are likely to remain complicating factors in Soviet-Libyan relations as long as Qadhafi remains in power." Moscow also will almost certainly continue to avoid giving Qadhafi the security commitments he apparently wants. Besides their desire not to be drawn into a military clash with the United States, the Soviets probably fear that giving Tripoli such a commitment would harm their relations

"See "Impact of Future Developments" section for discussion of Soviet options should Qadhafi die or be ouste:



with Algeria and Egypt. The USSR's unwillingness to commit itself to Libya's defense appears to be the primary reason that the friendship and cooperation treaty the two sides announced in principle in March 1983 has yet to be concluded. The Soviets, in our view, have been—and remain—ready to sign an accord similar to their other friendship and cooperation treaties with Third World countries that do not carry security commitments. If Qadhafi agrees to this, a treaty could be signed at any time

Despite the frictions and the Kremlin's desire to maintain some distance from Qadhafi, the benefits each side derives from the relationship probably will prompt them to continue, and perhaps even expand, their cooperation in the next few years. Qadhafi's heightened sense of vulnerability after the US raid in April probably will lead him to seek greater Soviet military backing. Although to date he has restricted Soviet access to Libyan air and naval facilities, he probably now would welcome an increase in that access because of the impression it would create of a greater Soviet willingness to defend Libya. We believe Moscow desires increased military access but would move cautiously to avoid giving such an impression. The Soviets probably would seek permanent access for their IL-38s, greater use of port facilities at Tobruk, and—possibly—permission to station logistic ships in 👡 Tobruk harbor as they do now in Tartus, Syria

The Libyans periodically threaten in public—most recently in April—to grant the Soviets independent military bases in Libya. In fact \_\_\_\_

I that Al Jufra airfield, which the Soviets nave been constructing, will be an exclusively Soviet base. We believe, however, that Moscow probably would not expend the resources on building independent Soviet naval or air bases in Libya as long as Qadhafi is in power. Apart from the high risk of being drawn into a US-Libyan conflict and the negative impact such a move would have on the USSR's relations with Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, the Soviets would be likely to calculate that the unpredictable Qadhafi could repossess the bases and send Soviet forces home once the US threat subsided, or that he would seek to hold Soviet policy hostage to base privileges. Moreover, from a purely operational standpoint, the risks of Soviet military bases in Libya might not be worth the benefits. For example, although Soviet strike aircraft,

if based at Al Jufra, could pose a threat to US naval operations in the Mediterranean, they would be vulnerable to NATO tactical aircraft and difficult to maintain and supply during a conflict

South Yemen. Syria is the Soviets' most important client in the Arab world, but South Yemen is the closest. Whereas in Syria the Soviets have a presence throughout the military but almost nowhere else, in South Yemen they-along with their East European and Cuban allies-permeate the entire government, party, and military structure. The Soviets' interests in the PDRY-a dismally poor country of little more than two million people-stem from its Marxist orientation and its strategic location. The Soviets value the PDRY because it is all they have to show for almost, 70 years of trying to foster the growth of Marxist regimes in the Arab world." They promote South Yemen as a model for other Middle Eastern states to follow and work with it to aid leftist movements in the region. Aden is a haven for Middle Eastern Communists, leftist Palestinians, and the remnants of Marxist insurgents who once fought in neighboring Oman and North Yemen

South Yemen's location at the confluence of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean gives it military significance for the Soviet Union. Naval ships of the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron make regular use of the port facilities at Aden." and Moscow keeps two [L-38]

" Officia

The 165R however, played no role in the establishment of South Yemen in 1967 and only a supporting role in the country's swing to the left in the first few years after independence." With the loss of the use of port facilities in Berberg, Comalia, in 1977, Aden grew in importance for the Soviets. Since 1980, Soviet Indian Ocean ships have made an average of about 75 visits annually to Aden. The port, however, is heavily congested with commercial traffic, and Soviet combatants usually use the anchorage off South Yemen's Socotra Island or the port facilities the

Soviets have on Ethiopia's Dahlak Islan 🛣

Suelet

Figure 5
South Yemeni Facilities Used by the Soviet Military

naval reconnaissance aircraft at Al Anad airfield, north of Aden, on a continuous basis £

enhances the souncy to monitor US and other Western naval movements in the region (see figure 5).

The Soviets initially welcomed South Yemen's sharp turn leftward during 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il's 1978-80 rule. They apparently realized, however, that his radicalism was disrupting the country—much as Hafizullah Amin's did in Afghanistan in 1979—and, after intensive consultations with PDRY leaders, they acquiesced in his replacement by Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani in April 1980. From Moscow's vantage point, Hasani, though not as ideologically "pure" as Isma'il, probably was viewed as loyal and more adept at holding the ruling Yemeni Socialist

Party's (YSP) fractious elements together. The Soviets may have intended Isma'il's return in 1985 as a useful "insurance policy" to keep Hasani honest, but we believe they did not favor his reassumption of the top party post. As the noted Isma'il was popular with the Soviets, out they recognized that he did not make a good leader, and they accepted Hasani as the more effective alternative.

The radical Marxist coup in January that toppled President Hasani ushered in a new and unpredictable era in Soviet-PRDY relations. The weakening of the YSP, the death of many top pro-Soviet figures, and the tribal rivalries the coup inflamed have led to a more unstable South Yemer

Soctet



# Factsheet on Soviet-South Yemeni Relations

Soviet Ambassador: Al'bert Rachkov (assumed post in July 1986)

PDRY Ambassador: Ahmad Abdallah abd al-Ilah (assumed post in November 1985)

Estimated	Number e	of Soviet	Personnel
in PDRY	excluding)	depende	nts)

Diplomatic a	30
Military advisers and technicians	1,000
Independent Soviet military units	300
Economic advisers and technicians	550
Total	1,880

# Soviet Trade With PDRY (million US \$) b

Exports	Imports	Total
86	8	94
129	8	137
. 93	8	101
184	7	191
136	7	143
172	10	182
	86 129 93 184 136	86 8 129 8 93 8 184 7 136 7

#### Military Sales (million US \$)

# Estimated Number of PRDY Personnel Receiving Military Training in USSR

1980	NA
1981	NA
1982	NA
1983	2,000
1984	2,000
1985	N.

# Soviet Economic Credits/Grants Extended

(million US \$)	
1980	209
1981	0
1982	0
1983	0
1984	0
1985	0

# Facilities Used by Soviet Military

Aden

Naval support/repair

facility C

Socotra Island


Al Anad Airfield

Two 1L-38 naval reconnaissance/ASW aircraft stationed there

trade.

All officials—political, economic, military, intelligence—who work in the Embassy and Consulate (Al Mukallah), as well as media and trade representatives.
 From official Soviet statistics, which do not include all military





We believe that Moscow had no compelling reason to seek Hasani's ouster, did not support the coup, and was surprised by it. By 1984 it had become clear that the Soviets and Hasani had resolved their differences over his opening toward the West and with moderate Arab states, as well as over the PDRY's displeasure with the low level of Soviet economic aid that plagued their relations in 1982-83. Hasani was the only Arab leader granted a meeting with Gorbachev at Chernenko's funeral in March 1985. Soviet leaders did not meet with him at the funerals of Brezhnev and Andropov in 1982 and 1984, respectively

Inc Sovice appeared quite happy with Hasam's policies. In fact, his more moderate foreign policy played a decisive role in convincing Oman and the UAE to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1985

South Yemeni expressions of fealty to the USSR became more and more effusive during Hasani's last year in power. The communique from the YSP Central Committee plenum in February 1985 lauded the "increasing development of the strategic alliance relations" between the PDRY and the Soviet Union. The

Josed the increasingly pro-Soviet feature in the Harman regime's public statements during 1984-85. Hasani may have adopted this almost obsequious pro-Soviet posture to head off the threat to his leadership that began to arise within the YSP in mid-

Hasani weathered the threat in 1984, apparently with Soviet support, but—perhaps as part of a compromise to end the party factionalism—Moscow convinced him to accept the return to Aden and appointment to the party secretariat of Isma'il.

Ja comer Series party official advised tenne is any riasani, during the latter's visit to Moscow in October 1984, to resolve their differences. [

Alsma'il returned in March 1985, shortly after he was reinstated to the party secretariat, and Hasani relinquished his post as head of government.

The Kremlin presumably endorsed Isma'il's reinstatement to the Politburo at the YSP party congress in October 1985, but they also almost certainly backed Hasani's reelection as general secretary. Soviet leaders sent him a message on the eve of the congress, which, in effect, amounted to an endorsement of his continuation as party chief

Moscow's behavior during the coup attested to its lack of complicity. Soviet media carried Hasani's erroneous announcement on the first day of the coup. 13 January, that the "counterrevolutionaries" had been crushed and their ringleaders executed. Four days into the crisis. Soviet media were still calling the rebel leaders "putschists." Shortly thereafter, as the Soviets evacuated their nationals from Aden and the fighting shifted in the rebels' favor, the USSR adopted a neutral public stance and attempted to mediate between the two sides. It was only 10 to 14 days into the



Soviet trawter off the coast of Aden during too January 1986 fightin

coup, when the rebels clearly had gained the upper hand, that Moscow threw its support to the new regime, and even then it did so discreetly

nie Soviets kept a sow pronie so make it casici for them to deny any involvement in the fighting on the rebels' side. Moscow's more vital support consisted of pressure on North Yemen and Ethiopia not to aid Hasani's forces.

The new regime, nominally headed by President 'Attas," not only is beset with internal factionalism, but forces loyal to Hasani continue to harass the government from their safehaven in North Yemen, and the tribal animosities that the fighting exacerbated continue to smolder. Soviet officials have acknowledged that tribalism is one of the major problems the regime faces. Leonid Zamyatin, then chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Information Department, told a Lebanese newspaper in February that South Yemen is still encountering difficulties from the "tribal division of society." An

"'Attas, a longtime Hasani supporter and without an independent power base, apparently is only a figurehead. Although he replaced Hasani as president, he did not assume Hasani's more important post of YSP secretary general. The real powers in the new regime appear to be YSP Secretary General Ali Salim pt. Pich and Deputy Secretary General Salim Salim Muhamma:

important *Pravda* article in September echoed this view. It also blamed Hasani for precipitating the January events—the first time the Soviets stated this in public

Isma'il and other prominent rebel leaders were killed in the fighting, but most of the key figures in the new regime—including Bidh and Salim Salih—have a reputation of being radical Marxists and fervently pro-Soviet. Moscow, however, appears to be advising the new leaders to portray themselves as moderates. The regime has repeatedly stated in public that it desires good relations with all its neighbors

argued that there are numerous moderates in the new cabinet

Despite the new regime's fervently pro-Soviet tenor, there is the potential for Soviet-South Yemeni tensions over the level of Soviet economic aid and efforts by Moscow to expand its military access in the PDRY. The South Yemenis have long been dissatisfied with the level and quality of economic aid the USSR has provided. Many Soviet projects have taken years to complete and have compared unfavorably with the few Western projects that South Yemen has contracted for in recent years. Aden was particularly rankled by the paltry Soviet relief package following the major floods in 1982. Moscow is unlikely to provide significantly increased economic aid in the years ahead because of its own economic constraints and its probable belief that Aden is securely within the Soviet orbit and therefore not likely to alter its political allegiance, even if it were to obtain substantial Arab or Western assistance?

The Soviets may increase efforts to obtain expanded access to South Yemeni air and naval facilities and possibly even an independent Soviet military base.

"In fact, the choice of the "moderate" 'Attas to replace Hasani as president probably was a result of Soviet advice. 'Attas, in India when the coup began, flew to Moscow and remained there unforcebels announced their choice of him as provisional presider.

Soviet ships in Aden harbo

The most recent efforts

J occurred in 1983

Admirai Gorshkov, then Commander
in Cufe, of the Soviet Navy, traveled to Aden in

in Cufe, of the Soviet Navy, traveled to Aden in March 1983 to seek permission to build new naval and air facilities in South Yemen that would be controlled by the Soviets.

The current leaders probably would not object to expanded Soviet access to South Yemeni facilities but are unlikely to grant Moscow a sovereign base. This is a particularly sensitive issue with the South Yemenis, whose entire country was a sovereign British base for 129 years

Neither issue—economic aid or military access—is likely to develop into a major problem between the two countries. The South Yemeni leaders would prefer more generous economic aid but almost certainly view it as secondary to the military assistance Moscow provides. The Soviets, for their part, are not in dire need of expanded military facilities. They can adequately maintain their current air and naval forces in the region with the facilities now at their disposal. The pressure for increased access would intensify if they decided to expand those forces.

Thus, despite the traumatic effect of the coup on the South Yemeni ruling structure, Moscow maintains a strong foothold in Aden and is likely to continue to do so for at least the rest of the decade. The current regime is even more pro-Soviet than Hasani's. Tribalism and YSP factionalism are likely to remain destabilizing factors, but—as the coup has shown—even

with the YSP at war with itself, there is no credible organized threat outside the party to vie for control of the country. The most serious potential threat could come from Hasani's forces in North Yemen,

Such a development could lead Moscow to become even more directly involved in South Yemen's defense

Partners of Convenience: North Yemen, Iraq, Algeria, and the PLO

North Yemen. The Soviets' ability to maintain relatively good relations with a variety of regimes in Sanaa for almost 60 years is one of their success stories in the Middle East. Moscow has been involved in North Yemen longer than in any other Arab country.\* The treaty of friendship and trade the

Soviets signed with the feudal, theocratic regime of Imam Yahya in 1928 was their first with an Arab government. When the Imamate fell in 1962, the USSR moved quickly to support the new Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), going so far as to provide pilots to fly combat missions in 1962-63 and to provide both pilots and an airlift of military supplies in 1967—the first such Soviet military interventions in crises in the Arab world

The Soviets adroitly managed to maintain and even increase their influence in North Yemen under President Salih, who took power in 1978, despite their close ties to Marxist South Yemen and indirect support for the Marxist insurgency in the North during the early 1980s. The YAR's need for a reliable source of arms and training to fend off its two neighbors, South Yemen and Sandi Arabia, induced Sanaa to seek Soviet support.

Soviet interest in North Yemen stems more from its neighbors than from its intrinsic value. The YAR, with approximately 6.3 million people, represents a

The Soviets established relations with Saudi Arabia in 1926, two years before their treaty with Yemen, but withdrew their envoy in Jiddah in the mid-1930s and relations have been dormant ever sine at the contract of the same at the contract of the same at the contract of the same at the sam

potential threat to Moscow's ally, South Yemen, which has about one-third the population. Soviet influence in North Yemen represents some insurance against this threat

Moscow's presence in the YAR, although far less extensive than in the PDRY, is substantial. Soviet and East European arms compose approximately three-fourths of the inventory of the YAR's armed forces. About 500 Soviet military advisers and technicians are assigned to North Yemen, and about 250 Yemenis are presently receiving military training in the Soviet Union. In addition, there are approximately 175 Soviet economic advisers and technicians in the YAR and an embassy staff of about 150—after Egypt, the second largest Soviet mission in the Middle East. The Soviets may see Sanaa as the best place available to them to collect intelligence on Saudi Arabia, where they have no representation—thus, the large presence in a small country

and almost never speaks negatively about the Soviets in its media—treatment it does not accord the United States.

Moscow scored a propaganda success by convincing Sanaa in October 1984 to upgrade its longstanding treaty to one of "friendship and cooperation." The accord is the most vague and least binding of all such treaties the Soviets have signed to date " It differs from the 1964 treaty (the previous most recent update of the original document signed in 1928) in several ways; it has:

- A pledge to consult on international problems that affect both countries' interests.
- A pledge not to take part in actions directed against each other.
- Some anticolonialist rhetoric.
- A duration of 20, rather than five, years.
   These points are common to all Soviet friendship and cooperation treaties with Third World countries. Un-

cooperation treaties with Third World countries. Onlike most of the other treaties, however, the one with North Yemen does not have a clause calling for closer military cooperation. Moreover, the treaty's call for consultations on international problems does not

<sup>9</sup> The friendship and cooperation treaty with the YAR is the 13th Moscow has signed; two inflated with Figure and Sanacha work inter abrogated by those demoker.



#### Factsheet on Soviet-North Yemeni Relations

Soviet Ambassador: Anatoliy Filev (assumed post in September 1984)

NEGL

NEGL

14

YAR Ambassador: Abd al-Uthman Muhammad (assumed post in February 1983)

Estimated Number of Soviet Personnel in YAR (excluding dependents)			umber of YAR Personnel litary Training in USSR		
Diplomatic :	1		150	1975	100
Military ad	visers and techni	cians	500	1980	1,200
Economic ac	dvisers and techn	vicians	175	1981	500
Total			825	1982	600
				1983	400
				1984	250
				1985	250
Soviet Trade	With YAR (mil.	lion US \$) b		Soviet Econor	nic Credits/Grants Extended
	Exports	Imports	Total	(million US \$	
1981	32	NEGL	32	1981	55
1982	47	1	48	1982	0
1983	57	NEGL	57	1983	0.

Military Sales (million US 3)

I4

1984

1985

Facilities Used by Soviet Military

0

None

1984

1985

All officials—political, economic, military, intelligence—who
work in the Embassy, as well as media and trade representatives,
 From official Soviet statistics, which do not include all military trade.



stipulate that the two sides should attempt to coordinate their policies during crises, as does every other Soviet treaty but one

Substantively, the treaty adds more formality to the relationship and should, the Soviets hope, help to ensure its stability. The Kremlin's aim in such treaties apparently is to base the relationship on legal institutions, rather than on personalities, to ensure that Soviet-YAR ties will survive Salih's departure. There is nothing in the treaty, however, that guarantees that this will be the case or—as Egypt's and Somalia's abrogation of similar treaties showed—that the current North Yemeni leadership will not have a change of heart

A number of issues limit bilateral ties. Perhaps the most important is an economic one. North Yemen is a desperately poor country and is currently unable to meet the payments on its estimated \$900 million debt to the USSR. The servicing of this debt is a perennial topic at meetings between high-level Soviet and North Yemeni officials. The Soviets have apparently, for tack of alternatives, rescheduled at least part of the debt but are not willing to write it off as a loss. Sanaa's inability to pay also impinges on future purchases of Soviet military equipment. Moscow is unlikely to let the debt grow much beyond what it is today; the YAR is not as important to Soviet interests as Syria

The discovery of oil in North Yemen by a US company in 1984 may eventually alleviate Sanaa's, financial problems and ease frictions with Moscow over the debt. On the other hand, the newfound wealth might enable North Yemen to purchase more Western arms, and the involvement of a US oil company could lead to closer ties between Sanaa and Washington

If weapons were available and affordable in the West, North Yemen probably would opt for them to reduce its dependence on Moscow. High-level YAR military commanders—especially in the Air Force—have been critical of the Soviet training program in North Yemen, The main complaints were not enough flying time and a high accident rate.

# Soviet Friendship and Cooperation Treaties With Third World Countries

Egypt *	27 May 1971
Iraq	9 April 1972
India	9 August 1972
Somalia h	11 July 1974
Angola	8 October 1976
Mozambique	31 March 1977
Vietnam	3 November 1978
Ethiopia	20 November 1978
Afghanistan	5 December 1978
South Yemen	25 October 1979
Syria	8 October 1980
Congo	13 May 1981
North Yemen	9 October 1984

\* Egypt abrogated the treaty on 15 March 1976.

Somalia abrogated the treaty on 13 November 1977.

Moscow reportedly was concerned enough about Sanaa's anger over the Soviet reaction to the coup in Aden to offer increased military aid on favorable terms.

Although genuinely worried about Sanaa's intentions. Soviet leaders probably calculate that Salih is too heavily dependent on the USSR for arms to downgrade the relationship significantly. We believe that, if the Soviets concluded that Salih were seriously moving in that direction, they would become even more cooperative about supplying arms and more lenient about the terms of paymer

North Yemen's stance toward the regime in the PDRY will be a determining factor in Soviet-YAR relations over the next few years. If Salih provides significant military assistance to Hasani's forces, Moscow is certain to increase pressure on Sanaa to desist. Such pressure could include more visits by high-level Soviets, threats to cut off the supply of Soviet arms, or even a revival of the Marxist National Democratic Front guerrillas. Relations are likely to remain somewhat tense even if Salih eventually accepts the change of power in Aden. He already suspects that the radicals in the regime will attempt to destabilize North Yemen. At this point, we do not believe the Soviets will encourage such attempts short of major North Yemeni aid to Hasani's forces, but they probably calculate that the threat of potential PDRY destabilization efforts in the YAR will be a useful lever in their dealings with Sana:

Iraq. Iraq is important to the Soviets because it is:

- A major actor in the Arab world and a perennial rival with Syria and Egypt for preeminence among the Arabs.
- A rival of Iran as the most influential power in the Persian Gulf region.
- One of the world's major oil producers and, thus, a lucrative source of hard currency for Moscow.
- Virulently anti-Israeli and, until recently, almost as adamantly anti-United States.

The Soviets' relationship with Iraq has been their most erratic in the Middle East. Relations were so hostile under the Iraqi monarchy that Baghdad severed relations with Moscow in 1955 in response to Soviet protests about the formation of the Baghdad Pact. General Qasim's ouster of the monarchy in 1958 brought an immediate reestablishment and improvement of relations, but ties fluctuated with the various regimes that ruled in Baghdad through the mid-

The Ba'th Party's reemergence as the ruling group in Iraq in 1968—it remains in power today—led to another upsurge in Soviet-Iraqi relations. The new leaders of the Ba'th—in the aftermath of the massive Arab defeat at the hands of Israel in the June 1967 war—saw the Soviet Union as vital to the achievement of Arab aims. The Ba'th followed a radical

anti-Israeli, anti-US foreign policy and professed allegiance to a socialist internal order. Despite some differences, the USSR and Iraq drew closer over the next decade

Relations began to sour again, however, by the late 1970s, as Baghdad—fearful of growing Soviet involvement in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan—cracked down on the Iraqi Communist Party (CPI) and sought to reduce Iraqi dependence on Soviet arms by purchasing Western weapons. The relationship plummeted to its lowest point since 1958 when Moscow cut off arms shipments to Iraq at the outbreak of the war with Iran in September 1980. After attempting to capitalize on this embargo with the Khomeini regime in Iran and failing, the Soviets lifted it in the spring of 1981 and began to tilt decisively toward Baghdad in the spring of 1982, when the two sides signed their first new arms deal since the war began.


Soviet-Iraqi ties today are the best they have been since the heyday of the relationship in the early 1970s. This is almost entirely due to the Kremlin's decision to open up the arms tap to Iraq. The Soviets have delivered military equipment worth more than \$7 billion to Iraq since ending the embargo in early 1981, making them Baghdad's largest supplier (see figure 6).<sup>23</sup> To maintain this equipment and train the Iraqis, Moscow has approximately 1,000 military advisers and technicians in Irae.

The Soviets have coupled the arms flow with a more supportive public posture for Iraq in its war with Iran since Iraqi forces were driven out of most Iranian territory in June 1982. Most Soviet public statements take a neutral stance on the war, but Soviet media are

"ror a full discussion of the Kremlin's policy towns 744 WAR its shift to a pro-Iraqi position, see DI Intelligence Assertment 56V 33-10145C." [ ] Servergen 1794 Moscow's Titl I oward Bagnaad: 1 he USSR and face Wan Barwage Iran and Iraq.

The Soviets nave supplied Iraq with about one-third of its weaponry (in terms of dollar value) since the war began. France is second with over \$5 billion worth of deliverie






increasingly leaning toward the Iraqi position, particularly since the Iranian capture of Al Faw in February. They are praising Baghdad's willingness to end the conflict through mediation and criticizing Tehran's unwillingness to do the same.

Moscow's military support and backing for Iraq's position on the war has led to an improvement, both politically and economically, in the relationship. President Saddam Husayn acknowledged in an interview in October 1984 that "circumstances" at the beginning of the war with Iran had "cast their shadow" on Soviet-Iraqi relations but that ties were now "good." His visit to Moscow in December 1985, his first since 1978, highlighted the improvement in relations. even though it revealed continuing differences

The two countries have expanded their economic dealings. In April 1984, the Soviets extended Iraq a \$2 billion line of credit on favorable terms for civilian projects, according to a public statement by Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz. Baghdad has awarded Moscow major contracts since late 1983 to develop Iraq's West Qurnah oilfield, build a pipeline between Baghdad and Iraq's Southern Rumaylah natural gas field, construct two thermoelectric power plants, and survey sites to build a nuclear power plant. In addition, the USSR has since mid-1983 accepted oil as a partial means of payment for the arms it ships to Iraq."

"This oil is provided in two ways: Iraqi crude is pumped through the pipeline across Turkey and picked up at the Ceyhan terminus on the Mediterranean, and Saudi crude is picked up in the Persian Gulf and credited to the "raqi account with the Soviets. Moscow resells all of this (



During 1984 and 1985, the Soviets received an average of 80,000 barrels per day (b/d) of Iraqi oil and 40,000 b/d of Saudi crude, which was part of Saudi Arabia's aid to Iraq. The Kremlin's willingness to forgo the usual cash-on-delivery terms of Soviet-Iraqi weapons trade is another indicator of the importance it has assigned to improving relations with Baghdad and preserving the Soviet share of the Iraqi market.

Even with the increased Soviet involvement in the Iraqi economy over the past three years, however, Baghdad is still heavily dependent on Western and Arab trade and aid. Three-quarters of Iraqi civilian imports continue to come from the West, while aid provided by the Arab Gulf states dwarfs that of the

See table on page 7

# Factsheet on Soviet-Iraqi Relations

Soviet Ambassador: Viktor Minin (assumed post in March 1982)

Iraqi Ambassador: Sa'ad Abd al-Majid Faysal (assumed post in March 1984)

Estimated Number of Soviet Personnel		Estimated Number of Iraqi Personnel			
in Iraq (excluding dependents)		Receiving Military Training in USSR			
Diplomatic a Military advisers and technicians Economic advisers and technicians Total	50 1,000 5,500 6,550	1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985	NA 0 100 100 200 200		

Soviet Trade With Iraq (million US \$) b

	Exports	Imports	Total
1975	381	452	833
1980	729	398	1,127
1981	1.259	5	1,264
1982	1,347	25	1,373
1983	501	516	1,017
1984	336	823	1,159
1985	322	668	990

Military Sales (million US \$)

# Soviet Economic Credits/Grants Extended (million US \$) 1975 0

(minion US a)	
1975	0
1980	0
1981	0
1982	0
1983	1,000
1984	45
1985	NA


Facilities Used by Soviet Military

None



<sup>\*</sup> All officials—political, economic, military, intelligence—who work in the Embassy, as well as media and trade representatives, b from official Soviet statistics, which do not reflect all military trade.





Soviets. In 1983, for instance, the Arabs extended approximately \$12 billion in economic aid to Iraq; the Soviets provided \$45 million.

Despite Moscow's extensive involvement in Iraq, its record arms shipments, and the clear improvement in relations since the spring of 1982, fundamental differences continue to separate the two sides. The minimal time Gorbachev spent with Saddam during the latter's visit to Moscow in December 1985, TASS's description of their meeting as "frank," and the failure of the two sides to agree on a joint communique were a reflection of these differences and the legacy of intense enmity between the two sides

On international issues, the Soviets and Iraqis have long differed on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Baghdad rejected the 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242, which the Soviets helped formulate. Foreign Minister 'Aziz told former US Middle Eastern envoy Joseph Sisco in January 1985 that Moscow pressed Baghdad hard to accept 242 in the early 1970s. The Iraqis not only refused but also condemned the cease-fire following the war in 1973 and the subsequent peace conference in Geneva. Iraq also refused to support the joint US-Soviet call in October 1977 for reconvening the Geneva talks and is one of the few Arab states not to endorse the USSR's more recent efforts to hold an international conference on the Arab-Israeli issue.

.Aoscow and Baghdad do not see eye to eye on a number of other international issues, including:

- The flow of Soviet-made arms to Iran through third parties such as Libya, Syria, and the USSR's East European allies.
- The Soviet invasion and continuing occupation of Afghanistan. Baghdad strongly condemned the invasion, but since 1983—presumably as a response to Moscow's willingness to provide Iraq with large amounts of weaponry—it has abstained from the yearly vote in the UN General Assembly call for Soviet withdrawal (see table 2).

The Soviets and Iraqis share a fundamental distrust of each other that will not easily be eroded. The Soviets have seen Saddam repress the Iraqi Communist Party (CPI) and have been unable to ease the repression significantly despite repeated attempts. Although the Kremlin has urged the Iraqi Communists to cooperate with the government as a means of increasing their influence in the country, Moscow's eventual goal almost certainly is to oust the Bath.



Middle Eastern Votes on Annual UN Resolution Demanding the Withdrawal of "Foreign Troops" From Afghanistan

	January 1980	November 1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Afghanistan	N	N	N	N	N	N ·	N	N
Algeria.	Ä	A	^	Α	A	A	۸	Α
Bahrain	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Egypt	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Y	Y	Υ	Y
Icas	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Y	Υ	Y	Y
fraq 4	Y	0	Y	Y	A	A	Α	^
Israel	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Υ.	Y	Y
Jordan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Υ
Kuwait	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Y
Lebanon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y_
Libya	0	0	N	N	N	N	N	N
Mauritania	Υ.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Y	Y
Morocco	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Y	Y
Oman	Y	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Qutar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Υ
Saudi Arabia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sudan	0	Υ	Y	Y	Υ	Y	Y	Y
Syria •	A	N	N	N	N	N	. N	N
Tunisia	Υ Υ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Turkey	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Υ
UAE	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Υ
YAR	Α	0	0	Α	Α	0	0	0
PDRY	N	N	N	N	N	N .	. N	N.

The Soviets realize that the CPI is weak and have welcomed the improvement in Soviet relations with Saddam: thus, they are unlikely in the next few years to push for his ouster

The Iraqis are equally distrustful of the Soviets, resenting Soviet support for the CPI and past support for Iraqi Kurds (see inset). The Iraqi leadership believes that the Soviets could end CPI subversion in a moment if they wished to, according

Speret

Y = Yes N = No A = Abstained O = Absent

<sup>«</sup> Voting pattern has changed.



#### Moscow and Irag's Kurds

The level of Soviet support for the Iraqi Kurds—20 percent of the population—has fluctuated with the shifts in Soviet ties to the various regimes in Baghdad. When relations are good, Soviet support has been minimal; when relations sour, Moscow pays more attention to the Kurds. Currently, the Soviets keep their distance from the increasingly rebellious Iraqi Kurds. Contact with Kurdish leaders is maintained through a faction of the Iraqi Communist Party that is fighting alongside Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. Some Claim that the USSR is providing arms to Iraqi, Turkish, and Iranian Kurds, but such reports have never been confirmed. Moscow is likely to continue its contacts with Iraqi Kurds to maintain the option of stepping up support to them should Soviet-Iraqi relations deteriorate.

Senior Ba'th official, called the CPI a "lackey" party in a press conference in 1984 and said that Iraqi leaders saw "no relationship between our stand toward the Communist Party of Iraq and the Soviet Union. Therefore we reject that this or that should have any involvement in drawing up our internal policy "

Moscow's latest effort to improve the lot of the CPI in Iraq apparently came during Saddam's December 1985 visit to the USSI

ae Soviets convinced Saddam to meet with a CPI Central Committee member. Saddam offered amnesty to CPI members who would agree to return from exile but on terms that would severely hamper CPI political activity. The CPI official was inclined to accept the offer, but General Secretary Muhammad is adamantly opposed to reconciliation with Saddam. Thus, the Soviets may have as hard a task getting the CPI to unify and come to terms with Baghdad as they have had convincing Saddam to at

Moscow's embargo of arms to Iraq in the early days of the war with Iran has had a lasting effect on Iraqi views of the Kremlin.

Libya's provision of Soviet surface-to-surface missiles to Iran in 1985 heightened Baghdad's mistrust of Moscow." Foreign Minister 'Aziz told US officials that Iraq has complained repeatedly to the Soviets. Although Gromyko assured 'Aziz in March 1985 that Moscow had issued a stiff warning to Qadhafi, Iraqi officials were skeptical that the Soviets would press Tripoli very hard 4

Beyond the policy differences and the mistrust, the USSR's interests in Iraq are limited by its relationship with Syria and desire for influence in Iran. Moscow has long sought a reconciliation between Baghdad and Damascus with no success. The Soviets' stake in Syria prevents them from moving too close to Iraq, although, as Soviet officials have made clear in the past, Moscow will not give up its influence in Baghdad simply to please the Assad regime

in the long run, the Soviets see Iran as more important than Iraq. He stated that, although Moscow hopes to avoid having to make the choice, it was prepared, if forced, to sacrifice its influence in Iraq for the chance to gain influence in Iran. Although the diplomat may have been exaggerating for effect, the Intelligence Community has long held that the Soviets see Iran as the greater strategic prize.

\* Iran fired some of these missiles into Baghdad in the spring of 1985 and resumed firing in August 1986?



During the rest of the decade, the Soviet-Iraqi relationship is likely to remain a wary one, based almost solely on the arms supply link. Moscow might become even more cooperative in the quality, quantity, and financing of arms supplied to Iraq to counter Baghdad's growing ties to the West, particularly the United States. Such a Soviet step would be more likely should the war with Iran end," which would ease Iraq's acute need for Soviet weaponry and allow it the breathing space to shift to greater dependence on Western suppliers—a move under way before the war bega

If Saddam were to die or be ousted, the effect on the relationship would depend upon the nature of the regime that replaced him. From Moscow's standpoint, only an Iranian-dominated Shi'a regime or a more Western-oriented leadership would be worse alternatives than Saddam. If Saddam were simply replaced by his chief lieutenants, which is the most likely scenario, chances are they would share his distrust of the Soviets, although they probably would not allow this to dominate Iraqi policy toward the USSR. The Kremlin might seek to ingratiate itself with the new leaders by offering better credit terms on arms purchases as well as some of the more advanced weaponry it has been reluctant to provide, and possibly intelligence and security support to help maintain them in power. The relationship might become less acrimonious in this case but would probably not differ markedly from that which prevails under Saddam.

Algeria. The USSR has valued Algeria as an influential member of the Arab community and Third World and as a country developing along an "anti-imperialist" and "progressive" socialist path. Although the Soviets largely stayed aloof front Algeria's struggle for independence from France during 1954-62, they developed a close relationship with Algiers under its first two leaders, Ben Bella and Houari

Boumediene. Algeria purchased virtually all of its military equipment from the Soviet Union and its East European allies, and Moscow and Algiers saw eye to eye on most international issues. The relationship reached its peak in the 1970s, when Boumediene met with the Soviet Ambassador on almost a weekly basis and party-to-party contacts were frequen

Even under Boumediene, however, the Soviets were unable to develop the kind of influence in Algeria that they had, for example, in Egypt in the late 1960s. The Algerians maintained a certain distance and hercely guarded their independence

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Since President Chadli Bendjedid came to power in 1979, the Soviet-Algerian relationship has become steadily more distant, and Moscow has been unable to reverse the trend. The Soviets clearly preferred Bendjedid's leftist rival, Mohamed Salah Yahiaovi, as a replacement for Boumediene, who died in December 1978, and they do not trust Bendjedid

J. Chain that Soviet support for Yahiaout has Colored Bendjedid's attitude toward Moscow C.

said that the steady decime in Soviet-Algerian relations over the past few years is a result of Algiers's displeasure with Moscow's unwillingness to provide "full military support" and its attempts to influence Algerian foreign policy. In addition, the Algerians



# Factsheet on Soviet-Algerian Relations

Estimated Number of Soviet Personnel

Soviet Ambassador: Vasiliy Taratutu (assumed post in April 1983) Algerian Ambassador: Abdel Madjid Allahoum (assumed post in October 1984)

Estimated Number of Soviet Personne in Algeria (excluding dependents)	rl .		f Algerian Personnel Training in USSR	
Diplomatic *	80 -	1980	NA.	
Military advisers and technicians	800	1981	NA.	
Economic advisers and technicians	6,000	1982	200	
Total	6,880	1983	300	
		1984	100	
		1985	100	
Soviet Trade With Algeria (million US Exports Imports	,	Soviet Econor (million US \$	mic Credits/Grants E	xtended

Soviet	Trade	With A	llgeria	(million	US	<b>3</b> ) b
			E			

	Exports	<i>i mports</i>	1 otal
1975	156	187	343
1980	143	96 .	239
1981	157	117	274
1982	183	64	247
1983	217	16	233
1984	175	180	355
1985	158	328	486

Military Sales (million US \$1

# 

Facilities Used by Soviet Military

None

All officials—political, economic, military, intelligence—who
work in the Embassy and Consulates (Annaba and Oran), as well
as media and trade representatives.
 From official Soviet statistics, which do not include all military
trade.

resent the USSR's willingness to provide their rival, Libya, with large amounts of sophisticated weapons. Bendjedid has:

- Lessened Algeria's overwhelming dependence on the USSR for arms. Algiers has begun to purchase major weapon systems from Western countries, and the level of Soviet arms deliveries to Algeria has dropped off markedly since 1982, although a reported new arms deal signed this spring would reverse this decline.
- Sharply reduced the number of Soviet military advisers and technicians in Algeria. From a high of 1,500 in 1981, the presence is now down to approximately 800.
- Curtailed regular consultations with the Soviets.
   The visit by the Algerian President to the USSR this spring was only his second since assuming office, and he has not followed Boumediene's practice of frequent meetings with the Soviet Ambassador the "privileged dialogue" the Soviets enjoyed with senior levels of the FLN under Boumediene was a thing of the past.
- Dropped many senior-level pro-Soviet Algerian officials. The Algerian President replaced them with people who support his policy of lessening dependence on the USSR.
- Begun to modify Algeria's "socialist" economy.
   This has included some decentralization, expansion of the private sector, encouragement of foreign

investment, and a shift of emphasis from heavy to light industry. These policies were reflected in the FLN's revision of the Algerian national charter in December 1985. Soviet officials have commented.

backward of 10 years in the building of socialism in

the Soviets are seeking assurances from FLN officials that Algeria will continue to adhere to socialist economic practices.

 Improved relations with Western countries. The Algerian President's more positive relationship with the United States appears to worry the Soviets the most

The Soviets have exerted considerable effort to stem Algeria's drift away from the USSR under Bendjedid, especially over the past two and a half years. The Kremlin has sent a host of high-level officials to Algeria to shore up time (see inset).

Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, hoped



High-Level Soviet-Algerian Contacts, 1984-86				
May 1984	Shevardnadze—then Georgian party chief and a candidate Politburo member— represents the USSR at the congress of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) in Algiers. Received by Bendjedid.			
September 1984	Gromyko—then Foreign Minister—and Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahimi meet while in New York for opening of fall session of United Nations General Assembly.			
October 1984	Ponomarev—then candidate Polithuro member and Chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department—has talks in Algiers with senior FLN and Algerian Government officials. Received by Bendjedid.			
November 1984	Soviet candidate Politburo member Demichev has talks in Algiers with Minister of Culture and with senior FLN official Messaadia.			
December 1984	Admiral Gorshkov—then Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy—has talks in Algiers with senior Algerian defense and other government officials.			
July 1985	Algerian Navy Commander in Chief Cherif visits USSR and has talks with Admiral Gorshkov.			
August 1985	Algerian Prime Minister Brahimi has talks in Moscow with then Soviet Prime Minister Tikhonov.			
December 1985	General Ivanovskiy, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces and Deputy Defense Minister, visits Algiers for talks with Algerian military and political leaders.			
March 1986	Bendjedid makes his second visit to Moscow as president.			
June 1986	Major General Benloucif, then Algerian Army Chief of Staff, visits the USSR and has talks with Soviet military officials.			



August 1986

Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov visits Algiers and has talks with Messaadia and with Algerian Foreign Ministry officials.

during his December 1983 visit to convince the Algerians to abandon plans to purchase arms from the West. Another claimed that the visit to Algiers in Occoper 1984 of Boris Ponomarev, then Chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, was prompted by Moscow's concern over Algeria's continuing drift toward the West

Despite Algeria's slow drift from the USSR, it remains a valuable Soviet friend. It is still strongly nonaligned and anti-Israeli and continues to differ with the United States on many international issues—most important, on how to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The relationship with Algiers also provides Moscow with influence in North Africa beyond its ties to the mercurial Qadhafi regime. The Soviets, moreover, continue to earn valuable hard currency from arms sales to Algeria and still have more economic advisers and technicians there (approximately 6,000) than in any other less developed country. Whatever Bendjedid's long-term plans are, they will be heavily influenced by the fact that Algeria's armed forces remain overwhelmingly Soviet equipped.

that they believe Algeria's growing economic problems and concern about the intentions of Morocco and Libya will oblige Bendjedid to curtail his economic liberalization, distance Algiers from Washington, and strengthen ties to

Moscow. We believe, however, that the carefully planned nature of Bendjedid's policy changes indicate they are unlikely to be reversed while he remains in power. The broad-based support within the FLN for Bendjedid's shift away from the USSR makes it likely that the policy would even survive his departure. Thus, the Soviets almost certainly will not be able to restore the relationship during the rest of the decade to the closeness that characterized it under Boumediene. This represents an important setback to Moscow's position in the Maghreb and in the Middle East as a whole.

The PLO." The Soviets, by identifying themselves since the early 1970s with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (see table 3), have attempted to gain:

- Enhanced stature among the Arabs, most of whom regard a country's position on the Palestinian issue as a litmus test of its support for the Arab world.
- An edge with the Arabs over the United States, which does not recognize the organization.
- · An added means of leverage on Israel.
- A potential tool with which to hinder a US-sponsored Arab-Israeli settlement and a right to claim for themselves a role in any settlement.
- A source of influence in the region beyond established government.

Moscow, however, has never been comfortable with the ideologically diverse PLO, which depends on support from such conservative, anti-Soviet Arab governments as Saudi Arabia. As one scholar noted in a 1980 study of the Soviet-PLO relationship, the PLO is "far too unstable, uncertain and divided, far less Marxist and yet far too extremist to be Moscow's preferred partner." "Palestinian disunity, in particular, has contributed to the USSR's hesitation to take a definitive stance and has led to its numerous shifts in policy toward the PLO. Despite the PLO's importance

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Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and the Palestinian Liberation Organization: An Uneasy Alliance (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 253-54.



Table 3
Groups Within the Palestine Liberation Organization 3

	Leader	Headquarters	Size
Pro-Arafat			
Fatah loyalists	Yasir Arafat	Tunis	6,000 to 8,000 scattered
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)	'Abd al-Rahim Ahmad	Baghdad	300 to 500 in 1raq
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP)*	Muhammad 'Abbas (Abu al-Abbas)	Tunis	50 to 100
Neutral			
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) (Marxist)	Nayif Hawatmah	Damascus	1,200 to 2,000 scattered
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP) b	Ta'alat Yaqub	Damascus	Approximately 150
Pro-Syrian Pro-Syrian			
Palestine National Salvation Front			
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (Marxist)	George Habbash	Damascus	1,500 to 2,000 scattered
PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)	Ahmad Jibril	Damascus	800 to 1,000, mostly in Syria and Lebanon
Sa'iqa	'Isam Qadi	Damascus	500 to 1,000
Popular Struggle Front (PSF)	Shamir Ghawshah		200 to 300 scattered
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP) b	'Abd al-Fattah Ghanim	Damascus	Approximately 150
Fatah rebels	Sa'id Muragha (Abu Musa)	Dumascus	500, mostly in Syria and Lebanon

<sup>•</sup> The Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) is not a member of the PLO. In recent years, the PCP has cooperated closely with Hawatmah's DFLP. The Abu Nidal faction also is not a PLO member.

to Moscow, the fact that it is not an established government allows the Soviete to pursue a more tactical policy toward .

This tactical flexibility toward the PLO has been especially evident since the Israeli thrashing of PLO forces in Lebanon in 1982. The USSR's cautious reaction to the Israeli action strained Soviet-PLO

relations. Ties between Moscow and Arafat have been further complicated by the Soviet unwillingness to take forceful action to convince Syrian President Assad to abandon his efforts since 1983 to oust Arafat and gain control of the PLO. Although the Soviets have made their displeasure with this Syrian policy known to Assad, they have been careful not to allow the issue to jeopardize relations with their most important ally in the Middle Eas:



Also known as the Palestine Liberation Front.

The Leftist Alternative

Moscow has long maintained support for the Palestinian leftists, even while its relations with Arafat were good. The Palestinian Communist Party is the faction closest to the Soviets, but its influence among Palestinians has been limited. The much more influential Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—a Marxist group—has cooperated closely with the Kremlin for years. Former Soviet leader Andropov told a Communist leader in 1982 that the DFLP is the PLO's purest element—evidently meaning the most ideologically sound. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—also Marxist—has had its differences with the Soviets because of its more militant stance toward Israel.

It does not appear that the Kremlin views the leftists at this point as a replacement for Arafat.

... netheless, Moscow probably sees the leftists as a corrective influence on the "bourgeois" Arafat and as potential candidates for future leadership of the Palestinian movement. Soviet support for the leftists seems designed to reunite the PLO on a basis that curtails Arafat's ability to pursue talks with Arab moderates, the United States, and—eventually—Israel. Moscow also apparently hopes the leftists can help mend the Arafat-Assad rift.

The Soviets have been torn by conflicting interests in the Arafat-Assad dispute. Although the USSR agrees with some of the criticism directed at Arafat by Assad and the Syrian-backed PLO factions, it does not want to see the PLO come under Syrian control. Such a development would force the Soviets to deal with the Palestinians through fiercely independent Damascus. Arafat's moves in late 1984 to form a joint PLO-Jordanian delegation for peace talks with Israel, however, prompted Moscow to move closer to the position of Syria and Arafat's PLO opponents. The

Soviets' primary reason for opposing the Arafat-Hussein accord was the fear that it might have facilitated US-sponsored talks between the joint PLO-Jordanian delegation and Israel that excluded both Syria and the USSR

partment einef Qaddumi during his visit to Moscow in January 1986 that this would lead to US domination of the Middle East and pose a grave threat to the Soviet Unio

Former soviet leader Turty Andropov and PLU leader Yasir Arafat during his last official visit to Moscow in January 1985

The unraveling of the Arafat-Hussein accord in late 1985 and early 1986 has prompted the Soviets and Arafat to once again move closer: Arafat, because he is increasingly isolated; and Moscow, because it evidently senses that Arafat's weak position leaves him no choice but to improve relations with the USSR on its terms. Gorbachev apparently met with Arafat during the East German party congress in April 1986, according to PLO radio and

This was the first time a Soviet leader held cares with the PLO chief since 1983. The Soviets are also stepping up efforts to reunify the PLO. According to Moscow's mediation was responsible for the PLO's decision to send a joint delegation, with representatives of all the major factions to the 27th Congress of the CPSU in February.

The Soviets, however, do not appear convinced that Arafat has totally ahandoned hopes of collaboration with King Husseir

would not rule out Arafat's future cooperation with Hussein. He also was pessimistic about reconciliation among PLO factions. Moscow's failed attempts in the summer and fall of 1986 to broker PLO unity

The Palestinian issue is likely to remain the central one in the Middle East, regardless of who wins the power struggle within the PLO, and the Soviets will continue championing the cause. But the PLO's value as a vehicle for advancing Soviet interests in the region probably will remain much diminished. The PLO's internal rifts and feud with Syria put the attainment of Arab unity, which the Soviets consider essential, even further away. It will be difficult for the Soviets to achieve one of their primary goals in the Middle East—a major role in an Arab-Israeli peace conference—without close ties to a strong PLO that cooperates with Syria. Moscow would be unable to parlay its role as a benefactor of the PLO to obtain a seat at such a conference if the mainstream of the PLO remains at odds with Syria and the Palestinians themselves remain badly divided

#### Friendly Moderates

Moscow has long sought, as a part of its broader Middle Eastern strategy, to cultivate ties to the "moderate" Arab regimes. The Soviets have had their most success with three monarchies (Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco), a military dictatorship (Mauritania), and three ostensible parliamentary democracies (Tunisia, Sudan, and Lebanon). Although the Kremlin's long-term objective is developing Soviet influence in these countries, its more immediate and realistic goal is croding US influence. The Soviets have had their setbacks—most notably in Sudan under Nimeiri—but on balance their patient courting has paid some important dividends. Most, if not all, of these countries have:

- Acknowledged publicly that the USSR has an important role to play in the Middle East.
- Endorsed (albeit not necessarily enthusiastically)
   Moscow's call for an international conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute.
- Muted concerns about Soviet policies, particularly on Afghanistan

The key to Moscow's success has been its identification with the Arab cause, especially on the Palestinian question. The Soviets have also used arms sales to make inroads with some of the "friendly moderates." They signed minor arms deals with Morocco and Lebanon in the 1960s and 1970s and briefly were



Sudan's primary source of arms in the early 1970s. More recently, the USSR has provided Jordan and Kuwait with air defense weapons, capitalizing on the US Congress' reluctance to sell those countries certain arms. Although the Soviets have not sold arms to Tunisia, it is the one "friendly moderate" that allows Soviet naval ships regular access to its ports."


Trade and economic assistance have played only a minimal role in Moscow's relations with these countries. The only exceptions are Morocco, where the Soviets have invested heavily in the development of phosphates and have a profitable fishing agreement, and Mauritania, where they have a similar arrangement to fish in coastal waters in return for helping develop the Mauritanian fishing industry. Recent Soviet discussions with Kuwait on a variety of economic projects are likely to result in Kuwait's joining the list of exceptions.

Lebanon is important to the Soviets because of the Palestinian and Syrian presence and the US interest in it rather than for its intrinsic significance. They d not have major interests at stake there. They have sought influence with both the central government and the various political and religious factions but have never been a major actor. Moscow's closest ties are to the Lebanese Communist Party. The USSR also has a long history of dealings with such minor leftist groups as the Communist Action Organization the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Murabi tun. Since the Israeli invasion of 1982, the Soviets have focused attention on two of the most influential factions, the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) of Walid Junblatt and the Shia Amal of Nabih Barri. They have become particularly close to the PSP, providing it with the bulk of its arms

Similarly, the Soviets have attempted—unsuccessfully—to play some role in the international efforts to resolve the Lebanese problem. This has stemmed more from a desire to head off a US-brokered solution and find another entree into Middle Eastern affairs

"The Moroccans apparently are easing their restrictions on Soviet naval visits. A Soviet guided-missile frighte and a minesweeper called at Casablanca ig. Seotomber, the first such part call in Morocco in a decade

than from a genuine interest in getting involved in the Lebanese quagmire. Although the Soviets do not want to see Lebanon controlled by Syria, the importance of their relationship with Damascus is likely to prompt them to continue deferring to Syrian interests in Lebanon during the rest of the decade



economic rationale for its presence in Kuwait. During the visit to Kuwait in July of Konstantin Katushev, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, the two sides neared agreement on a host of economic deals, According to and Kuwaiti newspapers,

Such deals include:

 A Kuwaiti loan to the USSR of \$150 million at a favorable interest rate for construction of a natural gas pipeline between the Soviet Union and Greece.




- A swap of oil, whereby Kuwait would provide oil to Soviet customers in Asia and East Africa while Moscow would do the same for Kuwaiti clients in Western Europe.
- A similar swap involving ammonia deliveries.
- Kuwaiti assistance in oil refining, exploration, and drilling techniques for joint projects in the USSR.
   The last deal, in particular, could provide Moscow access to advanced oil technology denied to it by the West

Moscow received a windfall in Sudan with the ouster of the anti-Soviet Jaafar Nimeiri in April 1985. The Soviets dealt cautiously with the transitional regime of General al-Dahab, probably out of uncertainty over its longevity and in deference to the Ethiopians, who strongly opposed the regime. At the same time, the Kremlin stepped up aid to the Sudanese Communist Party and, via Ethiopia, has been providing indirect military support to the Marxist southern insurgent leader, John Garang, and his Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), according to L

Although we believe increases a mulitary support is not extensive, the Soviets almost certainly approve of Ethiopia's transfer of its Soviet-supplied arms to the SPLA.

The Soviets probably will continue their current dualtrack approach with the new government headed by the Umma Party's Sadiq al-Mahdi. As his August visit to the USSR indicated, Moscow is likely to try currying favor with his government, while keeping a certain distance so as not to jeopardize relations with a possible successor should Sadiq's rule prove short lived. The Soviets may offer to repair Sudan's aging inventory of Soviet arms and possibly sell new weapon systems once they believe Sadiq has consolidated power, provided Khartoum first curtailed assistance to Ethiopian insurgents. Libya's ties to Sadiq could provide the Soviets an opening, but they are likely to tread carefully to avoid a backlash should Qadhafi's intrigues backfire

Should Sadiq's rule lead to increased instability, or should the SPLA score significant gains, the Soviets would be likely to step up aid to the Communists and to Garang's forces. They would attempt, however, to



disguise such aid to avoid harming relations with Cairo. Egypt is far more significant to Soviet interests in the Middle East than is Sudan, which is likely to remain an economic and political basket case during the next five vears regardless of who is in control in Khartoum

Despite the inroads Moscow has made with the friendly moderates, virtually all maintain good relations with Washington. Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia retain important military links to the United States. Moreover, all of the friendly moderates remain skeptical about Soviet intentions. Morocco, for example, continues to suspect that the Soviets are aiding the Polisario rebels in the Western Sahara (see inset).

The Soviets are certain to continue their low-cost efforts to woo the friendly moderates away from dependence on Washington. In most cases, Moscow has little to lose, and in those areas—such as Lebanon—where Soviet ties to more important Arab countries impinge, preserving those ties will continue to take precedence. Internal instability in some of these countries is likely to offer Moscow the best opportunities for advancement. Instability in Lebanon



#### Moscow, Rabat, and the Polisario

The Soviets sympathize with the cause of the Polisario rebels, who are seeking an independent state in the Western Sahara. The Kremlin supports Saharan "self-determination"—as opposed to independence—in international forums and sanctions the transfer of Soviet arms to the rebels by Algeria and Libya.

authorized Augeria to transfer arms that it no longer needs to the Polisario, but not any major systems that might internationalize the conflict in the Western Sahara

Moscow, however, refrains from direct contact with the Polisario and has neither accorded it the status of a national liberation movement nor recognized the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR). Even the staunchly pro-Moscow Moroccan Communist party (the Party of Progress and Socialism) backs the Moroccan Government's claim to sovereignty over the Western Sahar.

military support and scant humanitarian aid. Cuban officials reported! hat each time they have

urged Moscow to take a more active role in aiding the Polisario, they have been firmly rebuffed.

The Kremlin's caution stems from its desire to maintain good relations with Moroccan King Hassan as well as an apparent judgment that the Polisario's chances of establishing an independent state any time soon are slim. In response to a question at a public lecture in 1982 in Moscow as to whether the Soviet Union recognized the SDAR, a Soviet specialist on North Africa from the Academy of Sciences' Africa Institute claimed the issue was "complex" because the Soviets had to "take into account our good relations with Morocco.

the Soviets believed that Hassan would maintain normal relations with the USSR to ensure that it would not step up aid to the Polisario.

and Sudan during the past three years already has eroded US influence and brought in regimes much more willing to deal with the Soviets than their predecessors had been. Domestic unrest in Morocco and Tunisia is likely to grow over the next few years, potentially providing the USSR with fertile ground to expand its influence or at least undermine that of the United States. And in Mauritania, where a military-led coup occurred in 1984, the chronic instability of the central government may eventually offer the Soviets opportunities in that far-off corner of the Middle East

### Wary Moderates

The only states the USSR does not have diplomatic relations with in the Middle East are the Persian Gulf

monarchies of Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia."
The Soviets scored their first breakthroughs in the region in years in the fall of 1985, when they established relations with Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)

Moscow's primary objective in the Persian Gulf region, in our view, is the elimination of the US military presence. Soviet propaganda incessantly criticizes the conservative Gulf countries for cooperating militarily

Neither the Soviets nor the Saudis ever formally severed diplomatic relations when Moscow withdrew its emissary from Saudi Arabia in the late 1930s. Thus, technically they still have relations, but in fact there have been no ties for almost 50 year.



#### Israel

The USSR's relationship with Israel has been a paradoxical one. Since as far back as Lenin, Soviet Communists have intensely distrusted Zionism, which they regard as reactionary and "bourgeois" despite its socialist element. Nonetheless, the Soviets were among the first to recognize the new Jewish state in 1948; but they have severed relations with it twice since then, in 1953—for five months—and in 1967. Israel's existence and US support for it have provided the Soviets their best entree for influence in the Arab world; yet their self-inflicted inability to talk with Israel has put them at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis Washington—which has influence with both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict."

The presence of over 2 million Jews in the Soviet Union, many of whom desire to emigrate, and the fact that Israel sees the protection and eventual emigration of Soviet Jews as a vital national interest add a volatile factor that is not present in the USSR's relationship with most other countries. The interest of American Jews and the US Government in the plight of Soviet Jews has had repercussions in US-Soviet relations. The collapse of the deal between Washington and Moscow in January 1975 that would have given the Soviet Union most-favored-nation trading status was a direct result of the Congress' Jackson-Vanik amendment, which required that the Soviets let a certain number of Jews leave each year—a pledge the Kremlin refused to make.

Moscow, in addition, has to factor into its Israeli policy the strong US commitment to the existence of Israel and the increasingly close security relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv. The Soviets have displayed concern over the US-Israeli "strategic cooperation" agreement—signed in 1981 but not implemented until 1983—particularly its focus on countering the USSR in the Middle East (see inset).

"Another irony of Soviet policy toward Israel is that, although Israeli society and policies come under harsher criticism from Moscow than those of any other Middle Eastern state, Israel is the only country in the region where the Communist Party has some influence in the national legislature (it holds four seat; in the "20-seat Knesset) and can legally criticize the government

### The US-Israeli Military Relationship

For years, Moscow's propaganda has depicted Israel as a US "gendarme" in the Middle East, and the US-Israeli "strategic cooperation" agreement of 1981 only reconfirmed that view. The USSR's special concern is that the US-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding on strategic cooperation is specifically aimed at countering potential Soviet military moves in the Middle East. One Soviet official, in talks in 1983, said the agreement is "an unprecedented military-political concord in the domain of international relations" because it refers to the Soviet Union as the "officially defined adversary."

The Kremlin also has been worried by the exchange of military technology and know-how between Israel and the United States. The Soviets, for example, issued an official TASS statement in May 1986 condemning Israel's decision to participate in research for the US Strategic Defense Initiative.

#### Lack of Relations

The Soviets have long acknowledged to US
and Israeli officials that it was a mistake to break
relations in 1967 at the end of the Six-Day War

I Some Soviets have caused the Kremlin's decision to break relations an "emotional act" and others, a rash move "in the heat of the moment."

At the same time, Moscow has continued since 1967 to emphasize that Israel has the right to exist. The Soviets have stated this explicitly in most of their "peace plans" for an Arab-Israeli settlement. Gromyko made one of the most emphatic Soviet

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Secret

public statements on this issue in a news conference in Moscow on 2 April 1983, when he declared that: "We do not share the point of view of extremist Arab circles that Israel should be eliminated . . . [this is both] unrealistic and unjust."

Within two years of the break in relations, the Soviets were probing for ways to renew ties \_\_\_\_\_

During this period, Soviet officials leaked numerous stories about an imminent resumption of Soviet-Israeli relations. In the reverse of today's situation, it was the Israelis who played hard to get and denied in public any movement toward restoration of ties. The Camp David accords in 1978 ended the USSR's courting of Israel, although periodic contacts have continued.

### Recent Developments

There has been an increase in Soviet-Israeli contacts since Gorbachev's accession to power. The Kremlin almost certainly approved Poland's agreement with Israel to open interest sections in Warsaw and Tel Aviv. One of the most significant Soviet steps was the decision to meet with Israeli officials in Helsinki in August 1986 to arrange for a Soviet consular delegation to go to Israel to review the operation of the Soviet interests section run by the Finnish Embassy and handle some consular matters. Although the Soviets abruptly ended the meeting when the Israeli side attempted to discuss Soviet Jewry and demanded that an Israeli delegation be allowed to go to Moscow, the meeting served as a signal to the Arabs that the USSR has the ability to develop its own independent

"The foreign ministers met—on Israel's request—at the opening sessions of the UN General Assembly in 1981 and 1984; Shevard-nadze met then Prime Minister Peres at the 1986 session; and Soviet and Israeli ambassadors in the major capitals meet occasionally. In addition, each May on the anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany. Moscow sends a lower-old delegation to Israel and Israeli leftists go to the USSF

policy toward Israel. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's meeting with then Prime Minister Peres, at the latter's request, in September at the United Nations reiterated the point, even though Moscow went out of its way to criticize Israeli positions in its media coverage of the meeting

The Balance Sheet From Moscow's Perspective

When Soviet leaders weigh the merits of resuming ties to Israel, they probably calculate that, on the credit side, reestablishing relations would provide an entree into Arab-Israeli negotiations from which they have been excluded since 1973. Specifically, Moscow would hope to convene its long-proposed international conference. Israeli (as well as US) opposition has been the biggest obstacle to holding such a gathering. Such a step would probably also improve the atmosphere in US-Soviet relations and possibly even lead to an energy of US restrictions on trade with the USSR.

On the debit side, reestablishing formal ties would alienate Moscow's Arab friends, most importantly the Syrians and Palestinians. Gromyko cited this as the primary reason for not taking this step where

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opposition prevented the USSR from restoring ties to Israel any time soon. More recently, Shevardnadze

retorted that the OSSK could not abandon as principles and must consider how its friends might react.

Moscow's concern about Syria's reaction appears to be well founded. President Assad's spokesman said in a public statement in November 1985 that "nothing justifies" the resumption of Soviet-Israeli relations as long as Israel continues to occupy Arab territories. Syria's severence of diplomatic relations with Morocco in July 1986 for hosting a visit by Peres indicates the intensity with which Damascus regards the issue?"

Some in Moscow would probably argue that the Arabs have nowhere else to turn and thus would have to acquiesce in a Soviet move to renew relations, no matter how distasteful. Most Soviet officials, however, probably are not that confident about the USSR's position with the Arabs. They are likely to worry that the damage in relations with the Arabs would be deep and lasting, possibly even severe enough to convince some—such as the Syrians and Palestinians—that there was no choice but to throw in their lot with the United States, as Egypt did, to get the best available deal with the Israelis. At the same time, these Soviets probably would argue that restoring relations is likely to encourage the moderate Arabs to reach an accommodation with Israel

An added complication for the Soviets in restoring ties would be the opening of an Israeli Embassy in Moscow that would be a magnet for "refuseniks" (Soviet Jews who have applied to emigrate but have not been allowed to leave) and the Soviet Jewish population in general

Moscow in 1974 that this would be a serious problem for the Soviets requiring firm guarantees from Israel limiting the activities of an Israeli Embassy in Moscow.

#### Prospects

Israeli flexibility on an international conference and the level of tensions between Israel and Syria are likely to determine the pace of Soviet moves to normalize relations, regardless of whether the hardline Likud or the more moderate Labor Party is in power. It would be difficult for the Soviets to convince Syria of the necessity for renewed Soviet-Israeli relations if Israel continues to hold to its current positions on the Palestinian question and the Golan Heights or new Syrian-Israeli hostilities crupt. Moscow's officially declared position is that relations will not be restored until Israel returns all of the lands seized in 1967, but we believe it is likely to take further steps toward better ties even without such Israeli concessions.

The Soviets probably will move very gradually to give the Arabs time to get used to the idea of better Soviet-Israeli ties before reestablishing full diplomatic relations. And Likud leader Shamir's scheduled tenure as prime minister until late 1988 is likely to hinder progress in Soviet-Israeli relations. It appears, however, that the Gorbachev foreign policy team—possibly prodded by CPSU International Department Chief Dobrynin, who reportedly has long favored restoring ties—is determined to find a way to correct the blunder Moscow made in 1967 by breaking relations.

An easing of tensions between Moscow and Washington will not automatically lead to improvement in Soviet-Israeli relations, but the last serious Soviet



efforts to improve ties occurred during the heyday of detente. The Kremlin probably would-hope that one benefit from improved US-Soviet relations would be cooperation on issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Gorbachev regime's view of the USSR's internal security—specifically, the extent to which dissent and emigration are to be tolerated—also will color its policy toward Israel. If Gorbachev continues his current tough policies toward Soviet Jews, this probably would indicate that he has no real intention of softening the Soviet position on Israel." On the other hand, an easing of restrictions on Soviet Jews would not necessarily mean Moscow was planning to reestablish ties to Israel. Such a liberalization could be directed more at influencing policy in Washington than in Israel

#### The Northern Tier

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Just as Egypt is the key Soviet target of opportunity in the Arab world, so fran is in the northern tier. Its size, location, and oil wealth give it key significance in Soviet strategy toward the Middle East. Although we assume Moscow's ultimate goal has been and remains the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Tehran, its more immediate concern has been to prevent its adversaries from achieving predominant influence there. Soviet concern over British and German ascendancy in Iran and how those powers might use their position in the country to threaten the USSR played a role in prompting the Soviet occupation of parts of northern Iran in 1920-21 and again from 1941 to 1946. The Shah's overthrow in 1979 ended a period of more than 30 years during which the Soviets faced an extensive US presence in Iran. Capitalizing on this strategic mindfall has been Moscow's primary aim in Irā:

"Although Gorbachev freed dissident Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, who has settled in Israel, he has not eased up on overall Jewish emigration. The number of Jews allowed to leave the USSR in 1986 is running at a rate that would put the yearend total lower than any year since 1970. In addition, Gorbachev's regime has stepped up its repression of Jewish "refusenth."



The Soviets have had almost no success in replacing US influence in Iran with their own. Soviet-Iranian relations have deteriorated sharply since 1982, when Moscow abandoned its efforts to court Ayatollah Khomeini's regime and tilted toward Baghdad in the war between Iran and Iraq. Since 1984 Tehran has shown signs of desiring a halt to the slide, but Moscow has not been convinced of the Khomeini regime's sincerity and has maintained a tough posture toward Iran. Soviet media criticism of Iranian policies continues almost unabated." The visit to Tehran in February of then First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko was the highest level Soviet visit to Iran since the Shah's fall, but by most accounts neither side showed a willingness to compromise on the basic issues dividing them. Similarly, the visits to the USSR in the summer of 1986 by two Iranian ministers, despite the positive handling in both sides' media, yielded few results—save\_perhaps, in the energy sphere (see page 57)

Despite this lack of success, the Soviets probably are satisfied that Washington also has not been able to reestablish itself in Iran. Concern that the United States will do so has evidently been high in Moscow.

"Moscow may have slightly softened its stance by stopping in September the operations of the "National Voice of Iran" (NVOI), a radio station that has broadcast in Persian and Azeri to Iran out of Baku in Soviet Azerbaijan sinct 1939. The significance of this step, however, is undercut by the fact that the Moscow-controlled Tudeh (Communist) party continues to broadcast anti-Khomoini propaganda to Iran from a radio station in Kabul, Afghanistan—"Radio of the Iranian Toilers



# For example

Iran was increasingly turning to Western technology and that its leaders were at heart oriented toward the Western economic system. This theme is expressed more directly in Soviet scholarly and journalistic writings on the Islamic regime. For instance, Soviet media gave extensive coverage to the US acknowledgment in November that it had secretly provided some arms to Iran.

the Soviets viewed with considerable concern the possibility that the United States would take military action to restore its position in Iran. He said the USSR's primary goal in Iran is to prevent the United States from regaining influence

Policy Differences. The trend in Soviet policy toward Iran since 1982 and the continued hostility of Khomeini toward the USSR strongly suggest that there will be no significant improvement in bilateral relations as long as the Ayatollah remains in power. Beyond the basic ideological differences separating the two regimes and Iran's traditional fear of its powerful northern neighbor, the issues hindering better relations today are:

- · Moscow's military support for Iraq.
- The continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and Iran's support for the Afghan rebels.
- Tehran's occasional hostile treatment of Soviets accredited to Iran and Moscow's withdrawal in 1984 and 1985 of most of its economic advisers and technicians from Iranian industries.
- The Khomeini regime's repression of the Tudeh Party.
- The public criticisms the two sides exchange in their media

The first two issues are the most significant and the ones on which changes in Soviet and Iranian positions are least likely over the next few years. Moscow has gone to great lengths to improve its position in Iraq

#### Soviet Reassessment of the Iranian Revolution

An article in the July 1982 edition of the CPSU journal Kommunist was a landmark in the Soviets' reappraisal of the Iranian revolution. The author, Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy, a deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department and one of the USSR's senior specialists on the Third World, stated that the fundamentalist clerics' consolidation of power in the summer of 1981 marked the end of the revolution's "genuinely people's antiimperialist" nature and the beginning of an "illusory" quest for an Islamic "third path" between capitalism and socialism"

Ul'yanovskiy claimed the February 1979 revolution was "bourgeois democratic" and could have moved in an "anticapitalist" (that is, pro-Soviet) direction. Unfortunately, he lamented, the complete triumph of the Shia clergy stifled the revolution's "progressive" tendencies:

The more the new organizations's power with its specifically Islamic features strengthened, the more rapidly the foundations of the revolution as a truly people's antiimperialist and democratic revolution were eroded

The article was a rationalization and, at the same time, a confirmation of the negative shift in the USSR's view of Khomeini's Iran. Articles and books by Ul'yanovskiy and others emphasizing the same themes in even more strident terms continue to appear in Soviet medic

since 1982 and, as long as the war continues, is not tikely to lessen its military support for Baghdad unless a clear prospect for major Soviet gains in Iran were to arise. The Soviets are not likely to pull out of Afghanistan entirely any time soon, and the Iranians are becoming bolder in their support for the rebels. Soviet media in February criticized Tehran for sending a clerical delegation into Afghanistan to meet



Table 4 Soviet-Iranian Trade

Million US \$

	Soviet Imports From Iran	Soviet Exports to Iran	
1975	317	391	
1980	116	399	
1981	653	567	
1982	260	795	
1983	509	755	
1984	298	297	
1985	163	245	

Source: Soviet trade statistics, rounded to nearest million US dollars.

with rebels and claimed "the Iranian officials' intervention in Afghanistan's domestic affairs is becoming more blatant and overt."

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani's talks with Soviet officials in Moscow in August yielded no meeting of the minds on Afghanistan. And, in December, Izvestiya, in one of the hardest hitting public Soviet criticisms of the Khomeini regime to date, accused it of cooperating with the United States in an "undeclared war" against the Marxist government in Afghanistan and in denigrating the USSR's "international assistance" to the Najib regime.

Possible Areas for Improvement in Relations. Even without movement on these issues, however, a lessening of the current high state of tensions is possible while Khomeini is in power.

Tehran's primary goals are to lessen Soviet affinary support for Iraq and convince Moscow to sell Iran major weapon systems. Although the Soviets have dragged their feet in responding to Iran's overtures, and bilateral trade in 1985 dropped to its lowest level since the early 1970s (see table 4), economic discussions are continuing. Both governments have indicated that some Soviet economic advisers and technicians are likely to return to Iran in the near future. Iran's Minister of Petroleum claimed after his August 1986 visit to Moscow that the two sides would conduct a three-month study to assess the possibility of resuming Iranian natural gas exports to the

USSR." Tehran terminated such deliveries in 1980 because of difficulties over pricing. Even if the two could agree on pricing, refurbishing the IGAT I pipeline would take six months to a year

The Soviets also might be willing, in return for Iranian concessions on other issues, to increase their arms sales to Tehran. Moscow already has allowed its East European allies to boost arms sales to Iran. Such sales increased by a factor of six in 1984

but dropped off again in 1985 (see

systems probably stems from two factors; they do not want to enable Iran to expand the war, and they want to avoid antagonizing Iraq

"The Cowiets have made no public mention of such an agreement.



After Khomeini. Although the Soviets are unlikely to soften their stance on Iran significantly as long as Khomeini is in power, they probably would mount a major effort to court a successor regime even if it were run by other fundamentalist clerics—the most likely development. (Khomeini is around 87 and reported to be in failing health.) If the new regime adopted a less hostile policy toward the USSR than Khomeini's, the Soviets would be likely to follow a policy of inducements aimed at improving state-to-state relations and, ultimately, increasing Soviet influence in Iran. They tried this for these years before giving up on

Should a successor regime prove to be as anti-Soviet as Khomeini's or, on the other hand, should a major power struggle ensue, Moscow almost certainly would use the potential levers it has both inside and outside Iran to promote the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Tehran. Ideally, the Kremlin would hope for a regime headed by the staunchly pro-Soviet Tudeh (Communist) Party. The Tudeh, however, has

not been a major factor in Iranian politics since the 1940s, and its ability to operate in Iran has been drastically reduced since the Khomeini regime declared the party illegal in 1983 and arrested many of its leaders, who remain in jail. The remnants of the party leadership fled to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and elected a new general secretary, Ali Khavari, to replace the imprisoned Nuredin Kianuri. The party's membership, which—according—totaled no more than 1,000 in

1982, aimosi cortainly has dwindled further.

The Soviets presumably recognize the Tudeh's weakness, and they have been calling for a united front of leftists (including the Fedaycen-e Khalq, Mujahedin-e Khalq, and Paykar parties) and disaffected minorities (see inset). Not all of these groups, particularly the strongest—the Mujahedin—are interested in cooperating with either the Tudeh or the Soviets, however, and the prospects for such a united front seizing power or even wielding major influence are likely to remain slim for some time to com

Moscow has two other levers—economic and military—with which to influence Iran. Iran's need for Soviet assistance in operating key components of the steel and power industries has already been noted. In addition, approximately 13 percent of Iran's imports currently transit Soviet territory, according to Iranian trade data. A Soviet ban on this transit trade would

Khomeini.



### Moscow and Iran's Minorities

The Soviet Army helped install the short-lived leftist, separatist regimes in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kordestan in 1945, and Moscow has maintained relationships with the Azerbaijani and Kurdish Democratic Parties, which remain influential in their respective regions (see foldout figure 12 at the back). The Soviets have spoken out openly since 1982 for Kurdish autonomy, and the media in the USSR's own Azerbaijani Republic often issue veiled calls for "reunification" of Soviet and Iranian Azeris. In addition, reports

suggest that the Societs maintain some contacts in Iranian Baluchistan, and Soviet media occasionally call for autonomy for the Baluch [

Seviets were not backing the minorities out of concern that instability in Iran would be likely to bring about Western intervention they would much prefer influence over a unitary Iran rather than full control over fragments of the country

We believe concern about Western intervention will continue to shape Moscow's policy toward Iranian minorities as long it views the regime in Tehran as antagonistic toward Washington. Should an Iranian government begin to turn back toward the United States, the Soviets probably would try to stir up the minorities on the assumption that instability is preferable to an Iran that is again in the US camp.'

create economic hardships for Iran, but almost certainly not enough to force it to alter its basic policies. Moreover, by wielding such a lever, Moscow risks pushing Tehran closer to the West out of economic need

Military Pressure. The presence of substantial Soviet military forces in the southern USSR and Afghanistan gives Moscow its most powerful potential lever

over Iran (see foldout figure 13 at the back). The Soviets have 28 divisions (26 motorized rifle, one tank, and one airborne) in the three military districts north of Iran and the equivalent of five or six divisions in Afghanistan. The divisions in the Turkestan, Transcaucasus, and North Caucasus military districts are among the least-well-equipped Soviet forces in the USSR's border regions. We believe, however, that these forces are sufficient, if mobilized, to mount either a limited or full-scale invasion of Iran on relatively short notice without substantial reinforcement from Soviet forces opposite NATO or China."

The Soviets have also been developing contingency plans since 1980 for military campaigns in Iran and the Persian Gulf region. In August 1980 following the Societ General ... Staff completely reevaluated contingency plans for Soviet military intervention in Iran. Claimed in 1982 that the USSR maintained detailed contingency plans for a "complete" takeover of Iran. In addition findicates that Moscow has created a theater-level military command for the Southwest Asia region—the Southern Theater of Military Operations

Any of the following developments, in our view, probably would lead the Soviets to consider military intervention in Iran:

- Moscow perceived that the United States was itself preparing to intervene.
- Central power in fran broke down and the country began to fragment.

"We believe that a full-scale invasion of Iran would require some 20 Soviet divisions and at least a month of preparation. Alternatively, an invasion with a limited objective such as Azerbatjan could be launched by about five to town divisions after two to three weeks of preparation.



Treaty of Friendship Between Persia and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Signed at Moscow, 26 February 1921

#### Article 5

The two high contracting parties undertake

(1) To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories of any organizations or groups or persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the allies of Russia. They will likewise prohibit the formation of armed troops within their respective territories with the aforementioned object.

(2) Not to allow a third party or any organization whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other contracting party, to import or to convey in transit across their countries material which can be used against the other party.

(3) To prevent by all means in their power the presence within their territories or within the territories of their allies of all armies or forces of a third party in cases in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers, interest, or safety of the other contracting party.

#### Article 6

If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or such power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a foreign power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defense. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed.

 A leftist faction seized power and appealed to the USSR for help."

Although the USSR has the capability to intervene militarily, the decision to intervene would be an agonizing one. Even a limited intervention into Azerbaijan would face fierce Iranian resistance and major terrain and logistic problems. A US military response would be difficult in this scenario, but Soviet leaders probably would judge there would be a strong likelihood of a US move to occupy parts of southern Iran.

A tull-scale invasion would present exponentially greater operational difficulties and risks of a major confrontation with the United States. Such a campaign would be on a scale larger than any the USSR has waged since World War II. In the best of circumstances—limited Iranian resistance and no US intervention—we believe it would take Soviet forces six to 12 weeks to seize the oil-rich Khuzestan region on the Persian Gulf littoral. Soviet leaders would anticipate that a full-scale invasion of Iran would prompt a major US military response.

a ware of the serious risks of such a confrontation.


#### Afghanistan

Ever since Russia's expansion into Central Asia in the 19th century, Afghanistan had been a buffer between the Russian, then Soviet, domains and South Asia, controlled until 1947 by the British. Moscow's invasion of December 1979 changed Afghanistan's status from that of a buffer to a potential integral part of the Soviet imperium. The invasion not only marked the

"If the Soviets were to intervene, they would be likely to cite Articles 5 and 6 of their 1921 Treaty of Friendship with Irun as legal justification for any intervention, just as they did in 1941. Article 6 states that should a third party intervene militarily in Iran or use Iranian territory as a base of operations against the USSR: "Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defense." The Shah unilaterally abrogated Articles 5 and 6 of the treaty in 1959, and the Khomeini regime reiterated the abrogation in November 1979. The Soviets have ignored the Iranian moves and still sweak publicly and privately of the entire treaty being in fore.







USSR's first occupation of a Middle Eastern country since the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iran in 1946, but also the first expansion of Soviet control in the region since the reconquest of Central Asia during and after the 1918-21 civil war. In addition, the invasion rescued the only Marxist regime—other than the one in South Yemen—in the Middle East.

The Soviets' occupation of Afghanistan has enhanced their ability to exercise influence beyond Afghan borders. They are in a better position to put military pressure on Iran and Pakistan. Thus far, Moscow has conducted only limited raids from Afghanistan into Pakistan and Iran against Afghan insurgent targets, and Soviet forces in Afghanistan as now constituted do not pose a major military threat to Pakistan or Iran. Moreover, before the Soviets could effectively use their presence in Afghanistan as a staging base for large-scale military operations beyond Afghan borders, they first would have to quell the insurgency and make massive logistic improvements (roads, airfields, fuel lines, communications). Nonetheless, Iran now faces Soviet forces on two flanks, Pakistan has to contend for the first time with a Soviet military presence on its border, and Soviet tactical airpower

has the potential to move some 400 kilometers closer to the Strait of Hormuz.

At the same time, the Soviets' invasion and continuing occupation of Afghanistan has had negative repercussions for them in the region and beyond. The occupation of a Middle Eastern, Islamic, and nonaligned nation has sparked resentment against Moscow from each of these constituencies (most Middle Eastern states are members of all three). Even some of the Soviet Union's friends in the region, such as Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and the PLO, were distillusioned by the invasion, although—for the most part—they have muted their displeasure. Perhaps even more important, the Soviet move has made some regional states more receptive to an increased US military presence in the region

The Situation Today. Before the Soviets can even contemplate capitalizing on their military presence in Afghanistan, they must first establish control over the countryside, a goal they appear to be little closer to achieving than when their troops first entered the country in December 1976.







### The Soviet Withdrawal

The Soviet leadership has made a decision which I will officially announce today. By the end of 1986, six regiments—one tank regiment, two motorized rifle regiments, and three antiaircraft regiments—along with their established equipment and weapons will be returned from Afghanistan to the motherland. [Applause] These units will return to the regions of their permanent deployment in the Soviet Union, and in such a way that all those for whom this may be of interest may be easily convinced of this.

 Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok, 28 July 1986

Unit	Location Prior to Withdrawal	Withdrawn?	Deception	on	Status	 	
Tank regiment	Shindand (most tanks deployed elsewhere until early July)	Yes. Ceremony 15 October	_/		()		/
Original motorized rifle regiment (MRR) with three battalions of armored personnel carriers	Shindand	No	-				•
New MRR with one battalion of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and two battalions of trucks	Shindand (initial elements arrived by 31 August)	Yes. Ceremony 17 October	-	-			
Original MRR with two battalions of APCs	Konduz	No					
New MRR with one battalion of APCs and two battalions of trucks	Konduz (initial elements arrived 29 August)	Yes. Ceremony 17 October					
			1		1		
Air defense regiment	Kabul	Yes. Ceremony 19 October	_	-	J		
Air defense regiment	Shindand	Yes. Ceremony 21 October					)
Air defense regiment	Konduz	Yes. Ceremony 27 October			L		_

People living in this city [Konduz] today bid a ceremonial farewell to the last of the six Soviet regiments being returned home in keeping with a joint decision by the governments of the USSR and Afghanistan.

-Moscow TASS in English, 27 October 1986



Socret

Over the past two years, the Soviets have attempted to redress the situation by augmenting their forces in Afghanistan, pursuing a more aggressive strategy against the insurgency, stepping up military pressure on Pakistan and Iran, improving training of Afghan military and political cadres, and replacing the Afghan leader. The USSR has some 116,000 men in Afghanistan, up about 30 percent since 1980. Among the most significant additions have been four more battalions of special-purpose forces, more fixed-wing aircraft (up from 75 to 115), and the deployment of a 2,500-man motorized rifle regiment to the Herat region near the Iranian border. None of the unitstotaling about 1,800 troops---that Moscow withdrew from Afghanistan in October was critical to the Soviet war effort (see inset)

The more aggressive Soviet pursuit of the insurgents has led to higher than usual casualties on both sides. Although Soviet forces have fought more effectively, and at least some Afghan forces have shown tenative signs of improvement, the regime remains unable to stand on its own.

In for the Long Haul. The Soviets, despite their minor troop withdrawal in October, appear to be prepared for a protracted struggle in Afghanistar hroughout the Soviet party, government, and military there is a general resignation to the fact that the USSR would be in Afghanistan for a "generation or more.' Soviet officials often cite the fledgling Bolshevik regime's long fight against the Central Asian Basmachi resistance as an indicator of Moscow's capacity to persevere against the Afghan insurgents. Gorbachev himself made each a semast I ne Soviet domestic media have given much more extensive coverage to the war during the past two years, which suggests the leadership is trying to prepare the public for a long struggle

From Moscow's perspective the costs of withdrawing are high.

Said the consequences of a premature withdrawal would be even

### A Reason To Hang Tough

The Soviets probably believe that the international costs of staying in Afghanistan are diminishing with time. Despite the continuing broad support for the annual vote in the UN General Assembly calling for the withdrawal of "foreign" troops from Afghanistan, most countries that condemned the invasion or even imposed sanctions against Moscow have returned to business as usual with the USSR. Oriental Institute department chief Gankovskiy told US Embassy officers in August 1985 that US involvement in Afghanistan is a passing whim of the Reagan administration. Although Gankovskiy probably was exaggerating for effect, and the Soviets are still quite concerned with US and other support for the insurgents, on balance most Soviet policymakers probably would agree with his basic point: US involvement is not likely to last indefinitely because Afghanistan is not of vital interest to the United States—as it is to the USSR

more catastrophic than those of failing to intervene in 1979 said that involved in Atgnanistan believe that soviet leaders would see it as "too shameful" to pull out. The Soviet Union's prestige as a superpower would be tarnished

The ideological rationale for not leaving is also compelling from a Soviet perspective. A major factor behind the initial invasion was the desire to avert the collapse of a Marxist regime. An article published in Novoye Vremya shortly after Soviet forces moved in asserted that: "To refuse to use the potential which the socialist states possess [to aid the Afghan Marxists] would mean, in fact, avoiding an internationalist duty." The Soviet Ambassador to France, in a speech in April 1980, said the Soviets could not "permit the transformation of Afghanistan into a new Chile," where the Marxist regime of Salvador Allende was toppled in 1973 and the Soviets were powerless to



prevent it. The Soviets probably fear that allowing the Marxist government in Afghanistan to collapse would set a dangerous precedent and raise questions about their willingness to support Marxist regimes elsewhere.

Despite the reasons to stay, some Soviet officials have indicated to Western and Pakistani sources that the Kremlin would seriously consider withdrawing its forces if reasonable terms could be worked out that preserve the nature of the Afghan regime. Some of these officials have actually claimed that a decision to withdraw has already been made. They may have been referring to Gorbachev's July announcement of a limited withdrawal. We doubt that a decision on a full withdrawal has already been mad-

The conflicting signals coming from the Soviets might simply be a smokescreen to ease international pressure on the USSR to withdraw ...

They could also be a reflection of a bake?

They the more aggressive strategy against the insurgents, the replacement of former Afghan leader
Babrak Karmal with Najib, and Moscow's more
flexible approach to the UN "proximity talks" with
Pakistan will eventually lead to a resolution of the
Afghan problem that would permit a withdrawal of
most Soviet forces. If so, the Soviets are likely to stick
with this policy course, which would probably involve:

- More aggressive attempts to eradicate robel bases of support within the country and across the border in Pakistan and Iran.
- Intensive training of Afghan military and political cadres, coupled with a broader campaign to win domestic acceptance of the Najib regime.
- Diplomatic and subversive efforts to weaken outside support for the insurgents (especially in Pakistan) and widen international acceptance of the Marxist regime.

Skillful implementation of such a policy could, in our view, lay the groundwork for the Soviets to remove a substantial part of their forces within two to three years, provided that Pakistan could be convinced to end its support for the rebels—an exceedingly difficult tasi

What Moscow evidently hopes to achieve in Afghanistan,

Subservient and secure as the one in Mongolia. If the Soviets eventually succeed, they will have extended their ability to exercise influence in South and Southwest Asia. For at least the next few years, however,

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Afghanistan is likely to remain a major headache for the Kremlin, whether or not the Soviets withdraw their forces

Turkey

Strategically, Turkey is the most important country in the Middle East from Moscow's perspective. It is the only state in the region that is a NATO member and that grants US forces permanent basing rights. The Turkish armed forces are by far the largest in the Middle East, and Turkey controls the choke point to the Black Sea. A recent Soviet study of the Middle East claims that the United States has given Turkey:

the role of a "barrier," isolating the Soviet Union from territorial contiguity with the countries of the Arab East and from direct access to them, [and] the role of NATO's "guard," controlling the gate leading from the Black to the Mediterranean Sea.

Undermining the Link to Washington. Moscow has' attempted to take advantage of Ankara's dissatisfaction with the level of US support since the 1960s. Turkey's anger over Washington's willingness to bargain away US missiles based on Turkish soil--without consulting Ankara-for the Soviet missiles Khrushchev placed in Cuba in 1962 and over US condemnation of Turkish moves during the crisis in Cyprus in 1964 led to the first warming of Soviet-Turkish relations in the postwar period. Moscow similarly capitalized on the US criticism of Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and the resulting US embargo of arms to Turkey. Turkish-Greek disputes over Cyprus and sovereignty in the Aegean also provide opportunities for the Soviets, but Moscow is constrained from moving too blatantly in using these disputes to woo Turkey away from NATO because of Soviet interests in cultivating Greece.

Soviet concern about Turkey's security ties to the United States has grown since the late 1970s. When Washington and Ankara were renegotiating their Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement in 1979, Krasnaya Zvezda warned that in the event of another war: "Turkey, where a substantial number of

US military installations are located, could undergo the tragedy of Hiroshima.

J

More recently, the Soviets have issued the same type of warning to Turkey in their media over Ankara's alleged desire to participate in research under the US "Strategic Defense Initiative." Moscow also has shown concern over Turkey's potential usefulness to US military efforts in the Middle East. In December 1983 Vasiliy Safronchuk, then chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East Department, criticized the reported establishment of US "Rapid Deployment Force" bases in Turkey during an interview with a Turkish newspaper.

Current Status of Relations. Despite the harsh Soviet criticism of Turkey's security ties to the United States, Moscow—by and large—has succeeded in maintaining a stable, if not always cordial, relationship with the various regimes in Ankara during the past two decades. The height of Soviet-Turkish cooperation came in 1978 with the signing of a "Political Document on Good Neighborly and Friendly Cooperation." The military takeover in Ankara two years later led to a cooling of relations that lasted until 1984



Moscow and the Turkish Straits

The Bosporus Strait, as newed from the Topkapi Palace, Istanb

Control over the Turkish Straits has been an objective of Russian rulers since Tsarist Russia became a Black Sea power in the late 18th century (see figure 8). Even after the Russians won the right from the Ottoman Turks in 1774 to navigate the Black Sea and pass through the Straits, Russia's southern fleet was confined to the Black Sea for all but two brief periods until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1921. Great Britain and France awarded Russia the Straits and Istanbul on paper in a secret treaty in 1915, and the USSR asked for the same in talks with Germany in 1940 to divide up Europe and the Middle East. Stalin made a final bid for control of the Straits at the end of World War II through appeals to his Allied partners for revision of the Montreux Convention of 1936 and, when those failed, through direct pressure on Turkey—also unsuccessfu.


Turkish control of the Straits places restrictions on the movement of Soviet warships in and out of the Black Sea in peacetime and could bottle up Soviet naval and merchant ships in times of tensions or hostilities. The Montreux Convention requires that the Soviets provide the Turks eight days' notice before sending any warship over 10,000 tons through A Sovies merchant ship passes under the Basporus Bridge, just narth of Islanbu

the Straits, and only one may transit at a time. No Soviet aircrast carrier or submarine may transit, except, in the case of the latter, for repairs. Soviet civilian, but not military, aircrast are allowed to oversty the Straits

Despite these restrictions, Moscow has managed to stretch and sometimes circumvent the Convention's provisions. For example, since the late 1960s the Soviets have made it a practice to declare transits of warships, whether or not they intend to use them. This allows them to augment their Mediterranean Flotilla more quickly in times of crisis. Moscow also has consended—and the Turks have accepted—that its Kiev-class aircraft carriers are actually antisubmarine warfare cruisers, thus enabling it to circumvent the ban on carrier transits. The Soviets also have flown military transport aircraft—claiming they were civilian flights—over Turkey to resupply clients in the Middle East and Africa. The Turks have reluctantly allowed such flights on a limited basis, possibly because of concern about Moscow's capability to restrict Turkish flights to Western Europe across Bulgaria.



Figure 8 The Turkish Straits



Societ

\_\_\_\_\_

Former Soviet Premier Tikhonov's December 1984 visit to Ankara—the first by a Soviet leader in almost a decade—put the relationship back on a more cooperative course, although tensions remain. Soviet media commentary on the strictly bilateral aspects of the relationship has been more positive since the Tikhonov visit, as reflected most recently by their favorable coverage of Prime Minister Ozal's July 1986 visit to the USSP

The economic sphere historically has been the most productive area of Soviet-Turkish relations. The focus of Tikhonov's 1984 trip was the signing of a trade agreement for the 1986-90 period that sets a target of \$6 billion in total trade between the two countries. Bilateral trade increased by 20 percent in 1985, according to official Soviet trade statistic.

Moscow has extended Ankara more credits—\$3.4 billion since 1958—than any other non-Communist country. To date, Turkey has drawn only about \$860 million of this amount, but it has used the aid to develop some important sectors of its economy. Soviet assistance has been crucial to construction of the lakenderun iron and steel works (the largest in Turkey), the Seydischir aluminum smelting plant, and an oil refinery in Izmir. The Soviets have approximately 1.500 economic advisers and technicians working at

these and other facilities in Turkey. In February the two sides signed a 25-year natural gas agreement that calls for the USSR to provide Turkey a peak of 4 billion cubic meters annually by 1992. This would equal almost 90 percent of Turkey's natural gas needs and about 5 percent of its energy needs.

Soviet Assers for Subversion. Turkish authorities \_\_\_\_\_ contend that Moscow was behind much of the left-wing terrorism that rowked Turkey in the middle and late 1970s

SSR and its allies are supporting the Kurdish insurgency in eastern Turker

We believe that Moscow maintains contacts with various Turkish leftwing and Kurdish extremist groups and has provided funding and probably some small-arms support through interrediaries

deines tau Fatan had given guerrina Grains to a small group of Turkish Kurds and



also evidence that the Buigarians have in the past smuggled small arms into Turkey, almost certainly with Moscow's acquiescence if not support. Although profitmaking is a motive and many of the arms apparently fall into the hands of rightwing terrorists,

we believe the Soviets hope—at little risk or cost—to

fuel opposition to the Turkish Government.

Soviet support, however, appears to have been relatively low level. Moscow, pursuing its traditional dual-track policy, apparently wants to be in a position to stoke the fires of Turkish internal unrest—which is indigenously generated—without damaging its state-to-state ties to the Turkish Government and provoking a confrontation with a NATO member

The evidence of Soviet support for the Turkish Communist Party (TKP), in contrast to the circumstantial evidence of support for terrorist groups, is unquestionable. The USSR is the prime financial backer of the TKP, which follows the Moscow party line. The party, which has been itlegal in Turkey since 1925, has its headquarters in East Berlin. With Soviet funding and technical assistance, the TKP operates two clandestine radio stations ("Our Radio" and "Voice of the Turkish Communist Party") out of East Germany that broadcast in Turkish to Turkey and Western Europe. The TKP, however, is a bit player in Turkey and has only a tiny following and a minimal ability to influence events there

Continuing the Dual-Track Policy. The long-term nature of Turkish internal unrest, West European criticism of human rights abuses in Turkey, the rivalry between Turkey and Greece, the Cyprus problem, and Turkish doubts about the intensity of the US commitment to Turkey promise to continue to provide the Soviets with openings both to exploit Turkey's weaknesses and to try to woo it away from the Western alliance. With the success the military regime and the subsequent civilian government of Prime Minister Ozal have had in stabilizing the country

since 1980, the Soviets are likely to put more emphasis on improving state-to-state ties and less on subversion during the next five years, unless the internal situation suddenly deteriorates. They will continue to cultivate their clandestine assets, both as a hedge to the future and a reminder to Ankara that they can cause trouble. The Soviets almost certainly recognize, however, that Turkey continues to be a bulwark of NATO on the USSR's southern flank, and they are likely to act with appropriate restrain.

#### Totaling Up the Balance Sheet

This survey of Soviet policy has shown that the USSR's position in the Middle East today is strong in the northern tier and much less strong in the Arab-Israeli theater. Whereas Moscow has the edge over Washington in all of the northern tier except Turkey, the United States retains greater influence than the Soviet Union in most of the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa

Moscow's influence in Syria, as well as in Libya and South Yemen, has not balanced its loss of influence in Egypt. The relationship with Syria—the USSR's most important in the Arab world—ensures Moscow a role in the region's central issue, the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the Soviet position in the Arab-Israeli theater will remain inferior to that of the United States as long as Cairo maintains close ties to Washington, and it seems likely that—barring a major political upheaval in Egypt—those ties will continue to be strong during the rest of the 1980s.

The USSR is recognized as an important actor by most of the Arabs, who value its support for a Palestinian state. The pro-US Arab states also see relations, or at least contacts, with the Soviet Union as a useful tool to ensure that Washington does not take them for granted. For most of the Arabs, however, the USSR's atheistic ideology, aggressive penetration efforts, and invasion of Afghanistan are ample



reason to keep a certain distance. Even in the pro-Soviet states—the PDRY excepted—local Communist parties are either proscribed or thoroughly tamed, and the Soviets have shown <u>little</u> ability to sway the internal political order

In the northern tier, the USSR has been able to exert major political influence only in Afghanistan. Despite decades of trying, the Soviets have had no success in the postwar period in steering political events inside Turkey and Iran. The Communist parties of both countries are illegal and have been—with the exception of the Tudeh in the 1940s—bit players in Turkish and Iranian politics

Military power remains Moscow's strongest card in the region. The military forces the Soviets have deployed in the southern USSR opposite the Middle East, their naval and air operations in the Middle East, their willingness to use force in Afghanistan and deploy their own air defense forces in Syria, and their provision of large amounts of modern weapons to their clients all indicate that the USSR will be a force to be reckoned with in the Middle East for years to come.

Beyond the northern tier, however, the Soviets still cannot match the power-projection capabilities of the United States and its NATO allies, and, in fact, US improvements in this field since the late 1970s threaten to leave Moscow even further behind. The Soviet Union lacks the aircraft carriers or access to regional airbases necessary to operate fighter aircraft beyond the bordering regions of the southern USSR. Without fighter cover, the Soviets would not be able to mount a contested deployment of ground forces to the region or protect their Mediterranean Flotilla and Indian Ocean Squadron from Western carrier-based aircraft. The Soviets are working to remedy these deficiencies by developing full-size aircraft carriers and the capabilities for long-distance air refueling for their fighters. They are likely, however, to have only one of these new carriers by 1990, and they are still years away from perfecting long-distance fighter refueling

Economically, the USSR continues to lag far behind the West, Japan, and now even increasingly active South Korea in the Middle East. For Moscow's clients or countries such as Iraq, which are temporarily strapped for the hard currency to pay for Western goods, Soviet economic aid and bilateral trade are important. Even countries as close to the Soviets as South Yemen and Syria, however, have been dissatisfied with the level and quality of Soviet aid and have been looking to the West and Japan to provide the consumer goods, technology, hard currency, and know-how that the Soviet Union generally lacks. Thus, the gap between Soviet and Western/Japanese/South Korean involvement in the Middle East is likely to widen.

The Soviets still have trouble turning their military strength into commensurate political influence in the Middle East. They remain frozen out of discussions to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. Obtaining a voice in the peace process—which would signify acceptance by the United States and the regional states involved of a major Soviet political role in the Middle East—continues to be one of Moscow's major goals (see appendix B). The USSR's prospects of realizing that goal in the next five years are not good

### Impact of Future Developments

We believe the USSR's primary policy goals in the Middle East during the rest of the 1980s are likely to be:

- · Consolidating control in Afghanistan.
- Blocking any US-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace settlement that leaves Moscow out and, optimally, regaining a Soviet voice in the peace process.
- Unifying the Arabs into a pro-Soviet front by ending the isolation of Moscow's Arab clients: Syria, Libya, and South Yemen.
- Stemming the drift of Algeria and Iraq toward lesser dependence on the USSR and closer ties to the United States.
- Expanding Soviet influence in Moscow's key Middle Eastern targets: Egypt and Iran.
- · Eroding Turkey's security ties to Washington.





We have assessed Moscow's prospects for achieving these tasks and have concluded that in most cases they are not promising. Gorbachev's best chances for success seem to be in preventing a US-sponsored Arab-Israeli settlement, expanding influence in Egypt and Iran, and, possibly, consolidating control in Afghanistan. What remains to be examined are some developments that would have a major impact on Soviet policy in the region—as well as important implications for the United States—and prompt us to alter our assessments.

# Positive Developments From Moscow's Perspective

### Rapprochement Between Syria and Iraq

The Soviets have attempted for years to get Assad and Saddam to bury their differences, but with no success.

ruled out a Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation so long as both Assad and Saddam remain in power. A rapprochement between the two would be likely to strengthen the hardline Arabs vis-a-vis Israel and bolster opposition to a US-sponsored settlement of the Arab-Israeli question. The Soviets, too, would hope that Syria could draw Iraq closer to the USSR, although both Damascus and Baghdad would remain fiercely protective of their independence from Moscow

# Rapprochement Between Syria and Arafat

The Soviets have tried even harder to bring Assad and Arafat together—also to no avail. This development would almost certainly end US hopes of achieving resolution of the Palestinian question without Syrian or Soviet participation. It also would be likely to ensure that neither Jordan nor Egypt dominated the PLO. An Assad-Arafat rapprochement probably would lead to closer Soviet-PLO ties and might facilitate the Soviet proposal for an international conference on the Arab-Israeli question. That proposal stands no chance of going anywhere as long as Syria, Moscow's closest Arab ally, and the PLO, the representative of the people whose future is being negotiated, remain at odds.

### Rapprochement Between Syria and Egypt

A Syrian-Egyptian detente based on anti-Israeli, anti-US policies would give more of a boost to Soviet fortunes in the Middle East than any other single development. Such a reconciliation, although unlikely any time soon, probably would lead to a significant improvement in Soviet ties to Egypt. It would not only end US hopes of achieving a settlement of the Palestinian question without Syrian and Soviet participation but also probably would lead to the unraveling of the Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement and revive thetwo-front threat to Israel

### Replacement of the Mubarak Regime in Egypt With a Neutral Regime

Such a development probably would lead to a sharp reduction or possibly to a cessation of US-Egyptian military cooperation and might result in Egypt's abandonment of the Camp David accords. Either step would be a major windfall for the Soviets, whether or not they were able to replace US influence in Cairo with their own. Moscow would step up its efforts toward that end, possibly offering to settle Egypt's military debt to the USSR on favorable terms and provide Cairo with major new weapon systems. The Soviets probably would encourage Syria and Libya to adopt a positive line toward the new regime in Cairo, hoping this would ease the way to better Soviet-Egyptian relations. If Damascus and Tripoli balked, however, Moscow would not be likely to be deterred from courting the new regime. The benefits from increased Soviet influence in Egypt probably would outweigh, in Soviet eves, the costs of incurring Syrian and Libyan wrat**k** 

### Decision by Pakistan To End Support for Afghan Rebels

This would deal a shattering blow to the rebels. Although the insurgency would be likely to continue for at least a few more years, the Soviets probably could quickly ensure that the rebels would be no more than a nuisance. Moscow would be likely to bring the bulk of its forces home, while leaving a sizable contingent in Afghanistan. Iran probably would sharply curtail its support for the rebels, not wanting to bear the brunt of Soviet wrath alone.





#### Severe Instability in Turkey

Moscow probably would attempt via Bulgaria to resume funneling small arms to Turkish leftists, step up financial and propaganda support, and criticize the Turkish Government's efforts to control such instability and US support for Ankara's efforts. The Soviets, however, would act with prudence to avoid sparking a major US response

#### Developments That Could Have a Mixed Impact on Soviet Interests

#### A New Syrian-Israeli War

This would be a wild card for Moscow. Washington's relations with the Arabs would stand to suffer unless they viewed US pressure on Israel as responsible for ending the fighting. The war would offer the Soviets the opportunity to bolster their stock with Syria and the Arabs as a whole by providing timely military resupply. And, no matter what their actual behavior during the war, the Soviets would move as they have after past wars to restock the Arab military inventory and increase Arab dependence on Soviet weapons. The Syrians might even agree, as they did after their defeat in Lebanon in 1982, to station Soviet combat forces in Syria.

At the same time, a Syrian-Israeli war would entail major risks for the USSR—the most serious being a US-Soviet military confrontation, something Moscow has always sought to avoid. Slightly less serious, but potentially more humiliating, would be a clash between Soviet forces sent to Syria and Israeli forces. The Soviets probably have a healthy respect for Israeli military prowess.

Moscow would also stand to lose if the Arabs perceived Soviet support to be insufficient, as they did in the 1967 and 1982 wars. Quick resupply of arms to the Arabs after the danger had passed rescued the Soviet position in those cases, but there is no guarantee that this strategy would work again. Moreover, there is the risk that, should the United States prove successful in bringing about a cease-fire, the Syrians might come to view cooperation with Washington—as the Egyptians did after the 1973 war—as the best means of obtaining what they want from Israe

# An End to the War Between Iran and Iraq

The Soviets consistently have called for an end to the war, but they would be likely to view its cessation with mixed feelings. On the one hand, they probably would welcome an end to a major and unpredictable war on their border that has already had some favorable repercussions for the United States. A negotiated settlement would:

- Reduce the significance of one of the prime irritants in Soviet-Iranian relations—Moscow's weapon sales to Baghdad.
- Probably make the Persian Gulf states less nervous about Iranian expansionism, decreasing their need and willingness to cooperate militarily with the United States.
- Possibly improve prospects for an Iraqi-Syrian rapprochemen

An end to the war, however, would also carry potential liabilities for the Kremlin:

- We believe Iraq, without as acute a need for Soviet weaponry, would accelerate its diversification of weapon suppliers.
- Iraq probably would further improve its relations with the United States as it looked to rebuild its economy after the war.
- Although a dramatic improvement in Iranian ties to Washington is only a remote possibility, Moscow might worry that the absence of the unifying factor of the war could weaken the present fundamentalist regime and bring in more pragmatic clerics, who might not be as averse to dealing with the United States.
- Iran would have a freer hand to increase aid to Afghan insurgents





toward the West, which has the economic wherewithal to rebuild the war-damaged Iranian economy. A
victorious Iran would undermine Soviet influence in
Baghdad and probably make the Khomeini regime
even less susceptible to Soviet inroads or pressure.
Moreover, the Kremlin would not want to see an antiSoviet Iranian regime, whose Islamic fundamentalism
might potentially attract adherents among the
USSR's own Muslims, spreading its influence beyond
Iranian borders

would have to worry that the new leaders could turn

# A Major Increase in Outside Support for the Afghan Rebels

This would compel the Soviets either to abandon their current strategy of shifting the burden of the fighting to the Afghan military or to risk the Marxist regime's collapse, which we believe they are not prepared to accept. A major expansion of Soviet involvement in the war against the rebels—possibly including increased cross-border raids into Pakistan—would carry significant political and economic costs. Moscow probably would come under heavy criticism from West European, Middle Eastern, and Third World governments. The increased Soviet involvement would especially complicate Soviet relations with China and India, not to mention the further chill it would have on US-Soviet relations

### US-Sponsored Talks Between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation

Although such talks today appear unlikely following the split between King Hussein and PLO leader Arafat, the two leaders could quickly reconcile. US success in working out a settlement of the Palestinian question without Soviet participation would be the most significant blow to Moscow's position in the Middle East since its loss of Egypt. The Kremlin, in our view, would go to great lengths to block the achievement of such a settlement. Soviet efforts would center on backing Syria's moves to intimidate its neighbors against reaching an agreement. Moscow probably would even provide military support for Syrian saber rattling aimed at Jordan or Israel, but the Soviets would advise Damascus against moves

### Negative Developments From the Kremlin's Perspective

### A Marked Expansion of the War Between Iran and Iraq

The greatest risk in this scenario is that a major threat to the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf could prompt US military intervention. Such a move—whether protection for convoys of oil tankers or, in the most extreme case, occupation of Iranian territory—would pose significant difficulties for the Soviets. Beyond the immediate problem of deciding what kind of military response they would have to make, the Soviets would face the longer term prospect of an expanded US military presence in the Persian Gulf region. The conservative Gulf states almost certainly would look to Washington for protection

The Soviets, in our view, also would not want either Iran or Iraq to emerge as a clear victor. Moscow has long preferred a relative balance between the two countries. If either state gained predominance, it would make it more difficult for the USSR to exert influence in the Persian Gulf region. A victorious Saddam would almost certainly be apt to act even more independently of Moscow than he does today. A defeated Iran would look for outside help. It might seek Soviet assistance, but, if the Khomeini regime collapsed as a result of losing the war, the Soviets

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that would provoke a full-scale war with Israel or push Amman toward closer security cooperation with Washington. If these Soviet and Syrian efforts failed to prevent a settlement from being reached, Moscow almost certainly would work to subvert the accord. Even if the accord held together, the Soviets would not be likely to drop their opposition and recognize a US fait accompli during the next five years

#### Death or Ouster of Assad

Soviet-Syrian relations have been close for over 30 years, and Moscow should be able to maintain its influence in Damascus after Assad's departure, provided the Ba'th Party remains in power. Any Syrian regime would have as its top priority the confrontation with Israel, for which Soviet military support is all but indispensible. Assad's successor probably would come from the military and therefore would be all the more likely to value ties to the USSR

Assad, however, has brought 16 years of stability to a country that was previously unstable, and the Soviets would fear that his departure might lead to more instability. Assad's regime is based on the small Alawi minority, which might not be able to continue its dominance without his commanding presence. A contentious struggle for power in Syria or—less likely—the accession to power of a group that is not favorably disposed toward the USSR would seriously jeopardize Moscow's long-term investment in Syria and, thereby, the overall Soviet position in the Middle East

is scarce on whom among the current regime the Soviets regard as their favorite to succeed Assad. They have had long experience, however, dealing with the most likely candidates—Director of Military Intelligence Ali Duba, Chief of Air Force Intelligence Muhammad Khuli, Defense Minister Talas, Chief of Staff Shihabi, and Vice President Khaddam—and probably could adjust quickly to any of them as head of Svria

The one current Syrian leader Moscow probably would not want to see succeed Assad is his brother, Vice President Rif 'at Assad. Soviet officials have often noted their distrust of Rif 'at


Since the late 1970s, he has adopted a thinly veiled anti-Soviet posture, and Moscow is suspicious of his extensive Western contacts

around the same time that the Soviets were pressuring Assad not to allow Rif 'at to assume any significant post because they cannot work with him. At a minimum, Rif 'at's accession to power would add a major degree of uncertainty to the Soviet-Syrian relationship.

#### Death or Ouster of Qadhafi

Moscow's relationship with Libya, more than any other in the Middle East, is dependent on one man. Qadhafi has revolutionized almost every aspect of Libyan Government and society and refashioned them in his own unique style. Without him, the odds would be against this system surviving for long in anything like its current form. Whether the Soviet position in Libya would survive the upheaval likely to follow Qadhafi's departure is an open question. \*\*s Soviet officials have privately acknowledged.

As with Syria, the Soviets almost certainly would not be able to sway a Libyan succession, but the longstanding arms relationship will give whatever regime



A Torrer

that comes to power in Tripoli reason to pause before reorienting its policy away from Moscow. For that reason, the Soviets probably would hope that a military man replaces Qadhafi

The Soviet-Libyan relationship might survive the succession relatively well should Qadhafi's de facto second in command, Major Jallud, assume the reins of power and hold the country together (see inset). The Soviets have dealt with Jallud longer and more extensively than with any other Libyan leader.

he would preter Jallud as a successor.

#### A Major Drop in Soviet Oil Production

The slight increase in Soviet domestic oil production in 1986, which reversed a two-year decline, all but assures that the USSR will not become a net importer of oil during the next five years. The Soviets, however, have already increased their purchases of Middle Eastern oil in recent years (see table 5) and are likely to obtain even larger amounts throughout the rest of the 1980s.

Should the USSR's domestic oil production drop off much more sharply than we anticipate, the Soviets might become major consumers of Middle Eastern oil during the next five years. Such a development would give the Middle East even greater importance for Moscow and put the USSR in competition with the West and Japan for Middle Eastern oil.

12 In most cases, the Soviets accept the oil as payment for arms and resell it to their oil customer

The Soviets would face major problems in coping not only with decreasing hard currency earnings from oil sales—currently about 35 percent of total Soviet annual hard currency earnings—but also in coming up with the countertrade or, as a last resort, hard currency to pay for oil imports. Moscow probably would attempt to increase arms sales to OPEC countries to finance the oil, but those countries can only absorb so many weapons, and their hard currency reserves have dropped markedly since the early 1986 decline in the world price of oil. There are few other commodities the Soviets could offer to trade for the oil, but they might attempt to expand their participation in economic development projects in the Middle East, accepting oil as payment for their services.

The USSR would have added incentive to improve relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia—two of the countries that have the reserve capacity for meeting the oil needs of the Soviets and their East European allies." The Soviets might decide to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward Iran even while Khomeini remained in power, and they would be likely to work harder for normalized relations with Saudi Arabia. This need for oil would not force the Soviets to forgo opportunities to increase their influence in those countries and erode that of the United States. But Moscow would be likely to pursue those opportunities more cautiously while adopting a friendly posture toward the Iranian and Saudi Governments

We do not believe the Soviets' need for oil would prompt them to try to seize Middle Eastern supplies during the next five years. Even if such considerations as the military and economic costs involved in conquering Iran, for example, and the risks of sparking a war with the United States are put aside, the cost of ruling the country would far outweigh that of buying

<sup>44</sup> The Soviet oil production drop would hit Moscow's East European allies especially hard. All but Romania are overwhelmingly dependent on Soviet supplies. Politically, the Soviets could not allow their allies' enonomies to collapse and would have to keep providing some oil.



Table 5

Soviet Purchases of
Middle Eastern Crude Oil, 1980-85 a

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Libya	34	34	119	118	125	96
Iraq	36	0	2	46	77	65
Algeria	0	0	0	0	15	29
Szudi Arabia <sup>a</sup>	0	0	0	21	38	48
[ran	0	45	18	44	25	15
Syria	5	6	14	15	10	9
Oman	0	0	0	0	1	2
Total	75	85	153	244	291	264

Derived from official Soviet trade statistics

\* Saudi Arabia sells crude to the USSR on behalf of Iraq.

the oil. Such a move would be a military-strategic gain, but it could not be justified nor prompted by economic neet

#### Impact of Trends in Overall US-Soviet Relations

We believe the USSR will continue to pursue its longstanding strategic interests in the Middle East regardless of the state of US-Soviet relations. The central position the US-Soviet rivalry holds in Moscow's policy toward the Middle East, however, means that improvement or deterioration of the overall relationship between Moscow and Washington can have major consequences for that policy

#### Improvement

A revival of US-Soviet detente will not necessarily prompt the Kremlin to moderate its behavior in the Middle East because Moscow highly values potential gains in the region for their own sake and sees them as furthering its position in the superpower competition with Washington. Detente did not prevent the Soviets during the October 1973 war from mounting a massive arms resupply effort for their Arab allies and threatening to intervene unilaterally in the closing moment:

The most direct impact a US-Soviet detente is likely to have on Moscow's policy in the Middle East is in prompting the Soviets to intensify their efforts to be included in regional negotiations. The USSR almost certainly would center its efforts on convincing the United States to return to a joint US-Soviet initiative to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, preferably an international conference chaired by Washington and Moscow. To obtain US approval for such a course, the Soviets—under these conditions—might be willing to reestablish relations with Israel and attempt to convince Syria and the PLO to attend such a conference.

In an atmosphere of detente, the Soviets might give greater consideration to the impact their arms sales could have on regional stability. The USSR refrained from giving the Egyptians all they wanted in the early 1970s and might do so again with its current regional arms clients if it believed that the sale of a particular weapons system risked sparking an Arab-Israeli clash that could damage US-Soviet relations and if it believed Washington would act with similar restraint. The Soviets probably would be less worried about US-Soviet tensions over the Middle East than about the effect this might have on other, more important, areas of the bilateral relationship. They would want to avoid, for instance, a repeat of the effect their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had on East-West relations. It tilted the balance in Congress against ratification of the SALT II Treaty and steeled NATO's determination to proceed with the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Western Europ&

Moscow also would be likely to refloat a host of proposals designed to limit superpower arms sales and military deployments in the region—such as the Brezhnev Proposal of 1980 banning military bases in the Persian Gulf region, the plan to limit naval deployments in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, and schemes for nuclear- and chemical-weapons-free zones. Of course, Moscow would design such proposals to have only minimal restrictions on its own military activities, but it might agree to some limitations if an overall agreement hindered US ability to deploy military power in the Middle East





#### Deterioration

Soviet behavior in the Middle East since the decline of detente in the mid-1970s-including the invasion of Afghanistan, deployment of Soviet air defense forces to Syria, sale of increasingly more lethal arms to regional clients, and constant fanning of anti-US and anti-Israeli sentiment among Middle Eastern statesgives an indication of the types of actions Moscow could take if US-Soviet relations deteriorate further. The Soviets, for example, might press harder for Syria, Libya, and South Yemen to grant permanent naval and air bases to Soviet forces. They also might provide those countries and other regional clients with the latest and longest range versions of Soviet weapons complete with all of the most sophisticated electronics they often withhold. In addition, they could urge OPEC states to embargo oil sales to the West and step up aid to insurgents and opposition groups in pro-US countric

Soviet behavior would still be constrained by objective factors, such as the risks of a major Arab-Israeli war, Israel's military superiority, and US advantages over the USSR in deploying forces to most of the region. In a period of deteriorating US-Soviet relations, however, Moscow almost certainly would be more apt to exploit rather than work to control regional crises.





#### Appendix A

### Overview of Soviet Involvement in the Middle East Before 1970

When the history of Soviet and US involvement in the Middle East is compared, it is easy to see why the Soviets often view the Americans as upstarts. The United States has been directly involved in the Middle East for roughly half a century; the USSR and its Russian predecessors for more than a millenium. The first "Russian" involvement in the area occurred in 860, when a Kievan Rus army briefly laid seige to Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, which encompassed much of what is today the Middle East. "Russia" and "Turkey" battled each other many more times over the centuries. From 1676 to 1914, alone, the Russian and Ottoman Empires fought 11 wars. During the same period, the Tsar's also fought three wars with Iran

Beginning in the late 18th century, with the decline of both the Ottoman and Persian realms, Great Britain became Russia's main rival for influence in the Middle East. The Russians and the British, in seeking to expand and protect their empires, vied for predominant influence in Afghanistan, Iran, and the Ottoman Empire, which held nominal sway over the Levant, North Africa, and the western rim of the Arabian peninsula. The growing power of Germany in both Europe and the Middle East prompted Russia and Britain to cooperate in the region during the last decade of Tsarist rule, but the traditional rivalry reemerged after the Bolsheviks took power in 1917.

Despite the Bolsheviks' revolutionary rhetoric about igniting the colonial East against its "imperialist oppressors," the USSR under Lenin and Stalin exerted influence only in the northern tier borderlands. Khrushchev claims in his memoirs that Stalin considered the Arab world a British sphere of influence. Stalin believed that the USSR was too weak militarily in the region to ghallenge British hegemony, and indeed it was

World War II, however, created new opportunities. As the captured German documents from Nazi-Soviet negotiations of November 1940 indicate, Moscow hoped to supplant Great Britain as the predominant power in the Middle East. At the war's end, Stalin used the Soviet Army's occupation of northern Iran to establish "people's republics" in the Kurdish and Azeri regions. He also attempted through direct threats to obtain from Turkey a military base on the Straits and the return to the Soviet Union of two provinces in eastern Turkey that the Bolsheviks had ceded in 1921. Strong resistance by the Iranian and Turkish Governments and by the United States and Britain foiled each attempt and prompted Stalin to return to a conservative strategy in the region:

The most significant legacy of World War II for the Middle East was the weakening of the main colonial powers of the region, Britain and France. This development eventually led to the emergence of independent and strongly nationalistic regimes in the Arab world that distrusted the West and were willing to cooperate with the USSF

#### 1955-67

The Soviets were not ready to take advantage of this opening until 1955. By then Stalin and his ideological aversion to dealing with local nationalists in the Third World were gone, and a confluence of interest had emerged among the USSR, Egypt, and Syria aimed at undermining the alliance system the United States and Britain were establishing in the region—the Baghdad Pact. Egypt's Nasser opposed the pact because he saw it aimed at splitting the Arabs and isolating his regime. The Soviets opposed it as another link in the Western alliance system along their borders and as an impediment to the expansion of their influence in the Arab world. Khrushchev was pragmatic enough to recognize the opportunity and devise



a strategy to capitalize on it. The Soviets developed links to most Arab countries in the mid-1950s, but, as one prominent Western scholar of Soviet Middle Eastern policy wrote, the key to Soviet success in the Middle East after 1955 was not

a "correct Marxist-Leninist appraisal," nor loans or credits, nor very cunning diplomacy. Moscow did not gatecrash; it was invited to become a major Middle Eastern power by Egypt and Syria

The Soviets patiently increased their influence in the Arab world between 1955 and 1967. They were aided by such events as the Anglo-French collaboration with Israel in attacking Egypt in 1956 and the anti-Western backlash this fueled among the Arabs, and the overthrow of the pro-British monarchy in Iraq in 1958, which removed the only Arab country from the Baghdad Pact." The radical new regime in Baghdad appeared for a time to offer the best opportunity to the Soviets for leftist, perhaps even Communist, influence in the region, and Moscow moved quickly to

court the Iraqis-much to the displeasure of Nasser, who considered the Qasim regime a major rival. By the early 1960s, however, it had become clear that Marxist influence would not last in Iraq, and the Soviets accordingly paid more attention to cultivating Egypt and Syria

In the northern tier, the Soviets abandoned Stalin's heavyhanded attempts to expand Moscow's influence and instead developed relatively extensive ties first to the Afghans, then the Turks, and finally to the Iranians. Ankara and Tehran remained closely linked to Washington but were receptive to improving relations with their powerful northern neighbor. The regime in Kabul, ruling a country that was geographically isolated and without links to another great power, was ripe for Soviet cultivation. Afghanistan remained nonaligned but was drawn closer and closer to Moscow

#### 1967-70

The massive defeat the Arabs suffered at the hands of Israel in the June 1967 war prompted them to move much closer to the USSR. The trend was most pronounced in Egypt, where Nasser put aside his earlier reservations about the Soviets and invited them in to rebuild and retrain his armed forces

The Egyptian facilities the Soviets were allowed to use during 1967-72 gave Moscow the widest military access to the Middle East it has ever enjoyed. The

"Walter Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East. (Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1972), p. 2 ¶
"After Iraq's pulloet, the aligned Lagreargenized as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), composed of "rickey, Iran, Pelisian Reference (CENTO). Pakistan, Britain, and the United State





Mediterranean Squadron gained extensive access to Egyptian ports and anchorages, and the Soviets established in Egypt their only naval aviation unit at the time outside the USSR. The unit eventually comprised naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, intelligence collection, and strike aircraft—significantly enhancing Moscow's capabilities to monitor US and NATO forces in the Mediterranear

During 1967-70, the Soviets exerted more influence on Egyptian domestic policy than they ever have, before or since. Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy claims in his memoirs that the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo at the time played "a more influential role in Egypt than even Lord Cromer had during the early years of British Colonial rule." The Soviets looked favorably on the "progressive" changes Nasser implemented, especially the growing influence he gave the ruling Arab Socialist Union, which was led by the staunchly pro-Soviet Ali Sabry. Moscow may have even believed, judging from a study on Egypt by two of the USSR's leading Middle East watchers, that Nasser was gradually moving in his last years toward acceptance of "scientific socialism." Whether or not he was, his death in September 1970 made the question most and marked the beginning of the decline of Soviet influence in the Arab world.



### Appendix B

### Moscow and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process

Soviet officials recognize that the Arab-Israeli conflict has been and is likely to remain the central issue in the Middle East. We believe the Soviets do not view the Arab-Israeli peace process as an end in itself but as a means to enhance their influence in the Middle East, especially at the expense of the United States. Moscow realizes US support for Israel is the major obstacle to improved US-Arab ties and that the Arab-Israeli dispute increases the receptivity of the Arabs to Soviet military and political backing. The Soviets do not necessarily want to solve a problem that has brought them substantial benefits but almost certainly would support a settlement that satisfied their Arab allies and institutionalized a Soviet role in the region.

The Soviet Union has been a participant in the peace process since the creation of the Israeli state and the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. As the USSR expanded its presence in the region from the mid-1950s on, it played increasingly influential roles in negotiating the cease-fires that ended the Arab-Israeli conflicts in 1956, 1967, 1970, and 1973. Despite these efforts, the Soviets have been unable to sustain their influence in the peace process much past the end of each war. When the Arab states that Moscow had armed sought to develop the cease-fires into a genuine political settlement, they turned to the United States because of Washington's leverage with Israel

Moscow's specific diplomatic goal has been to obtain a seat at the Arab-Israeli negotiating table as a coequal of Washington. It achieved this briefly in 1969-70, in December 1973 at the Geneva Conference, and—on paper—in an agreement with the United States in October 1977. Regaining such a role would be an acknowledgment by the United States and the states in the region of the Soviet Union's "legitimate role" in the Middle East. More concretely, it would enhance the Soviets' ability to block any US-sponsored settlement they believed harmful to their interests

The Soviets repeatedly call both publicly and privately for a return to US-Soviet cooperation on the peace process and for a reconvened international conference. Senior Soviet Middle Eastern specialist Primakov's most recent book displays indignation at Washington's "betrayal" of the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1977 to reconvene the Geneva Conference on the Arab-Israeli question. A TASS commentator noted that President Reagan's omission of the Middle East—during an address at the United Nations in October 1985—from his list of regional conflicts that the superpowers could jointly resolve was indicative of Washington's unilateral departure from "the joint Soviet-American accords on a Middle East settlement.

The Soviets have issued numerous Arab-Israeli peace proposals over the years. Their July 1984 plan contains the most detailed elaboration Moscow has issued of the mechanics of an international conference (see inset). The provisions closely follow the Kremlin's plan for the Geneva Conference of December 1973 but



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### 29 July 1984 Soviet Proposal for an Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement \*

The following six "principles" should be negotiated at an international conference:

- Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories seized in 1967 and after; recognition of inviolability of new borders; dismantlement of Israeli settlements established on Arab land after 1967.
- Creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip; a short transition phase during which the United Nations administers the territories is acceptable; the new state has the right to form a confederation.
- Incorporation of East Jerusalem into the new Palestinian state.
- All states in the region guaranteed the right to a secure and independent existence and development.
- An end to the state of war between Israel and the Arab states, and a commitment by all parties to respect each other's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and to resolve disputes peacefully.
- Guarantee of the settlement by the permanent members of the UN Security Council or the Council as a whole. The Soviet Union is ready to participate in such guarantees.

The conference would be attended by Israel, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the PLO, the United States, the USSR, and by "some" other states from the Middle East and from "areas adjoining it" capable of making a "positive contribution."

Boldface points were not in Soviets' previous proposal.
 15 September 1982.

appear aimed at preventing what happened then, when Washington outmaneuvered the Soviets and brokered separate Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Syrian agreements

The views of its Arab allies are a major constraint on the USSR's maneuverability with respect to a peace settlement. Moscow has made some attempts in the past to moderate the positions of its allies:

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ciaims that the Soviets were genuinely trying to influence the Arabs toward agreeing to a peace settlement with Israel in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Indicates that the Soviets tried repeatedly—and unsuccessfully—in 1967 to convince Syria to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242 as a basis for resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute. They were similarly unable to convince Damascus to attend the Geneva Conference in 1973 or support its reconvening in 1977.

Moscow pressed Baghdad hard in the early 1970s to accept UN Resolution 242.

 Senior PLO official Khalil Wazir noted in an interview with a Kuwaiti newspaper in March 1986 that the "Soviet Union has asked us since 1968 to recognize" resolutions 242 and 338

Indicate that the Soviets suggested that PLO recognition of Israel's right to exist would facilitate attainment of Palestinian objectives in the peace process. The Soviets continue to advise the PLO leader to accept resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist according



The USSR, however, has shown it is not willing to press its Arab allies too hard or get too far out in front of them in the peace process. In 1969, for example, Egypt tentatively accepted a UN proposal for indirect negotiations with Israel, and the Soviets informed the United States that this framework might be acceptable to them,

When Nasser subsequently changed his mind, Moscow similarly reversed its position in discussions with US official:

The Soviets, if they obtained a significant role in a peace conference, might again attempt to moderate their allies' positions. We believe, however, that the Soviet Union does not possess the leverage to make Syria and the PLO sign an agreement that did not meet their objectives, and it would not risk damaging bilateral relations—especially with Damascus—by pushing them too hard on the issue

#### The Situation Today

The agreement between Jordan's King Hussein and PLO leader Arafat on 11 February 1985 to form a joint delegation for peace talks once again threatened to leave the USSR on the sidelines of the peace process. The Reagan Plan of September 1982 called for just such a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to enter direct peace talks with Israel. Soviet criticism of the Arafat-Hussein agreement was direct and strong, and Moscow loudly applauded Hussein's abandonment of the agreement in February 1986.

The Kremlin may be encouraged by the wider support its plan for an international conference has received. Now virtually all of the Arabs—save Libya and Iraq—have endorsed the idea, although with widely varying degrees of enthusiasm. Even the United States and Israel have dropped their total opposition to attending some form of international conference at which the USSR is present. The Soviets, however, remain skeptical about Washington's and Tel Aviv's change of heart

Moscow's latest scheme for getting its foot in the door of Arab-Israeli negotiations—via a preparatory conference for the formal international conference—is likely to go the way of past Soviet gambits. The idea.

by Gorbachev July 1986 was given formul public endorsement by Shevardnadze in his speech to the United Nations in September.

the Soviets had no clear ideas on such a preparatory conference

Among Moscow's Arab friends, the Syrians, as usual, have been the coolest toward the scheme. Although Soviet media stated that Shevardnadze and Syrian Foreign Minister Shara' discussed the Soviet proposal for a preparatory conference during their meeting at the United Nations in September, Syrian media made no mention of it. The key stumblingblocks for Damascus remain the participation in any conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute, whether preparatory or not, of Israel and Yasir Arafat's wing of the PLO. The Soviets are no closer to loosening the Syrian knot. Until they do, there will be no international conference along the lines they propose, even if Israel and the United States acquiesce in the Soviet plan

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## Appendix D

## Soviet Ambassadors to Middle Eastern Countries

Country	Ambassador	Assumed Post	Replaced (Assumed Post)
Afghanistan	Pavel Mozhayev	August 1986	Firkyat Tabeyev (1979)
Algeria	Vasiliy Taratutu	April 1983	Vasiliy Rykov (1975)
Bahrain	(no diplomatic relations)		
Egypt	Gennadiy Zhuravlev	September 1986	Aleksandr Belonogov (1984)
Iran	Vil Boldyrev	May 1982	Vladimir Vinogradov (1977)
Iraq	Viktor Minin	March 1982	Anatoliy Barkovskiy (1973)
Israel	(Moscow broke relations in June 1967)		
Jordan	Aleksandr Zinchuk	February 1985	Rafik Nishanov (1978)
Kuwait	(Post vacant since October 1986)		Pogos Akopov (1983)
Lebanon	Vasiliy Kolotusha	May 1986	Aleksandr Soldatov (1974)
Libys	Pogos Akopov	October 1986	Oleg Peresypkin (1984)
Mauritania	Leonid Komogorov	November 1986	Ivan Spitskiy (1981)
Могоссо	Malik Fazylov	December 1983	Yevgeniy Neresesov (1978)
Oman	Aleksandr Zinchuk	May 1986	First ambassador (also ambassador to Jordan; resides in Jordan)
Qatar	(no diplomátic relations)		
Saudi Arabia	(no resident ambassador since mid-1930s)		
Sudan	Yevgeniy Musiyko	October 1983	Vladislav Zhukov (1978)
Syria	Aleksandr Dzasokhov	October 1986	Feliks Fedatov (1984)
Tunisia	Vladimir Sobchenko	November 1986	Vsevolod Kizichenko (1981)
Turkey	Vladimir Lavrov	October 1983	Aleksey Rodionov (1974)
UAE	Feliks Fedotov	October 1986	First ambassador
Yemen, North	Anatoliy Filev	August 1984	Oleg Peresypkin (1980)
Yemen, South	Al'bert Rachkov	July 1986	Vladislav Zhukov (1982)



#### Appendix E

#### Estimated Numbers of Soviet Personnel in the Middle East, 1986

Country	Diplomatic (Not Including Dependents)	Military * (Advisors and Technicians)	Economic (Advisers and Technicians)	Total	
Afghanistan	130	2,000	5,000	7,130	
Algeria	80	800	6,000	6,880	
Bahrain		0	0	0	
Egypt	170	0	200	370	
Iran	40	0	1,400	1,440	
Iraq	50	1,000	5,500	6,550	
Israel b	0	0	. 0	0	
Jordan	20	50	0	70	
Kuwait	40	20	0	60	
Lebanon	40	0	0	40 .	
Libya	50	2,000	5,000	7,050	
Mauritania	20	0	0	20	
Morocco	120	0	175	295	
Oman	0	0	0	0	
Qatar	0	0	0	0	
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	0	
Sudan	20	0	0	20	
Syria	90	3,000	1,000	4,090	
Tunisia	130	0	240	370	
Turkey	150	0	1,500	1,650	
UAE	20	0	10	20	
Yemen, North	150	500	175	825	
Yemen, South	30	1,000	550	1,580	
Total	1,350	10,370	26,750	38,470	-


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	Descripcion	Introduced in Soviet Ferces/ in Syria		Description	Introduced in Sprint Farces, in Syria
Air Defense Systems			Air Defense Systems		
	Long-sange (240-275 km), high-altitule SAM. Primary Spriet strategic defense against US bombery.	F 7	MIG-25 Feather E	Advanced interespiter with improved airborns interespt radat. Has limited expubility to track targets flying below it.	7
	Mobils, low-to-medium altitude, medium-range (24 km) SAM with improved ECCM.	77			
	Mobile, fow-altitude, short-range (12 km) SAM. Used by ground forces and for point defense.	Name of the last o	Creased Forces Systems T-72 MI	Probably the tank NATO has designated the T-72 (bt. 1981/3). Equipped with laser rangefinders and probably thicker fooling armor. May be vulnerable only to the latest and heaviest Western antitank systems.	$\Sigma$ .
34.0	Low-altitude, short range (7 km) SAM. Tracked and pessibly improved version of older wheeled SA-9.	£ 7	 (-0-0-0-	Tactical surface-to-surface missile with effective range of approximately 70 km. Capable of fining nactors, chemical, high explosive, or amproved convernional warbcasts. Synams probably provided with latter two.	53
- <del>-</del>	Improved shoulder-fixed SAM with cooled infrared detector to intercept target head-on.		Electrolist/Electronic Warfare Equipment Cose Disk Hig Cap Pole Horn	Electronic dus link for ground-based air defenset, jam existant. Top-of-the-tlax Soviet electronic warfare equipment, Possibly operated by Soviets.	Li
MG-23 Player G	Tactical fighter, Syrians have latest vession (MED), best in Soviet operational inventory.	7	MI-8 HIP JAK	ECM-equipped helicopter for airborne jamming. Probably manned by Saviets.	Ü
No. Do And on other control line			Note Springs	An antiship cruise missile on mobile leancher for coutai defense with a range of up to 100 km. Assiship cruise missile on mobile leancher for coutai defense with a range of 80 km.	57




Figure 11
Ethnic Groups in Southern Soviet Union and Neighboring Middle Eastern Countries



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Defense Costocil Gertrecker Deput Chief for Altes/Anta (9) conextly Cortout Chemistra: Publishers Gorbanier International Department Debyasie Organi Chief for Niddle EastMorth Africa Figure 13 Organizations. That Formulate of Implement Seriet Policy Toward the Middle East Department 30 Chicoe side drunkping contries Department 10 Department 19 Journal of American 19 Journal of Mark East Kondencies in the Middle East KGB Chehalor Pist Chef Discogne Eguckly Department 8 New, Tentier, Aren't



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